Russia: Other Points of View

KILLING THE 'RESET', ONE BIASED ARTICLE AT A TIME

COMMENTARY

This article by Gordon Hahn is response to: Foreign Policy’s, 28 June 2012 issue, article “Putin’s Got America Right Where he Wants It" written by Michael Weiss.  The article can be found below following Gordon’s comments. 

Sharon Tennison 

By Gordon M. Hahn

As I have noted elsewhere, while I disagree with almost everything President Barack Obama has done, I as a conservative regard his ‘reset’ policy as one of a few small bright spots during his tenure.  We conservatives naturally do not want to see him re-elected, but it is not necessary to distort his record on Russia to achieve that eventuality.             

Prior to Obama’s presidency, American policy on post-Soviet Russia had been an unmitigated disaster.  It was high time we acknowledged our mistakes and made some compromises with Russia––if only in our self-interest.  The U.S. needs Russia on a host of key national security issues ranging from Iran’s nuclear ambitions to the war against global jihadism.

Unfortunately, as the U.S. presidential campaign shifts into high gear, Republicans of various persuasions are mounting a campaign to undermine what they see as the potential ‘reset’ feather in Obama’s cap.  The days are long gone when American politicians engaged in at least some restraint in the ‘gotcha’ political culture, particularly when an issue revolves around U.S. affairs beyond our shores.  Now every international event is interpreted as if by political operatives straight from campaign staffs in the effort to undermine their political opponents.  This was true during George W. Bush’s two terms, and it is true for Obama.  This means killing the “U.S.-Russia reset” in the minds of the American people, one article after another, in the U.S. mainstream media’s already severely-biased Russia coverage.

ALLIANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA?

REPRINTS

Russia Profile Panel Contribution

Vlad Sobell

Ultimately, the question of whether there will be a “strategic alliance” between Russia and China will be answered in Washington. Should the US choose to ignore Russia’s security interests and continue to surround it with an anti-missile defence system manned exclusively by NATO, then the rationale for a Russo-Chinese alliance will strengthen; conversely, it will weaken if NATO opts to take Russia’s interests into account and abandons its current uncompromising stance.

Since both Russia and China are preoccupied with economic modernization, they have no interest in imperial expansion and/or any confrontation with the West or indeed with each other. Any moves on their part that might be perceived as aggressive or “neo-imperialist” in the West are above all defensive.

Both of these post-totalitarian Eurasian giants are governed by conservative, nationalist-leaning regimes that have embraced hard-nosed realism in external affairs. They crave a stable and predictable system of balance of power in which their “peaceful rise” can be safely managed to the benefit of all.

This does not mean that there is no place for the West in Eurasia or that the US does not have the right to forge its own (potentially) anti-Chinese and anti-Russian alliances. Indeed, a robust system of balance of power necessitates a modicum of Western presence in the region. However, the West ought to recognise that ultimately “Central Eurasia” (that is, the former Soviet Central Asian republics) is bound to be a Sino-Russian backyard, which means that it ought to behave there as a respectful guest, not as a neo-imperialist overlord. The West’s failure to do so could activate a latent Russo-Chinese alliance that might see fit to try to evict disrespectful troublemakers from the region.

RUSSIA'S STRATEGY

REPRINTS

by George Friedman

www.stratfor.com

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 reversed a process that had been under way since the Russian Empire's emergence in the 17th century. It was ultimately to incorporate four general elements: Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Siberia. The St. Petersburg-Moscow axis was its core, and Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine were its center of gravity. The borders were always dynamic, mostly expanding but periodically contracting as the international situation warranted. At its farthest extent, from 1945 to 1989, it reached central Germany, dominating the lands it seized in World War II. The Russian Empire was never at peace. As with many empires, there were always parts of it putting up (sometimes violent) resistance and parts that bordering powers coveted -- as well as parts of other nations that Russia coveted.

The Russian Empire subverted the assumption that political and military power requires a strong economy: It was never prosperous, but it was frequently powerful. The Russians defeated Napoleon and Hitler and confronted the far wealthier Americans for more than four decades in the Cold War, in spite of having a less developed or less advanced economy. Its economic weakness certainly did undermine its military power at times, but to understand Russia, it is important to begin by understanding that the relationship between military and economic power is not a simple one.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY, FRANCE AND RUSSIA?

REPRINTS

www.stratfor.com

by George Friedman

The idea of Germany having an independent national strategy runs  counter to everything that Germany has wanted to be since World War II  and everything the world has wanted from Germany. In a way, the entire  structure of modern Europe was created to take advantage of Germany's  economic dynamism while avoiding the threat of German domination. In  writing about German strategy, I am raising the possibility that the  basic structure of Western Europe since World War II and of Europe as  a whole since 1991 is coming to a close.
If so, then the question is whether historical patterns of German  strategy will emerge or something new is coming. It is, of course,  always possible that the old post-war model can be preserved.  Whichever it is, the future of German strategy is certainly the most  important question in Europe and quite possibly in the world.

Origins of Germany's Strategy

Before 1871, when Germany was fragmented into a large number of small  states, it did not pose a challenge to Europe. Rather, it served as a  buffer between France on one side and Russia and Austria on the other.  Napoleon and his campaign to dominate Europe first changed the status  of Germany, both overcoming the barrier and provoking the rise of  Prussia, a powerful German entity. Prussia became instrumental in  creating a united Germany in 1871, and with that, the geopolitics of  Europe changed.

What had been a morass of states became not only a unified country but  also the most economically dynamic country in Europe -- and the one  with the most substantial ground forces. Germany was also  inherently  insecure. Lacking any real strategic depth, Germany could not survive  a simultaneous attack by France and Russia. Therefore, Germany's core  strategy was to prevent the emergence of an alliance between France  and Russia. However, in the event that there was no alliance between  France and Russia, Germany was always tempted to solve the problem in  a more controlled and secure way, by defeating France and ending the  threat of an alliance. This is the strategy Germany has chosen for  most of its existence.

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: PUSHING TENSIONS TO THE LIMIT?

REPRINTS

STRATFOR,  February 6, 2012

Summary

As Russia and the United States prepare for their presidential elections, tensions between the countries are growing. The central point of contention is U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans. Russia has several levers, including its ability to cut off supply lines to the NATO-led war effort in Afghanistan, to use in the standoff over BMD, but the United States could retaliate by supporting the current protests in Russia. Moscow is willing to escalate tensions with Washington but will not push the crisis to the point where relations could formally break.

Analysis

Relations between the United States and Russia are incredibly tense as both countries prepare for presidential elections in 2012. The campaign season has presented both sides opportunities to escalate tensions, but it is unclear how far each side will go.

Moscow and Washington have been in a standoff over myriad issues ever since Russia began to roll back Western influence in its periphery and assert its own power. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States surged into the region intending to create a cordon around Russia to prevent it from ever becoming a global threat again. But after 2001, the U.S. focus shifted to the Islamic theater, and a previously crippled Russia began to strengthen. Washington continued some of its policies of Russian containment, such as trying to give the key former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine NATO membership, but Eurasia was not the United States' key focus.

This gave Russia the time and opportunity to resurge into its former Soviet states. Moscow's ultimate goal is not to recreate the Soviet Union -- that entity eventually failed. Instead, Russia wants to limit the influence of external powers in the former Soviet Union and be recognized as the dominant player there. Consequently, foreign governments -- particularly the United States and Europe -- must shape bilateral relations within the framework of this understanding. In the past few years, Russia has been relatively successful in regaining influence in many of its former Soviet states. This brought Russian power back to its broader frontiers, particularly in Central Europe, where the United States has staked a dominant position. Russia is not looking to control Central Europe, but it does not want the region to be a base of U.S. power in Eurasia. Washington sees Central Europe as the new Cold War line -- a position previously held by Germany -- that halts Russia's influence.

RESETTING PUTIN

REPRINTS

by Eugene Ivanov

http://rbth.ru/articles/2011/10/10/author/Eugene%20Ivanov

The American political establishment should not be naive about how the return of President Putin will affect U.S.-Russian relations.

What will Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency mean for U.S.-Russia relations? Source: AP
A consensus is emerging among Russia-watchers that Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency will have little impact on the country’s foreign policy and, in particular, on U.S.-Russia relations.  Andrew Kuchins, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., has eloquently summarized this sentiment:
 
“The possible election of Putin as the president of Russia will not signify a fundamental change in the direction of U.S.-Russia relations.  The main reason for this is the fact that no major decisions on foreign or domestic policy during the period of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency have been made without implicit or explicit support from Mr. Putin.”

MOSCOW'S MOMENT OF TRUTH ABOUT TEHERAN

COMMENTARY

by Gordon M. Hahn

Time is running out for the Kremlin in its up again down again relationship with the mullahs in Teheran.  Moscow has enjoyed fairly good relations with Iran, especially when it comes to trade.  However, the deteriorating relationship between Iran and the rest of the international community is putting the squeeze on Russia’s sometimes troubled, sometimes smooth, relations with the Iranian regime.

To be sure, some progress has been made during the Obama administration in getting Russia to join with the U.S. and other Western and concerned nations to contain the Iranian menace.  Moscow has agreed more than not, to join in voting at the U.N. in favor of sanctions against Teheranm, than for its refusal to come clean about its illegal nuclear weapons program.  Moscow has also cooperated with the sanctions regime.  Last year President Dmitrii Medvedev issued an order ceasing all weapons sales to Teheran, including blocking delivery of the S-300 air defense system contracted earlier.  It also long delayed loading fuel into Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant that went on line this year.

US-RUSSIA RESET: WHATS BEHIND THE GINNED-UP CRISIS IN U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS?

REPRINTS

www.foreignpolicy.com, August 12, 2011

BY SAMUEL CHARAP 

Samuel Charap is director for Russia and Eurasia at the Center for American Progress. 

Storm clouds are gathering over what has been a signature shift in U.S. foreign policy under President Barack Obama: the "reset" of relations with Russia. The usual suspects, from the Weekly Standard to the Washington Times to hawkish cold warriors in Congress, see recent news as vindication of their argument that the reset represents dangerous appeasement of a relentless foe on the march, an adversary with which it would be folly to cooperate in any way. 

Some of the headlines, including a supposedly Kremlin-ordered attack on a U.S. Embassy, leave one with the impression that the U.S.-Russia relationship is on the brink of a return to the state of near confrontation that Obama inherited. 

NATO EXPANSION, AND U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE 'NEAR ABROAD'

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

Several events this week prompt a reconsideration of a potential deal breaker in the U.S.-Russian ‘reset’ or thaw, and the failed policy of NATO expansion without Russia which was adopted by the Clinton Administration in the mid-1990s. 

First, the anniversary of the Five-Day August 2008 Georgian-Russian War passed with Georgia still deprived of 30 percent of its perceived territory––and Abkhazia and South Ossetiya set on a long road to real independence.  This was the price Georgia paid for its own hubris and the West’s clumsy interference in a region it poorly understands.  That interference was driven by the policy of NATO expansion, which militarized American and Western democracy-promotion efforts and piqued Russian resistance to them.

In addition, American policy was driven in large part by the anti-Russian biases of many U.S. post-sovietologists, analysts, and journalists when it comes to assessing Russia’s relations with its own minorities and former Soviet nationalities.  Often, these relations are caricatured on the model of the white hats and the black hats.  The Russians are cast as the nasty black-hated nationalistic imperialists, while the peoples like Georgians and their nationalist leaders are cast as the good guys, ‘beacons of democracy.’ 

RETHINKING THE RESET

REPRINTS

Moscow Times, 01 July 2011

by Andrei Tsygankov

Since the reset button in U.S.-Russian relations has been pressed, Russia and the West have learned to cooperate on multiple issues from Iran and Afghanistan to nuclear arms control. Still, the momentum for improving Western ties with Russia seems to be caught in a holding pattern. It seems that both sides are increasingly frustrated with each other's policies.

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently condemned Russia for its sharp reaction to NATO's plans for a missile defense system in Europe. The Kremlin threatened to develop new intercontinental ballistic missiles that could spark a new arms race. Clearly frustrated, Rasmussen chided Russia's outdated thinking. "We are not a threat to Russia, we will not attack Russia, we will not undermine the security of Russia," he said.
The Kremlin, however, maintains that NATO's missile defense plans could undermine Russia's security as soon as 2020, when the system's fourth phase will be deployed. Moscow is suspicious of the fact that in response to the concerns it voices, it only receives vague, rhetorical assurances and other brushoffs.