Russia: Other Points of View

WHY PUTIN WILL NOT RETURN TO THE PRESIDENCY….NOT IN 2012 ANYWAY

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn 

As Vladmir Putin’s presidency was coming to an end, the Washington indeed Western consensus was that Putin would seek a way to remain president, despite the Russian constitution’s limit on no more than two consecutive presidential terms. 

Invoking Putin’s and the Russians’ native khitrost’ or cleverness, experts exclaimed far and wide that rather than simply ignore the constitution’s two-term limit, Putin would force through constitutional amendments or laws that would allow him to remain in the Kremlin.  He also might leave temporarily appointing a puppet as an interim placeholder so technically he would not violate the limit on no more than two consecutive terms.  Even if Putin decided to forego the presidency, experts explained, he would anoint a hardline successor from the FSB, someone like Sergei Ivanov, to continue Russia’s inevitable turn away from democracy and foreign relations with the west.  Instead, Putin left the Kremlin and backed Dmitrii Medvedev, the most liberal high ranking figure in his administration, as his choice for president.

US-RUSSIA RELATIONS

REPRINTS

U.S. - Russia Relations in Pre-Summit Flux

This report is republished with express permission of STRATFOR http://www.stratfor.com

Just days before the NATO summit in Lisbon in which Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama will meet, Medvedev has postponed his annual State of the State address from Nov. 22 to Nov. 30 to account for a possible shift in U.S.-Russian relations, according to STRATFOR sources in Moscow.

Over the past six months, Moscow and Washington had set many of their disagreements aside to achieve more critical goals. Russia wanted aid on its modernization and privatization programs, a cessation of Western support for Georgia and Ukraine, and a freeze on ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in Russia’s periphery. The United States wanted Russia to sign onto sanctions against Iran and to drop support for Tehran, as well as provide increased logistical support for the war in Afghanistan. On all these issues, there was some sort of common ground found, meaning that Moscow and Washington seemed to have struck a temporary detente.

THE THIRD TURN

ROPV CONTRIBUTORS

by Patrick Armstrong

The hypothesis of this essay is that the conventional Western view of post-Communist Russia has passed through two cycles and is entering a third. While the first two were grounded mostly on what observers wished to see, the third is shaping up to be based more on reality.

Little Brother

As Tom Graham wisely observed some years ago: while no one will take seriously a country with a declining GDP, no one can ignore one whose GDP is rising. When the USSR fell apart in 1991, its extraordinarily centralised economy, whose links were now were blocked by new national borders, choked and died. Living standards sank, inflation exploded, the tax base collapsed, state employees went months without pay, factory employees were paid in kind, the social support system failed and the demographic decline that had begun in the Khrushchev period accelerated. All indicators worsened at once. This was the time when “free fall” was a favourite descriptor. A reminder of this period was a piece that appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in 2001, starkly entitled: “Russia is Finished.” Still available on the Net, it makes curious reading today.

A MASS PRIVATIZATION PLANNED

REPRINTS

www.stratfor.com

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin approved a plan to privatize approximately 240 state companies in 2010 alone. It is part of a larger plan in which thousands of state firms will be privatized over a three-year period. There are economic and political reasons for the privatization, but the most important reason is that it supports a geopolitical imperative for Moscow.

THE TALE OF TWO PRESIDENTS

ROPV CONTRIBUTORS

The tale of two presidents: a man for the country or a country for the man?

By Eugene Ivanov

A few weeks ago, the good old science of Kremlinology got a delightful gift.   At a meeting with members of the Valdai Club, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told the audience that in 2012, he and President Dmitri Medvedev will sit together and decide which of the two will run for presidency.  The interpretation of Putin’s words by Western pundits and the media was swift and unambiguous, if somewhat expandable.  They concluded that Putin is going to return to his old Kremlin office and possibly stay there until 2024.  

Before trying to infer what Putin actually meant to say, it’s worth pointing out that forecasting his future has always been a dubious job.  For example, a prominent Russia expert predicted, in January 2005, that “Putin will be out of office in the near future.”  Yet in the fall of 2007, the same expert opined that Putin will remain in power indefinitely by "possibly following declaration of a national military emergency."  Needless to say, neither forecast has come even close to getting materialized. 

It turns out that the much better predictor of what Putin will or will not do has been his own words.  Whatever one might think about the Russian strongman, lying for the sake of political expediency is not in his character (a feature pointed to by many world leaders, including President George W. Bush).  During his presidency, Putin has always maintained that he was not going to change the Constitution in order to run for a third term.  At the same time, he repeatedly indicated his desire to endorse, sometime in 2007, a “successor.”  This is exactly what happened in reality: in December 2007, Putin threw his weight behind Dmitri Medvedev who was nominated shortly before that by United Russia and other political parties. 

EU REPORT ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA

REPORTS

Russia: Other Points of View (ROVP) has followed the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia since its first hours. The New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal maintained a facade obscuring the truth about which country invaded.  Apparently to get to the truth of the situation, the Europeans made a first-ever decision to do a thorough investigation of events of the invasion and the culmination of the 'five-day' war.  The long-awaited EU Report was finally released on September 30, after having been held up since July, most likely since its analysis didn't reflect major stockholders' interests.  In any case, the full EU Report can be studied here Download EU Report on Conflict in Georgia

Additional articles:

- War report wounds isolated Georgian leader

- Georgia/Russia: how our political discourse works

- What do you do when your ally is the aggressor?

- Russia and Georgia both hail report on war

VISIT TO UKRAINE BY PATRIARCH OF THE RUSSIA ORTHODOX CHURCHChurch

COMMENTARY

Comment on Sophia Kishkovsky, “Kirill's Visit Exposes Dangers in Moscow-Kiev Ties,” New York Times, August 7, 2009 

By Gordon M. Hahn

Russian Media Watch (RMW) would like to comment briefly on a recent article published in the New York Times on the visit to Ukraine by Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill I.  

To be sure, the article is not the most egregious example of the U.S. mainstream media's bias against Russia, especially as compared to the lack of criticism of far worse regimes such as China, Cuba, North Korea, Africa, and the Muslim world. However, the article tips its hand in the headline which warns against the “dangers” of “Moscow-Kiev Ties,” implying that it would be better if the countries of these two culturally, linguistically, and historically fraternal peoples had few if any ties. 

In addition, the article managed to address almost all of the issues complicating Russian-Ukrainian relations – the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimea, inter-church relations, and the interpretation of the late 1920s Soviet famine in Ukraine.  These issues have been discussed in several other reviews and articles here at ROPV and do not need repeating here. 

Most important, however, is the glaring omission of the issue that is really dividing Russia and Ukraine as well as creating divisions within Ukraine itself between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians, putting the country’s interethnic comity and territorial integrity at risk; that issue is NATO expansion. 

GEORGIA'S MURKY MOTIVES

REPRINTS

By Uwe Klussmann, Der Spiegel, March 23, 2009 

An EU enquiry investigating the events of last summer's conflict between Russia and Georgia is shining an unfavorable light on Mikheil Saakashvili. A secret document may prove that the Georgian president had planned a war of aggression in South Ossetia.

Mamuka Kurashvili, the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping forces that had been stationed in South Ossetia before last summer's war, is no expert on the fine points of international law. But when the stout general, wearing a uniform festooned with medals, appeared before the television cameras of his native Georgia on Aug. 7, 2008, he proved to be surprisingly well-versed in the legal justification for the attack on the province, which had declared its independence from Georgia in the early 1990s.

Georgia, Kurashvili told the press, had decided "to reestablish constitutional order in the entire region." The general's words came at the beginning of a five-day war between Russia and Georgia, which quickly escalated into the most dangerous confrontation between East and West since the end of the Cold War. The conflict suddenly demonstrated to Europeans that an armed conflict with Russia on their own continent was no longer inconceivable.

Ukraine Late for NATO

reprinted from Kommersant.com, November 26, 2008

The first U.S. official acknowledges that Ukraine won't get MAP at the summit of NATO foreign ministers slated for December 2 and 3, 2008.

More Signs of a Possible Thaw Under Medvedev

by GORDON HAHN, PhD

Shortly after his inauguration, Medvedev met with the oppositional chairman of Russian Union of Journalists (RUJ), the democratic opponent of Putin's creation, the Media Union. According to the chairman, Medvedev agreed to protect the media so it could cover corruption with greater freedom.