Russia: Other Points of View

REPRESSION OF JOURNALISM IN RUSSIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

COMMENTARY

By Gordon Hahn

American mainstream media produces an inordinately large number of articles highlighting the murders of journalists in Russia.  These articles are in part motivated by, and often include data from the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) which does important work on documenting murders, beatings, and imprisonments of journalists across the world.  However, the use of CPJ’s raw data can sometimes be misleading.  For example, their list of the 20 ‘deadliest countries’ for journalists does not take into account that many of the countries on the list have few independent journalists to be killed and many off the list who have none – and this is why they do not appear on the list. 

Journalistic and analytical articles usually cite the raw figure for the number of killings per country for one year or several, but these data are never put in context.  For example, the size of the population and the number of journalists influences the likelihood of such violence.  The larger the population and the number of journalists in a given country, should increase the likelihood and occurrence of such events.  The more molecules or atoms in a given space, the more often they will collide if in motion.  Similarly the greater the population the more journalists there are likely to be, the more corrupt bureaucrats and businesses to be investigated, more crimes to be exposed and so on.  All this increases the likelihood that someone under investigation by a journalist will use force or use their connections with the state apparatus to shut down investigating journalist’s activities.  Below, Russia Media Watch takes a first step towards incorporating other factors into the calculus by bringing in population size. 

A better methodology would also factor in the number of journalists in each country; unfortunately, reliable data for all countries is unavailable.  It would also be good to factor in the population in the years each journalist was killed and produce an average population over the period 1992 through July 2009, the date for which the population figures are relevant.  Regardless of the limits of bringing in the single new factor of country population in order to put the CPJ’s raw data in better context of population, it is more useful to consider this factor than not to.  The results of this factor’s inclusion are included in the tables below.

Russia in Global Comparative Perspective

Simply using the number of killings leaves Russia, with 52 killings since 1992, appearing as one of the world’s worst violators of journalists’ rights and free speech with the fourth highest volume of murdered journalists. When one introduces the country population factor into the CPJ’s list of the “20 Deadliest Countries” for journalists, a rather different picture of Russia appears.  Russia moves from the position of fourth highest volume of murdered journalists to fourteenth in the top twenty on the CPJ list as of December 2009 (see Table 1).  

TABLE 1. CPJ Ranking and Number of Journalists Killed since 1992 for Countries Listed in CPJ’s “20 Deadliest Countries” List Compared with Journalists’ Murdered Per Capita for the Population of the Countries Listed on CPJ’s “20 Deadliest Countries” List with an Adjusted Rank.

A comparison of the CPJ ranking and the per capita rank shows just how much a difference this contextual factor makes.  The rating of democratic but very populous country like India highlights the skewed effect of ignoring the population variable.  Its ranking under the per capita method becomes more commensurate with its relative political comity and respectable record of protecting civil rights.  It also should be noted that some countries that were not included in the top twenty that used CPJ’s simple counting method, would likely surpass India and even Russia among others on the list, if the per capita method were used; Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Latvia among them (see below).  Furthermore, there are numerous other intervening variables.  For example, the entire CPJ ‘20 Deadliest Countries’ list is composed of countries where there has been some significant level of press freedom along with war, most often jihadist insurgencies, or major criminal drug cartel violence.

Comparison with other Post-Soviet States

Simply using the number of killings leaves Russia, with the highest number of journalists killed among the post-Soviet states since 1992, tainting Moscow as the worst violator of journalists’ rights and free speech in the region.  However, when the per capita method is used, Russia emerges as an average post-Soviet country (see Table 2).  The worst violators become Tajikistan,Georgia, Azerbaijan. These three countries as well as democratic and NATO member Latvia turn out to have more journalists murdered since 1992 per capita than Russia.

TABLE 2. Number of Journalists Killed Since 1992 in former USSR by Country Listed in Order of Highest Number of Killings Per Capita Population (CPJ Number of Killings since 1992 in brackets if any, CPJ Ranking in List of “20 Deadliest Countries” if any in parentheses)

The Imprisonment of Journalists in Russia in Comparative Perspective 

The murder of journalists is actually more prevalent in less authoritarian and weak democratic regimes.  More authoritarian and totalitarian regimes arrest them before they can get very far in their investigations.  Such regimes have tight control over their allies in government and business, usually state-owned or state-controlled and the ruling party’s, clique’s, or junta’s penetration of society is so deep that dissident journalists are uncovered and arrested before they can challnge a protected state elite or economic interest.  This becomes clear when one looks at the CPJ’s list of countries in which journalists are imporisoned and the number imprisoned in each (see the CPJ’s table 3 below).  The top three oppressors are neo-tatalitarian China, Iran, and  Cuba. 

TABLE 3. CPSJ's List of Imprisoned Journalists for 2009

Russia’s lone imprisoned journalist wound find himself in prison in most countries around the world.  Even in some democratic countries he would be judged as having violated the law by calling for the overthrow of the constitutional order and cooperating with terrorists.  Boris Stomakhin, imprisoned in march 2006, wrote numerous articles supporting the Chechen separatists and Caucasus jihadists on their site www.kavkazcenter.com.  These jihadists, now calling themselves the Caucasus Emirate, have killed and wounded some six thousand people since the end of the second Chechen conventional war in 2002.  

Russian authorities convicted him for the following words: “Let tens of new Chechen snipers take their positions in the mountain ridges and the city ruins and let hundreds, thousands of aggressors fall under righteous bullets! No mercy! Death to the Russian occupiers! ... The Chechens have the full moral right to bomb everything they want in Russia.” (Database on Imprisoned Journalists, CPJ, www.cpj.org/imprisoned/2009.php, accessed December 14, 2009.) 

To conclude, the raw numbers, shorn of context and analysis of intervening variables provide an exceedingly misleading snapshot of the comparative strength or weakness of any particular state’s repression of terrorists.  The raw numbers are often used by the U.S. mainstream media to convey to American readers that Russia is among a handful of grevious violators of journalists’ rights and freedom of speech.  Although that record is not particularly good, it is not nearly as bad as the U.S. mainstream media or the raw numbers would lead one to believe. 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Medvedev Speech. Last week Medvedev gave the annual Presidential address to Parliament. (Russ) (Eng). The principle theme was “modernisation”: “Today we are talking about modernisation – this is the essential aspect of my Address today – about our desire to be modern.” His definition: “A truly modern society is the one that seeks constant renewal, continuous evolutionary transformation of social practices, democratic institutions, visions of the future, assessments of the present, the one engaged in gradual but irreversible changes in technological, economic and cultural spheres, the steady improvement of the quality of life.” He understands that this involves a major psychic change: “Instead of an archaic society in which the leaders think and decide for everyone we will become a society of clever, free and responsible people” and “we ourselves will change too”. These speeches are made annually (the Constitution requires them, Art 84.f) and I am interested that, for practically the first time, the Kommentariat appears to have actually read the speech rather than skimmed it looking for some phrase it can twist into a threat. But old blinders are still on as many commentators spun it as a criticism of Putin, because they never bothered to read Putin’s speeches. Here from Putin’s speech in 2004 (the first I looked at): “We want high living standards and a safe, free and comfortable life. We want a mature democracy and a developed civil society… We are interested in further integration of the Russian economy into the international economy.” What many people cannot imagine is that this is a long-term project carried out by a team. Putin stabilised things; Medvedev is to modernise things. But it’s the same project. The doing of it, is, of course, the problem. It will be neither easy nor short. Nor entirely successful.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Election fraud. Two opinion polls, both by Levada, give us data on how people say they voted in the elections last month. A poll of Muscovites (JRL/201/4) gives 46.1% for United Russia (official numbers 66.25%), 27.1% for the communists (13.3%), 11.8% for LDPR (6.13%), 7.9% for Just Russia (5.33%) and 3.7% for Yabloko (4.71%). A nation-wide poll asking the same question gives United Russia 47%, communists 13%, Just Russia 8%, LDPR 7% and Yabloko 2%. When the Yabloko leader said his vote hadn’t been counted at all, a recount was ordered and, lo! it was found that some Yabloko votes had “accidently” been miscounted. But these numbers do not give us a clear picture. Levada tells us that Muscovites voted communist at twice the rate of the nation; this seems improbable. Levada also tells us that fewer people voted for Yabloko than the official numbers give; this too seems improbable if the scenario were to inflate United Russia’s numbers and deflate the others. So, as always, an examination of the data we have deepens the mystery. The Yabloko leader has described what his people told him and it appears that fake voters was the preferred method. Medvedev met with the head of the CEC and said “All types of claims must be investigated thoroughly”. Well, we’ll see. These numbers make a prima facie cause for fraud favouring the pedestal party but leave us in the dark as to what degree of fraud there was.

THE WASHINGTON POST's RAMPAGE ON OBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH

COMMENTARY

By Gordon Hahn 

Washington Post's October 3 editorial sunk below the paper's already dismal record of partisanship and Russophobia, by falsifying the causality and conduct of the August 2008 Georgian-Russian Five-Day War.  In this particular editorial the WP built its grossly one-sided narrative using not just its traditional practice of negligent and intentional omissions, unsupported and unsupportable claims, and inaccuracies,  but also downright lies. Let's take each in turn. 

The editorial's first charge against Russia is that it had been "overtly preparing for war for months before its troops began their rampage." Of course, the fact that any nation prepares for war does not mean it wants war.  In fact, quite often the contrary is the case: states prepare for war to deter it.  Deterrence is most likely to be the purpose, if war preparations are undertaken "overtly" as Russia's were, and as the WP itself acknowledges. The WP editorial omits that Saakashvili had been planning for war in secret, according to several Rose revolutionaries and former allies of Georgian President Saakashvili, including a former parliament speaker and a former defense minister. Indeed, according to the latter, who participated in Georgia's war planning, Saakashvili had been developing war plans to forcibly reintegrate both South Ossetia and Abkhazia not for months, but for years.  It is likely that Russian secret services were well aware of Saakashvili's plans, and the Kremlin planned accordingly.  Naturally, the WP leaves out these inconvenient truths, for they would spoil the WP's Russophobic narrative of Russia's eternal, all-encompassing blame for every problem facing the post-Soviet and post-communist states.  The fact is that the five-day Georgia-provoked war was the tragic consequence of the messy Soviet state construction and collapse compounded by leadership lapses in Tbilisi, Tskhinvali, Washington, Moscow, Brussels and Strasbourg. 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Ukraine. On the 11^th Medvedev sent a sort of open letter to Ukrainian President Yushchenko complaining about relations and enumerating Russia’s complaints (for the majority of which Yushchenko would be most responsible). Reactions are  appearing: some mocking, some thoughtful. I don’t understand the point of this. Yushchenko will not be the next President of Ukraine and whoever replaces him will have a more reasonable relationship with Russia. According to Gallup, approval of their government by Ukrainians is “the lowest in the world”. Surely the best thing for Moscow to do, if it wants a Ukrainian government interested in more than the “colour revolution package” of irritating Moscow and joining NATO, is to keep its mouth shut and wait for the Ukrainian people themselves to toss Yushchenko out. They need no encouragement from Medvedev: the “Orange Revolution” was based on false premises. As to the Ukrainian arms deliveries to Georgia (and I’d still like to know who paid for them), that’s percolating away in the background in Ukraine and needs no help from Medvedev either. It will likely re-surface with the new President in January, whether Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. So, altogether unnecessary, silly and rather whiney.

Economy. Some numbers aren’t as bad as previously. Unemployment is reported to have slightly declined (from 6.7 million to 6.3 million or 8.3% of the economically active population).  GDP is reported to have grown 7.5% in the 2^nd quarter over the 1^st (but, year-on-year, is down 10.9%). Has it bottomed out?

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Putin popularity. At last, there is a reasonably intelligent piece on Putin’s popularity. But, while it makes the important point strongly, it is still has some of the clichés that clutter up Western reporting. The important point is that Putin’s popularity has held up despite the fall in oil prices. However, it is a cliché that his popularity suffered with the Kursk sinking (presumably the feeling is that Western leader would in a similar case), the piece claims a “significant drop”, but the chart shows only about one point lost and soon regained. Someone is quoted dragging out the hoariest cliché of all: Russians’ alleged “lasting desire for strongman leadership.” No, it’s much simpler than that. Compare Russia’s prospects in 1999 with today’s. Russians give Putin’s team credit for the improvement across the board: higher standard of living, greater stability and cohesion, increased position in the world and all the rest. There’s nothing mysteriously Russian about it: people like effective leaders everywhere. Another point to reflect on is that many observers assume that they can measure political freedom by the level of opposition they perceive. They see opposition in Georgia or Ukraine, but little in Russia. But, as the piece shows, since 2000 about seven out of ten Russians have approved of Putin; an observer will have to look much harder there to find an opponent than in the other two countries where the government structure is much less popular. There it’s easy to find opponents of the government: in Ukraine more than nine out of ten disapprove the government and in Georgia - eight out of ten. And, I suspect, they are much more passionate about their disapproval.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Respect and influence. Two centuries ago John Jay wrote: “If they [foreign powers] see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.” True then and true now. A Medvedev interview touches on many of these points: “Just as our foreign policy has a direct impact on living standards here at home, so does our success at home have a direct impact on how others perceive us.” He knows Russia has some distance to go: “So long as others see Russia as a country with an unacceptably high level of corruption we will be treated accordingly.” If you want to know what the Russians think about things, read what they say; not what other people want you to think they said.

THE NORTH CAUCASUS

COMMENTARY

The North Caucasus: Through Mainstream Media's Distorted Lens 

by Gordon Hahn

The U.S. and Western mainstream print media – the New York Times (NYT), Washington Post (WP), Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Economist and Newsweek – continued their grossly one-sided presentation of what is happening in Russia’s jihadi-plagued North Caucasus.  This time it came in their coverage of the murder of the courageous Russian journalist Natalya Estemirova.  It is only when such incidents occur that the North Caucasus jihad makes even the most brief blip on the mainstream media’s radar screen. 

The following paragraph from the WP catches the flavor of the mainstream media’s entire take on the North Caucasus: “(Estemirova) was a meticulous researcher, but she was also fierce in her determination not to submit to the fiction, so ardently purveyed by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his circle, that Chechnya is quiet and that the problem there has been solved. It has not. House burnings have become a frequent form of collective punishment by local authorities, with at least two dozen incidents in the past year and a half. Suspected militants and collaborators, their relatives and any other perceived enemy of the regime can be tortured, abducted and assassinated” (Tanya Lokshina, “Another Voice Silenced in Russia,” Washington Post, July 17, 2009). 

FREEDOM OF PRESS IN RUSSIA

Russia's Free Press Hoax

by William Dunkerley

A recent New York Times editorial (February 12) claims that Vladimir Putin stifled Russia’s free press. That’s not the first time this accusation has been leveled. Last year, the International Herald Tribune ran the headline, “Kasparov: Putin killed Russia free press.” The Toronto Star wrote, “Free press under siege in Russia.” Right on theme, Reporters Without Borders earlier proclaimed, “...independent press has all but disappeared in Russia.” 

What’s the hoax here? It’s the idea that there was actually a free press to stifle or kill. In reality, there was none.

ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR THE MARKELOV MURDER: Going Beyond the Mainstream Media’s Agenda

By Gordon M. Hahn

On January 19, civil rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and Novaya gazeta journalist Anastasia Buburova were gunned down in broad daylight in the center of Moscow.  Mr. Markelov leaves behind two children two-years and four-years old.  Ms. Buburova does not appear to have been a target; she may just have been in the wrong place at the wrong time.

It was expected that U.S. mainstream media will use this tragedy for political purposes, to blame Russian leadership for these murders without considering the evidence or the alternative scenarios.