As the Arab 'Spring' continues to devolve into an Islamist winter for Moscow and the U.S., both find themselves increasingly on the horns of multiple dilemmas. Russia's dilemma is rooted in its previously forced bet in favor of the Islamic world's Shiite populations over the Sunnis––which has been anchored in Russia’s trading partner and periodic support for Iran, a Shia nation. Unfortunately for the Kremlin, this bet was staked out just as a wave of revolutionary Sunni Islamism/Jihadism was rising across the ummah (Arabic for “nation” or “community,” but not necessarily a common ancestry or geography).
Nowhere is this dilemma better demonstrated than in Syria, where Moscow has been lending diplomatic support to Iran's chief ally, the minority Alawite (Shia) regime of Bashar al-Assad.
A geostrategic calculus also influences Russia’s reticence about the downfall of the Assad regime. Syria has been Russia’s chief ally and weapons buyer in the Middle East for decades––and in addition provides the only warm water port in the region for the Russian Navy. Unfortunately for Moscow, which initially hoped the Syrian crisis could be resolved through negotiations or restabilization, the Assad regime appears to be doomed––and any new regime coming next is likely to seek revenge, especially if it is an Islamist one (which most likely it will be). This means the next leadership could be worse than the former.
Russia's approach to the Middle East is based on a worldview that is fundamentally different from the one shared by the West.
The currently dominant discourse in Russia is that of a culture that incorporates both Western and Eastern influences while preserving its own distinctiveness. As supporters of the so-called "civilizational approach", they insist on protecting Russia's distinct values, and their foreign policy debate is increasingly framed in cultural categories.
The Kremlin has identified two prominent threats to its vision of Russia as a civilization at the intersection of the Western and Islamic worlds. The first of these threats is radicalized and militant Islam. Russian analysts and politicians often speak of special relations with Muslims but differentiate between moderate and radical Islamists. President Vladimir Putin has expressed his respect for traditional Islam, saying that it is integral to Russia's religious, cultural and social fabric. Putin has also made a point of separating moderate Islam from "all forms of religious intolerance and extremism."
By Gordon M. Hahn, Senior
Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies
IIPER’S DATA ON THE CE ATTACKS
AND JIHADI-RELATED VIOLENCE IN RUSSIA
DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 2012
* IIPER is
written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted. Research assistance is provided by
Anna Nevo, Casey Mahoney, Daniel Painter,
Elizabeth Wolcott, Jerry Davydov, Kevin Butts, Michelle Enriquez, Olga Volcsko,
and Stephanie Barko. IIPER accepts outside submissions.
The
recent spate of spats between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister
Dmitri Medvedev again raises questions about the political relationship between
the members of Russia’s ruling tandem. On September 25, Putin reprimanded the
government for failure to produce a viable budget and three government
ministers for failure to carry out his presidential orders. The criticism was seen as a slap in
Medvedev’s face.
In the next days
Medvedev seemed to hit back.
Speaking at a business forum in Sochi, Medvedev referred to a 2008
incident when then prime minister Putin promised to “send a doctor and a
prosecutor” to the billionaire owner of steel and coal producer Mechel who
failed to attend an industry meeting with Putin because of illness. At the time, Medvedev called for
officials to stop “scaring businessmen.”
Medvedev now revived the disagreement, saying: “I think that in modern
Russia, if we talk about business, unequivocal orders are being made in
different ways, let's say, in proposals to send a doctor in for a cure. Russian
business knows what I mean ... I wish we (would) start learning to live in a
different way.”
Russia Inc. Some reported numbers for the first half of the year. The Finance
Ministry reports
that the federal budget is running a surplus of about US$8 billion. GDP is up 4.4% and
industrial production by 3.2%. By
today’s standards, these aren’t bad numbers. Population is reported to have grown by about 85,000
since the beginning of the year although it was immigration that made it into growth:
despite improvements, natural increase is still negative. However
births are growing faster than deaths. A VTsIOM poll finds that Russians
say they are paying
more attention to their health.
Popularity. I’m a little
mystified by this report that a Levada poll finds a
significant drop in Putin’s rating since the election. The Levada
site (Google
translation) doesn’t show any such thing: if anything his rating has
squeaked up a bit. (Mind you the first is referring to an August poll while the
site is still in July: but that quick a drop seems improbable). The opinion of
whether Russia is going forwards or into a dead end is not much changed either.
So as far as I can see Levada data doesn’t show any particular trend this year.
However, taking it from August 1999, we do see a downward trend for both Putin
and Medvedev but an upward trend in how the country is doing. Putin’s slippage
from the heights began gently around the autumn of 2008 but the “index”
(approve minus disapprove) only went below 50 at the end of 2010 and he’s still
67:32. (otherpoliticianscan,
of course, only dream of such numbers). Does this mean anything? Perhaps
Russians are getting tired of him (slowly); perhaps they are becoming more
healthily sceptical about their leaders; perhaps Russia’s economic performance,
which while good by today’s standards is less than it used to be, is affecting
them. I still think that Putin’s decision to return was a mistake. We will see.
Syria et al. Whenever something horrible happens in the world that Western governments and media outlets actually notice, we find two different reactions from Moscow and Washington. Moscow confines itself to anodyne statements about constitutional agreement, peace and so forth – admirable sentiments which do nothing. Washington, on the other hand, feels it has to pick a side and blame those that don’t. US media outlets either create this judgement or follow along (which comes first?). Washington then accuses Moscow (and others) of preventing it “doing something”; the media picks up this line and fills up with stories (many of which don’t prove to be true: this one again, for example). When the crisis ends, interest and coverage do too. The collective memory is wiped clean and attention moves to the next CNN crisis. Since the end of the Cold War I recall four of these “humanitarian interventions” that exemplify this pattern. No one today ever mentions Somalia (1992) or Haiti (1994); the first being an utter disaster and the second ineffective. As to Kosovo (1999) we never heard about the KLA and organ harvesting at the time or much else about the people NATO put into power today; as to Libya (2011) mention of gunmen fighting it out or knock-on effects in Chad or Mali stays far in the back pages. The reality is that these “humanitarian interventions” aren’t such big successes that anyone should lightly proceed to the next one. So, if Putin “lectured” Obama, whose knowledge of the worldisabitshaky, I have some sympathy with him. Their bland joint statement here.
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