Russia: Other Points of View

ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE

COMMENTARY

Flying So High You Can’t See the Ground

By Patrick Armstrong

Ukrainians will be electing a new President on Sunday and, while we do not yet know who will win, we know that neither Yanukovych nor Tymoshenko is running on an overtly anti-Russia platform. Therefore, whoever wins, relations between Kiev and Moscow will likely be calmer than they have been since the “Orange Revolution” of 2004. Stratfor sees this in apocalyptic terms: “The next few months will therefore see the de facto folding of Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence” and “a new era of Russian aggressiveness” now begins The author goes on to talk about the Carpathians as a defence shield for Russia, Ukraine as Russia’s “breadbasket” and so on.

But who decided that this was the question that Ukrainian voters were answering? It was the “Orange Revolution” and its outside backers that injected into Ukrainian politics the binary choice of either joining the West or becoming Russia’s appendage: at no point was there support among the majority of Ukrainians for such a choice. And there is absolutely no reason to treat the recent election as having made such a choice. While Yushchenko was indeed the binary candidate: “either this pro-Kremlin couple and pro-Kremlin policy wins, or the pro-European policy does”, he and his view have been brutally rejected by the voters. No surprise, of course, to those who have been watching opinion polls in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Ukraine-Russia relations. Will obviously be “better” as neither winner is running on an overtly anti-Russia platform. That having been said, a better word would be “rational relations”. The NATO obsession was a disaster for relations (and extremely divisive inside Ukraine, where an overwhelming majority want good relations with Russia) and that is now over. There will, however, still be disagreements but, with luck, they can be settled outside of an apocalyptic framework.

Internet. The latest numbers suggest about a fifth of Russian adults (24 million) use the Internet daily. This figure is said to be up about 20% since last year. (JRL/2010/11/5). As I have said many times before, the standard scare pieces about government control of Russian media omit to mention Internet access (probably because they are mostly written by Old Media types). The New Media is replacing the Old all over the world.

Belarus, Kazakhstan: A Customs Deal and a Way Forward for Moscow

REPRINTS

Despite attempts by the West to bring Russia's border states into NATO, the prospects look less likely with each passing month.  It would be well for American political elite and journalists to grant Russia the same ‘friendly’ space around its borders that the US enjoys in its near abroad. Further, it's time to stop presenting this situation as '"the Kremlin's design to control its near abroad and establish its Soviet-era influence."  Russia has no interest in controlling border states - but has justifiable desire to have friendly trade relations with these nearby countries.

Stratfor, Dec 31, 2009 

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan will enter into a common customs union Jan. 1, 2010, making economic integration between the three countries — already strong — even greater. The official details of the union are not finalized and will be solidified in multiple phases over the next year, but it already is clear the move is designed to increase the Kremlin’s control of its near abroad and re-establish its Soviet-era influence.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

 by Patrick Armstrong

Putin phone-in. On Saturday, Putin gave another marathon phone-in session (Eng) (Russ). As befits the Prime Minister’s job, everything was domestic (except for a bit about the WTO and the Jackson-Vanik amendment). The discussion was very detailed and, as ever, many questions were of the nature “My roof leaks, can you fix it?” My favourite bit was the presenter’s observation: “We have a lot of messages which quote the local authorities as saying: ‘We hear that Putin has promised it to you, so go and ask Putin’”. To which Putin replied: “Well, if you have such facts, let me know while we are on the air and we will sort out [мы разберемся] the people who give such answers.” Still a long way to go. And, once again he refused to give any indication of future plans. Here is his reason: “The biggest mistake would be to adjust our current work based on the interests of future election campaigns… When you start thinking about your ratings or about what you should do in the interests of future election campaigns, you will immediately feel tied to that and unable to make decisions some of which may be unpleasant but important for the economy and ultimately for the people.” Neither he nor Medvedev (nor Mr X) will ever say anything different before the event.

WORKING WITH RUSSIA TO PREVENT EURASIAN COLLAPSE

REPRINTS

by Andrey Tsygankov

RFERL, Oct 29, 2009 

The Eurasian region continues to disintegrate, and neither Russia nor the West has been able to arrest the destabilizing dynamics.

Evidence of rising instability throughout the region include the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, renewed terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus, the persistent failure of Western forces to stabilize Afghanistan, the inability of Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans and drug lords, and the paralysis of legitimately elected bodies of power in Ukraine and Moldova.

Violence is gradually spreading, waiting for an opportunity to erupt into a large-scale conflict. Transregional transportation routes may soon be choked due to Russia's conflicts with Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkmenistan.

The West's attempts to secure and stabilize Eurasia after the end of the Cold War must be recognized as a failure. In the mid-1990s, U.S. geostrategists such as Zbigniew Brzezinski recommended that the United States pursue a policy of replacing Russia as the referee and protector of the newly established non-Russian states in the region. After initial hesitation, the United States and other Western states followed this advice.

Yet Eurasia has not become stable or peaceful and continues to disintegrate. The bureaucrats in Washington and Brussels have failed to understand that they lack the resources, the will, and the experience to stabilize the complex region. Today -- after the Iraq war and the global financial crisis -- the United States is beginning to recognize its overextension, but it is not at all clear if Washington and Brussels are prepared to act differently in Eurasia.

Continue reading this article 

UKRAINE-RUSSIA TENSION IN CRIMEA?

ARTICLE CRITIQUE

Response to Washington Post "Ukraine-Russia Tensions Evident in Crimea - Kremlin Asserting Its Influence in Region" by Philip P. Pan, Oct 6, 2009

by Gordon Hahn

The Washington Post article reviewed below is yet another one from the paper littered with one-sided opinion masquerading as news.  The article is yet another that insinuates into readers’ minds the view that Russia is planning aggression against Ukraine and is solely to blame for the deterioration in relations between the two countries.  It contains numerous inaccurate statements, claims unsupported by data or facts, and a consistently one-sided perspective.  It should be noted that this article follows a summer replete with articles in the Post and other mainstream media and other news outlets purporting to show that Russia would attack Georgia this summer.  ROPV continues to wait and see when these predictions will be borne out in and whether anyone else will hold the U.S. mainstream media responsible in any way for its misleading reporting.

To access the full analysis, please click here Download WP_Pan_6_Oct_09

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Election fraud. There are objective and perfectly understandable reasons for United Russia to win most elections in Russia. The population supports its leaders and, consequently, extends that support to their pedestal. In fact, Levada’s most recent numbers show United Russia with more than one and a half times as much support as all the others combined. The losers always charge vote fraud but usually it ends there. This time, the three losers, LDPR, KPRF and Just Russia actually walked out of the Duma in protest (all have now returned); there have been some small protests, the Communists are demanding the resignation of the Head of the CEC and says it will be holding rallies today. So this one has better legs (and supporting detail) than the pro-forma protests of earlier times. We will see what happens. Again, however, I stress that a consideration of polling numbers over time shows that United Russia is bound to win; cheating only determines the scale of that win (so, indeed, why do it at all?) Medvedev once murmured something about reducing the 7% threshold. I believe 7% is too high for Russia’s conditions (unless, of course, its purpose is to produce enormous United Russia majorities across the country) and it would be better to go back to the old 5% threshold. But there is no “correct” number and there is great variation across the world.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Regional elections. Elections were held across Russia on Sunday and, as usual, United Russia dominated the results. The losing parties have charged fraud and walked out of the Duma on Wednesday in protest. What are we to make of this? It is very likely there was a degree of fraud, both from the top of the power pyramid and from the bottom. But there are objective reasons for the domination of United Russia. It is the party in power and the population has showed, in innumerable opinion polls, that it approves of the people in power; approval of Medvedev and Putin is easily transferred to their pedestal party. Some opposition parties have been led by the same people for 15 years: why should anyone decide that Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov, who have been rejected time and time again, suddenly have the answers? As to the others, Yabloko, while it has a new leader, marginalised itself by its repeated refusal to collaborate with like-minded people, Just Russia has never really got off the ground and Other Russia is a stunt for Western naïfs. Therefore, in my opinion, fraud, pressure and the like can account for the margin of victory but not for the victory itself. The Russian “opposition” has found a comfortable niche which is personally profitable to its leaders while United Russia gets things done. Not an ideal situation to be sure, but one which many hands have made.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Missile Defence. Medvedev has formally announced, after some confusion (again!) from various spokesmen, that the deployment of Iskander Missiles to Kaliningrad has been cancelled (they never were actually deployed – it was always conditional). Yesterday the Foreign Minister Lavrov said that the new US plans presented no risks for Russia, good conditions were present for dialogue and that Moscow and Washington would soon hold talks on missile defence. Of course: Moscow was concerned when the idea was to stop ICBMs, but defence against medium- and short- range missiles doesn’t bother it. On the other hand, Russia’s UN Ambassador said that it would complicate nuclear disarmament. I have often wished the Russian Foreign Ministry would get a better grip on its people and stop this dribble of confusing and partially contradictory statements. Mind you, NATO’s no better:  it is asking for help while encouraging Tbilisi’s NATO aspirations. What message will any of the suspicious people out there take from these pairs of statements?

EU Report. The report was published last week. It is probably not a coincidence that the next day PACE rejected Tbilisi’s motion to deprive Russia of voting rights. Nino Burjanadze has accused the government of covering up the report; while Saakashvili has hailed it as complete vindication some Georgians are claiming that Russian money is to be found there.  I regard it as rather little, rather late, naïve and incomplete; my argument is here. But at least it knows who started the war.

THE EU REPORT: LITTLE AND LATE

COMMENTARY

by Patrick Armstrong

The long-delayed Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia was finally issued on 30 September, 13 months after the war. It is to be found here: Vol I (Introductory); Vol II (Report); Vol III (Submitted material). In what follows quotations are from the BBC-supplied version (which is somewhat faster loading). Generally speaking, I regard it as rather little, rather late, naïve and incomplete. It is also excruciatingly delicate – even precious – in what it says and what it avoids saying. It concludes with a number of unexceptionable, but rather vague, recommendations.

It is incomplete because it, evidently seeing the conflict as one between Georgia and Russia as other commentators have, leaves the Ossetians out. While the authors feel it useful to give some historical background on Georgia, going back to the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783, there is no equivalent discussion of the Ossetian (or Abkhazian) point of view. But, if asked, Ossetians would certainly speak of their unwillingness to be part of Georgia and refer to earlier Georgian attacks in 1920 and 1991. Their arguments for independent status (here is Abkhazia’s) should be heard out even if they are to be refuted. Tendentious perhaps but a significant factor in Ossetian (and Abkhazian) perceptions. The fact is that the Ossetians, rightly or wrongly, do not want to be part of Georgia, fought for their independence when the Russian Empire collapsed, were placed in the Georgian SSR by Stalin-Jughashvili, tried to be excluded from it when the USSR collapsed, fought another independence war and, very probably, stopped the Georgian attack before the Russian forces got there (some Tskhinvali combat footage at 7:50). To leave their point of view out of the Report is to be incomplete. Added to which, the discussion about their citizenship (the authors assert that they were Georgian citizens) is to altogether ignore their contention that, while they were certainly Soviet citizens in 1991, they never agreed to becoming Georgian citizens. Indeed the world recognised Georgia, in the borders that Stalin gave it, while the disputes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were actually going on.