Russia: Other Points of View

RUSSIA'S OLIGARCHS

REPRINTS

Putin's oligarch killer

Asia Times, Mar 2, 2012

By John Helmer

MOSCOW - When the archaeologists of the next millennium excavate, they will find the evidence of a tectonic shift and turning-point in Russian history that took place in the two months between December 28 and February 25.

That's from the day Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed government order number VP-P13-9308, and instructed Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin to supervise compliance; to the day when lawyer and prominent blogger Alexei Navalny listed the most powerful oligarchs in the country (Switzerland too) as the target of the political opposition - after Putin wins the presidential election.

Navalny's speech at last Saturday's St Petersburg rally marks the first time the oligarch system, and the oligarchs as individuals rather than Putin, have been made the public focus of the opposition movements. Navalny himself named the lines of business to identify the individuals, though he didn't name names.

Putin's order predates Navalny's, and it has taken time for the political opposition to understand it - if implemented, it marks the beginning of the end of the oligarch system that has dominated Russia since the collapse of the communist system. Just how significant this is may not require a glacial span of time to uncover. But if it is happening, Putin has already beaten the opposition to their own game. That is, if opposition to the oligarchs was the opposition's game.

THE PUTIN-MEDVEDEV TANDEM and FOREIGN POLICY DISFUNCTION

REPRINTS

by Vlad Sobell

Independent analyst, London

Contribution to the Frolov Panel, Russia Profile

I have always believed that the “tandem” is not an optimal arrangement – for reasons that seem obvious to me. To be credible, a leader of a country must possess – and be seen to possess – the ultimate and unambiguous responsibility for key state functions. Even where competences are not always precisely defined (as is the case in Russia, where the constitution does provide for a powerful prime minister), there must be only one supreme leader, otherwise there will be no clarity over who is really in charge.

In Russia, this supreme official is the President, who, according to the constitution, determines the “basic objectives of the internal and foreign policy of the state”. The President also appoints the Prime Minister. While obviously there will always be turf ambiguities and some overlap, the supreme responsibility clearly lies with the President. This was certainly the case under Putin’s presidency.

MEDVEDEV MAKES MORE PROGRESS ON JUDICIAL REFORM

COMMENTARY

By Gordon M. Hahn

The Russian court’s guilty verdict in the embezzlement case against Mikhail Khodorkovskii and Platon Lebedev has received the undivided attention of the U.S. mainstream media and is held up as the rule when it comes to Russia’s albeit less than independent or impartial judicial system.  But the media’s singular focus on this case is a smokescreen that allows them to suppress news about the long-term, potentially democratizing thaw that emerged under President Dmitrii Medvedev, as we predicted 38 months ago. 

The trial and conviction of Khodorkovskii and Lebedev is unfortunately a long-standing process that predates the new liberalization process, and therefore it cannot constitute evidence that nothing has changed.  It is the continuation of an old policy; one, moreover, that also may change, should Medvedev decide to grant one or both of them amnesty.  The prosecution of Khodorkovskii, therefore, is neither dispositive of, nor even pertinent to the question as to whether there has been any progress in liberalizing Russia’s judicial system.  What is relevant to, and dispositive of this question would be signs of greater degrees of judicial independence, more decisions that find in favor of average citizens filing against the state or the authorities, and decisions that expand the scope of citizens’ rights and reduce that of the state’s arbitrariness and the authorities’ impunity.  In the past, we have detailed some of Medvedev’s earlier steps in reforming the judicial system (Gordon M. Hahn, “Medvedev’s Judicial Reforms – Don’t Pre-Judge,” Russia – Other Points of View, 18 May 2009).

A TALE OF THE BEGGER AND THE BILLIONAIRE

REPRINTS

www.sublimeoblivion.com

by Anatoly Karlin

Imagine the following scenario.

In the US, a black homeless man “robs” a bank. He only takes a single $100 bill out of the wad of cash offered, because he was hungry and had to pay to stay at a detox center. Regardless, he had the good graces to return the money the day after. Net financial loss to the bank? $0. Years he was sent down to the slammer for: 15.

In another country, a billionaire fleeces the state by using offshore companies to sell his company’s oil production (and sees nothing wrong with it). Politicians and businessmen who oppose him get this nasty habit of turning up dead. Net financial loss to that country’s treasury, and ultimately taxpayers? Many billions of dollars. Years he was sent down to the slammer for: 14.

Now imagine that one of these cases becomes the focal point of universal condemnation of that country’s brutal, lawless, and authoritarian human rights regime – from Amnesty International and PACE, the US State Department and the German Bundestag, and regular scathing editorials from the biggest media titans. The country’s own liberals work overtime to campaign for the case to be overturned.

Which case would you guess I’m talking about? Surely it would be Roy Brown, the indigent beggar right? No way, sucker.

FREEING KHODORKOVSKII: WHY RUSSIA'S KHODORKOVSKII POLICY MUST CHANGE

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

Russia’s gradual reform agenda, its integration into Western life and institutions, and the reputations of President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin all demand a substantial change in the policy regarding imprisoning oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskii and his associate Platon Lebedev.  In addition, any state that contends to be a country ruled by laws and not by men requires just and merciful execution of the law, and in this case both justice and mercy. This is always part of a democratic legal system, and they have yet to be served by Russia’s politicized judicial process.  Russian law provides measures that would allow the political authorities to redress the injustice, while honoring the procedural requirements of rule of law state.

President Medvedev himself sparked hope that a change in Kremlin policy might be forthcoming during his first major press conference last month where he acknowledged that Khodorkovskii presented no danger to society.  Although Medvedev’s statement was prompted by a journalist’s question, he appeared ready for it, instantly issuing an uncharacteristically short and precise answer.  It was if he had been waiting for the question and the journalist had been put up to posing it.  The timing seemed significant, coming at a time when Khodorkovskii’s lawyers were preparing to apply for conditional early parole, about which Medvedev certainly would have known. 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Missile defence. Here’s Russia’s position in a nutshell: “We must receive guarantees that it is not directed against us. So far no such guarantees have been given.” Simple, easy to understand and any other country would say the same. “Trust, but verify”. Do you become more secure by making your neighbours nervous?

Libya. It is reported that several leaders, formally or otherwise, asked Medvedev to mediate in Libya. He is willing. Moscow has maintained relations with Tripoli and more recently opened discussion with the rebels in Benghazi and is therefore in a position to be a middleman. In his press conference after the G8, Medvedev said that he had sent Mikhail Margelov to Benghazi to begin talks, that “Gaddafi’s regime has lost legitimacy and he must leave” and that Russia would not give him asylum. Readers will recall that when NATO’s operation began, I wondered if it would end (as Kosovo did) with Russia helping to get it out of a stalemate.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Rule-of-law. At the St Petersburg Legal Forum Medvedev said: “Over these last years we have made progress in putting in place the foundations on which we can build a rule-of-law state in our country.” I think that’s a fair statement: he’s essentially saying that the beginning has been begun and not pretending that what’s been done is enough or that the job is finished. Police reform, legal changes, dismissals, some trials; that’s not nothing. I find that too much comment on Russia is absolutist: either a reform is 100% successful right now or it’s 100% failure. But, in the real world, it’s all incremental and one should look for small progress. It’s there.

Police reform. Medvedev has signed a decree establishing advisory panels at regional police headquarters. They are to “coordinate issues of public importance concerning the interests of peoples, federal and regional bodies of state power, local self-governments, and public associations”. That’s quite a lot he’s done in this area. Its effectiveness will be revealed in the next few years but again, it’s not nothing.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Medvedev Press conference. Medvedev gave a large press conference yesterday. He said he would announce “soon” whether he will run again. The inquiry into Sergey Magnitskiy will be concluded “soon”. He several times stressed that no one should stay in power forever (in the context of saying he had replaced half the regional leaders) and that people who do so come to “a rather bad end”. Russia’s political system is still being adjusted (“a forming democracy “) and that it was possible that Federation Council members (and governors) might be directly elected (not, apparently, “soon”). He understood that “local authorities try to varnish everything” when he comes to visit, but said that he also got information from blogs etc which “cut right to the truth”. Relations with NATO were “not that bad” but he reemphasised that Moscow had to be sure that “these strike potentials will not be directed at us”. (Many of course see this and similar statements as threats; they aren’t, they’re conditional warnings: if Russia feels it is threatened – which it doesn’t today – it will take counter steps. A perfectly understandable position and one that any country would take). But, once again, sometimes the level of detail was preposterous. I have noticed this many times in his and Putin’s Q&A sessions: a version of “my roof is leaking Mr President, will you repair it?”. The third question was about parking in Moscow. Medvedev answered the question in some detail but I believe he would have been wiser to say: ask the Mayor, that’s not my job. The Boss – even if there are two of them – cannot do everything.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

By Patrick Armstrong

Putin speech. Today Putin gave his annual speech to the Duma reporting on the government’s activities and plans. He was generally upbeat about Russia’s recovery from the financial crisis. He returned to one of his key themes: “This country requires decades of steady, uninterrupted development. Without sudden radical changes in course or ill thought through experiments based so often in either unjustified economic liberalism, or, on the other hand, social demagogy. We need neither. Both will distract us from the general path of developing the country. And, of course, we should maintain civic and inter-ethnic peace, and put a stop to any attempt to cause our society to split and quarrel among itself”. To my mind stability is still the dominating theme for him (probably less so for Medvedev, given the difference in age and experience – Putin was 39 when the USSR fell apart, Medvedev 26. A significant difference I believe). He enumerated a number of targets for the future having to do with the economy. His observation (supporting his contention that Russia had done better than some others) that Portugal had asked for emergency financial assistance put me in mind of his remark a decade ago: rather than Russia struggling to catch up to Portugal, it may happen that it passes Russia, going in the other direction.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Kuriles. I’m mystified why this issue has suddenly boiled up. Perhaps Medvedev’s visit last November has driven the two capitals into the inevitable rhetorical exchanges. Attempts are being made to calm things down: the two foreign ministers have promised to talk calmly and the chief of Antiaircraft and Missile Troops, responding to a suggestion that S-400 SAMs be deployed there, dismissed the idea as excessive and dangerous. The principal Japanese opposition leader has criticised his government for its language. At present each claims the islands and it is not easy to see how a compromise can appear. But there is at least one international example that might serve as a model – the Åland Islands.

Khodorkovskiy. An aide to the judge who sentenced Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev to another prison term has said: “Higher echelons didn't like the verdict, so it was replaced by another one”. The judge denies it, and, although the aide fully expects to be fired, the court says “it has no plans” to do so. Apart from any other considerations, there has always been a strong political content to the prosecutions because Khodorkovskiy was trying to gain control of the Duma and thence the government.