Russia: Other Points of View

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Putin platform. An article in Izvestiya lays out the outlines of Putin’s election platform. And perhaps we have a clue as to why he thinks he must return as President. It’s one of the most concise statements of his desire for gradual reform he has ever given us. “A recurring problem in Russian history has been the elites’ desire to achieve sudden change, a revolution rather than sustained development. Meanwhile, both Russian and global experience demonstrates how harmful these sudden historical jolts can be… This is balanced by a different trend, a diametrically opposed challenge – in the form of a certain inclination to inertia, dependency, the elites’ uncompetitiveness and high levels of corruption.” Perhaps he feels that only he has the political muscle to steer between these twin shoals. He reiterated the long list of achievements since 2000 when many “foresaw one future for Russia: bankruptcy and breakup.” In short, vote for me, you know what I’m doing, you’ve seen what I’ve done. He promises more such pieces. I was also interested to see what I believe to be his first public reference to Khattab – a figure not as well known in the West as he should be.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY REPORT

by Patrick Armstrong

Eurasian Union. Putin has spoken of his desire to form a “Eurasian Union” and this has attracted some attention. This is hardly the first time, though, that he has spoken of such a thing. We already have the Russia-Belarus union, which doesn’t seem to amount to much; the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which is still in its infancy; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation of Russia, four Central Asian countries and China and several partial members which is largely security-based. And, of course, the CIS which is as yet undead.  None of these is especially vibrant. Moscow and Astana have been the prime movers of most of them and they are founded on the remaining common economic/trade and security concerns of the countries involved. Perhaps the Customs Union will be expanded farther; that will depend on how successful it proves to be. There is, therefore, nothing especially new about Putin’s desires. However some things have changed in the 10 to 15 years that these ideas have been floated. The most significant change is that the attraction of the West/European “model” has waned somewhat. The dreams of acceptance, integration and equality that were alive in the 1990s have been replaced with a rather drearier reality. And the reality – unexpected 15 years ago – that Russia is doing best.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY REPORT

by Patrick Armstrong

On and on. The reaction. I’ve been reading a lot of reactions and I believe they can be summarised as follows. To Russophobes it was confirmation of their line that Russia is a dictatorship, always has been and always will be. Russian liberals are disheartened, some to the point of despair. There are the beginnings of mockery and the re-appearance of political jokes. (Here’s bald and hairy). People like myself (I leave the classification to you, Dear Reader)  are also disheartened and see The Decision as a failure of Putin’s imagination and confidence in the political system that he created. Many (probably most, in fact) Russians, however, support his return to the Presidency. And here I see several themes. A common one is that Medvedev was unsuccessful – a few are very condemnatory. They argue that he was unable to move “modernisation” forwards and failed to get much response from the West to his overtures. Another common theme is that Russia faces dangerous or difficult times ahead at home and abroad and that only Putin can be the timoneer. Some argue that with Putin at the top and Medvedev as PM, “modernisation” can be pushed through to the finish. Among these commentators we often see a conviction that stability and predictability take priority over everything else. And maybe that’s the clue. Russia had a pretty miserable time in the Twentieth Century and the Putin years do stand out as much better than anything then. Primum non nocere is engraved on Russian hearts. A quiet life is a lot better than the alternatives that Russia has lived, and died, through.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY REPORT

by Patrick Armstrong

Police reform. The Interior Minister says police who may be exposed to temptations of bribery will have to take regular lie-detector tests. He is pretty pleased with the results of the “combing” process. I think, to put it mildly, he’s over-optimistic. The Investigative Committee says that police officers have been charged with 70 crimes in the last 10 days. And that’s the ones they’ve been charged with. Obviously the teeth on the comb were set too far apart.

Politkovskaya. Perhaps a break-through: a former policeman, Dmitriy Pavlyuchenkov, was arrested and charged with organising her murder. The theory is that he was a contractor and the investigators say they know who ordered her death. The prosecution theory has always been that the man who ordered it is no longer in Russia. Pavlyuchenkov’s name came up early in the case but he seems to have been able to avoid charges and apparently functioned as a sort of secret witness for the prosecution. From the beginning I have believed that she stumbled – perhaps unknowingly – across some piece of information a Chechen “biznesman” didn’t want known. Nothing to do with Putin or the government.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Then and now. The 20^th anniversary of the 1991 coup attempt and its sequella is upon us and I agree with Gorbachev’s comment that the coup planners “were truly idiots, and they destroyed everything. And we proved ourselves to be semi-idiots, myself included.” The 17 March referendum  showed, with important exceptions, that the bulk of the population wanted to remain united. (The results foretold much of the coming fighting and secessions too). But it didn’t happen and there was no small misery in consequence of the breakup. However there is an interesting piece comparing ordinary life in Russia then and now in terms of purchasing power. In essence, despite much remaining poverty (20% or so), per capita income is up about 45% since 20 years ago. 45% is not that much perhaps over two decades, but the growth comes post-Putin after the seemingly unending fall throughout most of the 1990s. No wonder most Russians support Putin/Medvedev. It would be interesting to see a similar calculation in the other 14 former SSRs. In that connection, I leave you with this quotation from Ukraine’s then-PM Kuchma in 1993: “…like everyone else, I believed that Ukraine is so rich that it provided for the entire [Soviet] Union. It turned out that it is, in fact, rich. However, was it really a provider?” I believe many SSRs thought that they put in and the RSFSR took out and the moment Moscow was gone they would be better off. Not true, as they have had opportunity to learn and reflect on.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Election bet. I’ve put mine down: Medvedev will run, Putin will not, there may be a second Team candidate (ie one from United Russia and one from Just Russia).

Putin Q&A. Another session worth reading. He was in Magnitogorsk to open a new cold rolling complex  but, as usual, answered all the questions thrown at him with his customary frankness and mastery of detail. As I have noticed on several occasions lately, he seems to be in a reflective mood and is ready to speak about what he believes he accomplished (stability again: “Who is going to invest in a country that is always shaking like a leaf?”). Several times lately he has been looking back in detail but forward in generalities. Is this a (tiny, I agree) indication that he is contemplating retirement?

Legal activity.  Quite a lot since my last Sitrep. Contractor arrested for swindling the Navy (and, by the way, a rather easily detected swindle). Four people in the North Caucasus arrested as they were preparing a bomb attack on Moscow. Yet another RosAtom executive arrested on charges of embezzlement. Another traffic cop arrested in another “blue light” affair. Three police sentenced for abuse of office. Criminal investigation into a St Petersburg shipyard.  Charges laid in the Bulgaria sinking. Investigation into a “blue light” death re-opened. Extreme nationalist sentenced. Two charged in a laser blinding case (there have been a spate of these lately). A man arrested for a multiple murder. And, in the Magnitskiy case, charges have been laid and the investigation re-opened. That’s what I’ve noticed in three weeks – I wouldn’t say that nothing is being done about corruption and malfeasance.

The New York Times and Washington Post: All the Bias That’s Fit to Print

By Gordon M. Hahn

This week saw the New York Times’ and Washington Post’s continuation of their tradition of allowing only those articles and opeds that paint the worst picture of Russia and–– occluding from the American public the positive changes occurring in Russia under President Dmitrii Medvedev in tandem with former president Vladimir Putin, his Prime Minister. 

First there was the Washington Post oped piece by Lilia Shevtsova, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment's Moscow Center.  She opined that “The rift between Vladi­mir Putin and incumbent Dmitry Medvedev is growing, says a well-known pundit. Medvedev has become a symbol of change, an influential journalist assures us. Quite a few are betting on Medvedev as a pro-Western reformer. This is just what Putin, now prime minister, needs as he prepares for the March 2012 election: Let the world think that a competition is underway in Moscow. Let the world believe that Medvedev has a chance. Let the world hope that Medvedev is a liberal” (Lilia Shevtsova, “Putin's best trick yet,” Washington Post, 22 May 22, 2011). 

PRESERVING INFLUENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD: RUSSIA'S GRAND STRATEGY

REPRINTS

By Andrei P. Tsygankov

San Francisco State University

Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 58, No. 1, March-April, 2011, pp. 28-44.

Abstract

Russia has been creating flexible international coalitions in order to achieve its central objective of becoming an independent center of power and influence.

Russia is never as strong as we fear and never as weak as we hope.

Klemens von Metternich

1. Introduction

From Europe to the Middle East and Asia, scholars and politicians are increasingly recognizing the prominent role of Russia in international affairs. From a weak and inward-looking nation of the 1990s, Russia has emerged into a power that is capable of defending its international prestige using available economic, military, and diplomatic means. It has exploited its energy clout to expand Russian relations abroad and cemented its military presence in the strategic area of the Southern Caucasus by defeating Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia. By mobilizing its soft power, the Kremlin has also contributed to reversing the colored revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. After being seriously hit by the global financial crisis, Russia has quickly recovered as an important international player.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Corruption. A reasonably big fish was hooked yesterday: the head of the CIS anti-organised crime bureau (!), Alexander Bokov, was arrested in Moscow on embezzlement charges. The case seems to be that he extorted a large bribe and then trousered it. A couple of days earlier a case opened in Altay in which several officials were charged with hunting endangered animals two years ago. The former Mayor of Barnaul was charged with what looks to be a privatisation swindle six years ago. Last week the Interior Minister said that “Criminal proceedings were launched against some 10,000 officials, one-third of them were started for taking brides”. The tax Service has opened a 24/7 phone line and e-mail address so that citizens can report corruption examples. This is not nothing; gradually the campaign is starting to bite.

THE THIRD TURN

ROPV CONTRIBUTORS

by Patrick Armstrong

The hypothesis of this essay is that the conventional Western view of post-Communist Russia has passed through two cycles and is entering a third. While the first two were grounded mostly on what observers wished to see, the third is shaping up to be based more on reality.

Little Brother

As Tom Graham wisely observed some years ago: while no one will take seriously a country with a declining GDP, no one can ignore one whose GDP is rising. When the USSR fell apart in 1991, its extraordinarily centralised economy, whose links were now were blocked by new national borders, choked and died. Living standards sank, inflation exploded, the tax base collapsed, state employees went months without pay, factory employees were paid in kind, the social support system failed and the demographic decline that had begun in the Khrushchev period accelerated. All indicators worsened at once. This was the time when “free fall” was a favourite descriptor. A reminder of this period was a piece that appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in 2001, starkly entitled: “Russia is Finished.” Still available on the Net, it makes curious reading today.