Russia: Other Points of View

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

NGOs. The new law was overwhelmingly passed by the Duma and the Federation Council. (a real all-party effort – it’s a popular provision: 60% plus). In essence, NGOs that are foreign-funded and operate in the political sphere must report on the extent of foreign funding and label themselves as foreign agents. Here is what has changed. The law is somewhat modelled on the US FARA law of 1938 that “requires persons acting as agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal” (something seldom mentioned in much of the commentary on the Russian law). Much flapdoodle from those whose oxen will be gored and livelihoods will be affected. Application is, of course the key, but I have no problem with the law: I think Canada, which has a similar problem, should have a similar law. People should be able to know what interests are trying to influence them.

State Council. Leaders of the parliamentary opposition have been added to this advisory group which held its first meeting in this new format on Tuesday. Usual response: either an opening to or cooption of.

Internet. The Duma and the Federation Council have passed a law allowing websites “promoting illegal drugs, child abuse or suicide” to be shut down. Not uncommon elsewhere.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY, FRANCE AND RUSSIA?

REPRINTS

www.stratfor.com

by George Friedman

The idea of Germany having an independent national strategy runs  counter to everything that Germany has wanted to be since World War II  and everything the world has wanted from Germany. In a way, the entire  structure of modern Europe was created to take advantage of Germany's  economic dynamism while avoiding the threat of German domination. In  writing about German strategy, I am raising the possibility that the  basic structure of Western Europe since World War II and of Europe as  a whole since 1991 is coming to a close.
If so, then the question is whether historical patterns of German  strategy will emerge or something new is coming. It is, of course,  always possible that the old post-war model can be preserved.  Whichever it is, the future of German strategy is certainly the most  important question in Europe and quite possibly in the world.

Origins of Germany's Strategy

Before 1871, when Germany was fragmented into a large number of small  states, it did not pose a challenge to Europe. Rather, it served as a  buffer between France on one side and Russia and Austria on the other.  Napoleon and his campaign to dominate Europe first changed the status  of Germany, both overcoming the barrier and provoking the rise of  Prussia, a powerful German entity. Prussia became instrumental in  creating a united Germany in 1871, and with that, the geopolitics of  Europe changed.

What had been a morass of states became not only a unified country but  also the most economically dynamic country in Europe -- and the one  with the most substantial ground forces. Germany was also  inherently  insecure. Lacking any real strategic depth, Germany could not survive  a simultaneous attack by France and Russia. Therefore, Germany's core  strategy was to prevent the emergence of an alliance between France  and Russia. However, in the event that there was no alliance between  France and Russia, Germany was always tempted to solve the problem in  a more controlled and secure way, by defeating France and ending the  threat of an alliance. This is the strategy Germany has chosen for  most of its existence.

NATO EXPANSION, AND U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE 'NEAR ABROAD'

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

Several events this week prompt a reconsideration of a potential deal breaker in the U.S.-Russian ‘reset’ or thaw, and the failed policy of NATO expansion without Russia which was adopted by the Clinton Administration in the mid-1990s. 

First, the anniversary of the Five-Day August 2008 Georgian-Russian War passed with Georgia still deprived of 30 percent of its perceived territory––and Abkhazia and South Ossetiya set on a long road to real independence.  This was the price Georgia paid for its own hubris and the West’s clumsy interference in a region it poorly understands.  That interference was driven by the policy of NATO expansion, which militarized American and Western democracy-promotion efforts and piqued Russian resistance to them.

In addition, American policy was driven in large part by the anti-Russian biases of many U.S. post-sovietologists, analysts, and journalists when it comes to assessing Russia’s relations with its own minorities and former Soviet nationalities.  Often, these relations are caricatured on the model of the white hats and the black hats.  The Russians are cast as the nasty black-hated nationalistic imperialists, while the peoples like Georgians and their nationalist leaders are cast as the good guys, ‘beacons of democracy.’ 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Grain exports. When I was in Russia in the early 1990s I visited several farms. In my travels I don’t recall ever seeing a field that was being used for anything except grazing for a scrawny cow or two. I spoke to Russians and Westerners, more knowledgeable than I, who had seen farms; everyone agreed that the situation was, in a word, hopeless. At that time it was said that Russia imported half its food. Something has happened. Last year, with the bad summer, Russia halted grain exports and the world price went up. Exports have just been resumed (perhaps 15 million tonnes out of a total harvest expected to be about 85) and prices went down. Somehow the desperate situation of the 1990s has turned around and Russia is an important grain exporter for the first time since when? a century ago? In the 1990s, the idea of Russia becoming an major food exporter would have been utterly unimaginable. I am not aware of any coverage of this and I would love to see some. Private farming? A restructuring of the decayed remnants of state and collective farms? New land? What? Away from the everlasting barren speculation of neo-Kremlinology there are real stories to cover.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Modernisation.  On Friday Medvedev made a speech about modernisation to the St Petersburg Economic Forum. Those who believe that this program has already failed, or that the only question in Russia is the imaginary Medvedev-Putin feud/power struggle won’t be interested but it’s worth reading. Generalities for the most part, but he is the President and he was giving a strategic message. A message we are now familiar with: “Modernisation is the only way to address the many issues before us”; that progress is real but still small: “They are small fruits, but they are there.” As to state control of certain sectors: “I want to state loud and clear here that we are not building state capitalism. Yes, there was a point in our development when we increased the state’s share in the economy, but this was an unavoidable step and in many ways necessary in order to stabilise the situation after the chaos of the 1990s, and re-establish basic order. That avenue has exhausted its potential now… [he describes problems with state control: state interests always dominate, the greater possibility of corruption and poor management] … This economic model jeopardises the country’s future. It is not my choice. My choice is different. Private business and private investment should dominate in the Russian economy. The state must protect the choice and assets of those who consciously decide to risk their money and reputation. We need to give them the right to make mistakes, and opportunities for drive and development.” As to specifics he spoke of more judicial independence and, as ever, corruption. He does understand what must be done as well as how difficult it will be. But he is right – as Belarus is showing – that there is no alternative. And, I again stress that this is the “Putin program” too: there was much use of “modern” in his 2005 and 2007 Federal Assembly addresses; “it’s no longer possible to survive and be competitive without modernisation” (2010). And so on. All part of The Plan.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Police Reform. According to the Minister, one third of the top police officers did not survive the screening and have been dismissed – 119 of 335. That is not a trivial percentage and to my mind shows the effort is real. The idea was that the senior officers would be vetted by the Presidential Administration and juniors by the seniors – perhaps it would have been smarter to wait until the seniors’ vetting was over before beginning the juniors. But the effort isn’t over yet.

Corruption. It is almost a cliché in certain circles that Medvedev’s struggle against corruption has failed. Readers are invited, however, to consider this account of a successful effort to stop (corrupt) markups in medical equipment prices. That’s not been a failure. And, by the way, as to the other cliché that anti-corruption is Medvedev’s thing (and by implication not Putin’s), here’s Putin three years ago: asked “Which of Russia’s problems have you found the most wearying and difficult to resolve over these last eight years?”, he answered “Corruption”. Same program, different phase.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Missile defence. Here’s Russia’s position in a nutshell: “We must receive guarantees that it is not directed against us. So far no such guarantees have been given.” Simple, easy to understand and any other country would say the same. “Trust, but verify”. Do you become more secure by making your neighbours nervous?

Libya. It is reported that several leaders, formally or otherwise, asked Medvedev to mediate in Libya. He is willing. Moscow has maintained relations with Tripoli and more recently opened discussion with the rebels in Benghazi and is therefore in a position to be a middleman. In his press conference after the G8, Medvedev said that he had sent Mikhail Margelov to Benghazi to begin talks, that “Gaddafi’s regime has lost legitimacy and he must leave” and that Russia would not give him asylum. Readers will recall that when NATO’s operation began, I wondered if it would end (as Kosovo did) with Russia helping to get it out of a stalemate.

PRESERVING INFLUENCE IN A CHANGING WORLD: RUSSIA'S GRAND STRATEGY

REPRINTS

By Andrei P. Tsygankov

San Francisco State University

Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 58, No. 1, March-April, 2011, pp. 28-44.

Abstract

Russia has been creating flexible international coalitions in order to achieve its central objective of becoming an independent center of power and influence.

Russia is never as strong as we fear and never as weak as we hope.

Klemens von Metternich

1. Introduction

From Europe to the Middle East and Asia, scholars and politicians are increasingly recognizing the prominent role of Russia in international affairs. From a weak and inward-looking nation of the 1990s, Russia has emerged into a power that is capable of defending its international prestige using available economic, military, and diplomatic means. It has exploited its energy clout to expand Russian relations abroad and cemented its military presence in the strategic area of the Southern Caucasus by defeating Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia. By mobilizing its soft power, the Kremlin has also contributed to reversing the colored revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. After being seriously hit by the global financial crisis, Russia has quickly recovered as an important international player.

NATIONAL INTERESTS, CHAMPIONING DEMOCRACY, AND MSM DOUBLE STANDARDS

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

The U.S. mainstream media is fond not only of criticizing Russia’s soft (in my view) authoritarianism––but also is fond of cozying up to, and defending authoritarian regimes elsewhere.

To the point, a January 11, 2011 New York Times editorial titled “Lukashenko’s Gulag” castigated Moscow for supporting Belarus’s autocrat Alexander Lukashenko: “Mr. Lukashenko clearly thinks that his improving relations with Russia means he can thumb his nose at the West. The Kremlin, of course, said nothing about the stolen election and has enabled him with recent oil and gas agreements. Europe and the United States must now push back hard. There is little hope for democratic change in Belarus unless Mr. Lukashenko is forced to pay a stiff price for his abuses.”

But as the U.S. has been reminded recently in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen, and elsewhere, they too have been complicit in foreign authoritarian regimes, including by way ‘enabling them with oil and gas agreements.’  Parapharasing the NYT, substituting a few key words, highlights the hypocrisy: The U.S., of course, did nothing for decades about the repression of opposition in Saudi Arabia. It enabled the Wahhabi regime with recent oil and gas agreements. One can say the same about the repression of dissidents in China while enabling the communist regime with lucrative business ties.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

US-Russia. US Vice President Biden is in Moscow. He says that Russia’ accession to the WTO is a top priority, (although hinted that it depended on Russia’s human rights record) and may have made approving noises about ending the absurdly out-of-date Jackson Vanik Amendment. He reportedly told Putin that visa-free travel between Russia and the US was “a good idea”. Well, we’ll see. As to the WTO, it is quite absurd that Russia is not a member. During the time Russia has spent trying to get into it, Oman, Côte d’Ivoire, China, Cuba, Zimbabwe and others have entered. No problems with “human rights” there apparently. Russians could be forgiven for thinking that the WTO is not the economic organisation that it purports to be but really a political organisation. Members appear to have a quasi-veto and Tbilisi is quite happy to use its. A Russian official claims that Biden said that Washington had tried to talk Tbilisi out of opposing Russian membership. But I wonder how much influence Washington has on Tbilisi these days over what is the only pressure point on Moscow that Saakashvili has.