Russia: Other Points of View

THE WILTING PETALS OF GEORGIA'S ROSE REVOLUTION

REPRINTS

www.opendemocracy.net, 29 January 2010

By Salome Zourabishvili

There were such hopes for the future in Georgia after the Rose Revolution in 2004, but history is running backwards, says former foreign minister Salome Zourabishvili, and President Saakashvili must be told that enough is enough.

Six years ago, on 25 January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili took the oath of office as president of Georgia for the first time.

Then it was a day of hope and high expectations. At last our country would have a president truly committed to democracy, an end to corruption and peaceful reunification.

And for some time those hopes looked justified. One breakaway province, Adjara, returned to the fold and the other two in Abkhazia and South Ossetia looked as though they might follow suit. I joined the president's government as Foreign Minister and secured the removal of Russian military bases. Corruption was tackled and as a result tax revenues grew and tax rates fell.

ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE

COMMENTARY

Flying So High You Can’t See the Ground

By Patrick Armstrong

Ukrainians will be electing a new President on Sunday and, while we do not yet know who will win, we know that neither Yanukovych nor Tymoshenko is running on an overtly anti-Russia platform. Therefore, whoever wins, relations between Kiev and Moscow will likely be calmer than they have been since the “Orange Revolution” of 2004. Stratfor sees this in apocalyptic terms: “The next few months will therefore see the de facto folding of Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence” and “a new era of Russian aggressiveness” now begins The author goes on to talk about the Carpathians as a defence shield for Russia, Ukraine as Russia’s “breadbasket” and so on.

But who decided that this was the question that Ukrainian voters were answering? It was the “Orange Revolution” and its outside backers that injected into Ukrainian politics the binary choice of either joining the West or becoming Russia’s appendage: at no point was there support among the majority of Ukrainians for such a choice. And there is absolutely no reason to treat the recent election as having made such a choice. While Yushchenko was indeed the binary candidate: “either this pro-Kremlin couple and pro-Kremlin policy wins, or the pro-European policy does”, he and his view have been brutally rejected by the voters. No surprise, of course, to those who have been watching opinion polls in Ukraine.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Putin’s view. Occasionally we get a succinct indication of Putin’s thinking. Here’s one from a meeting with the State Council on Friday: “We must not allow our political culture to follow a Ukrainian scenario, and we must also prevent it from sliding into totalitarianism and despotism. Unfortunately, we know examples of this within the post-Soviet space”. A not unreasonable via media.

NATO. Relations proceed as NATO continues its self-educational process of realising Russia is more important than it used to think it was.

Prediction. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts that, by 2050, Russia’s economy will be the sixth-largest in the world and larger than any in Europe. There are too many future unknowns to put much stock in these kinds of predictions but it is interesting (amusing?) to juxtapose this with the commonplace predictions that Russia will collapse, sink into permanent poverty or that Russians will disappear from the earth.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Election fraud. Two opinion polls, both by Levada, give us data on how people say they voted in the elections last month. A poll of Muscovites (JRL/201/4) gives 46.1% for United Russia (official numbers 66.25%), 27.1% for the communists (13.3%), 11.8% for LDPR (6.13%), 7.9% for Just Russia (5.33%) and 3.7% for Yabloko (4.71%). A nation-wide poll asking the same question gives United Russia 47%, communists 13%, Just Russia 8%, LDPR 7% and Yabloko 2%. When the Yabloko leader said his vote hadn’t been counted at all, a recount was ordered and, lo! it was found that some Yabloko votes had “accidently” been miscounted. But these numbers do not give us a clear picture. Levada tells us that Muscovites voted communist at twice the rate of the nation; this seems improbable. Levada also tells us that fewer people voted for Yabloko than the official numbers give; this too seems improbable if the scenario were to inflate United Russia’s numbers and deflate the others. So, as always, an examination of the data we have deepens the mystery. The Yabloko leader has described what his people told him and it appears that fake voters was the preferred method. Medvedev met with the head of the CEC and said “All types of claims must be investigated thoroughly”. Well, we’ll see. These numbers make a prima facie cause for fraud favouring the pedestal party but leave us in the dark as to what degree of fraud there was.

WORKING WITH RUSSIA TO PREVENT EURASIAN COLLAPSE

REPRINTS

by Andrey Tsygankov

RFERL, Oct 29, 2009 

The Eurasian region continues to disintegrate, and neither Russia nor the West has been able to arrest the destabilizing dynamics.

Evidence of rising instability throughout the region include the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, renewed terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus, the persistent failure of Western forces to stabilize Afghanistan, the inability of Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans and drug lords, and the paralysis of legitimately elected bodies of power in Ukraine and Moldova.

Violence is gradually spreading, waiting for an opportunity to erupt into a large-scale conflict. Transregional transportation routes may soon be choked due to Russia's conflicts with Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkmenistan.

The West's attempts to secure and stabilize Eurasia after the end of the Cold War must be recognized as a failure. In the mid-1990s, U.S. geostrategists such as Zbigniew Brzezinski recommended that the United States pursue a policy of replacing Russia as the referee and protector of the newly established non-Russian states in the region. After initial hesitation, the United States and other Western states followed this advice.

Yet Eurasia has not become stable or peaceful and continues to disintegrate. The bureaucrats in Washington and Brussels have failed to understand that they lack the resources, the will, and the experience to stabilize the complex region. Today -- after the Iraq war and the global financial crisis -- the United States is beginning to recognize its overextension, but it is not at all clear if Washington and Brussels are prepared to act differently in Eurasia.

Continue reading this article 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Election fraud. There are objective and perfectly understandable reasons for United Russia to win most elections in Russia. The population supports its leaders and, consequently, extends that support to their pedestal. In fact, Levada’s most recent numbers show United Russia with more than one and a half times as much support as all the others combined. The losers always charge vote fraud but usually it ends there. This time, the three losers, LDPR, KPRF and Just Russia actually walked out of the Duma in protest (all have now returned); there have been some small protests, the Communists are demanding the resignation of the Head of the CEC and says it will be holding rallies today. So this one has better legs (and supporting detail) than the pro-forma protests of earlier times. We will see what happens. Again, however, I stress that a consideration of polling numbers over time shows that United Russia is bound to win; cheating only determines the scale of that win (so, indeed, why do it at all?) Medvedev once murmured something about reducing the 7% threshold. I believe 7% is too high for Russia’s conditions (unless, of course, its purpose is to produce enormous United Russia majorities across the country) and it would be better to go back to the old 5% threshold. But there is no “correct” number and there is great variation across the world.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Regional elections. Elections were held across Russia on Sunday and, as usual, United Russia dominated the results. The losing parties have charged fraud and walked out of the Duma on Wednesday in protest. What are we to make of this? It is very likely there was a degree of fraud, both from the top of the power pyramid and from the bottom. But there are objective reasons for the domination of United Russia. It is the party in power and the population has showed, in innumerable opinion polls, that it approves of the people in power; approval of Medvedev and Putin is easily transferred to their pedestal party. Some opposition parties have been led by the same people for 15 years: why should anyone decide that Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov, who have been rejected time and time again, suddenly have the answers? As to the others, Yabloko, while it has a new leader, marginalised itself by its repeated refusal to collaborate with like-minded people, Just Russia has never really got off the ground and Other Russia is a stunt for Western naïfs. Therefore, in my opinion, fraud, pressure and the like can account for the margin of victory but not for the victory itself. The Russian “opposition” has found a comfortable niche which is personally profitable to its leaders while United Russia gets things done. Not an ideal situation to be sure, but one which many hands have made.

IN AN INVASION, WHEN CAN A SPADE BE CALLED A SPADE?

ARTICLE CRITIQUE

Response to Wall Street Journal Europe "Europe Exposes Russia's Guilt in Georgia" by Svante E. Cornell, October 2, 2009 

by Gordon Hahn 

The WSJ Europe article reviewed below provides an exceedingly one-sided view of the EU report on the cases, conduct, and consequences of the August 2008 Five-Day Georgian-Ossetian/Russian War.

To access the full analysis, please click here Download GH_WSJ_Cornell_2Oct2009

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Missile Defence. Medvedev has formally announced, after some confusion (again!) from various spokesmen, that the deployment of Iskander Missiles to Kaliningrad has been cancelled (they never were actually deployed – it was always conditional). Yesterday the Foreign Minister Lavrov said that the new US plans presented no risks for Russia, good conditions were present for dialogue and that Moscow and Washington would soon hold talks on missile defence. Of course: Moscow was concerned when the idea was to stop ICBMs, but defence against medium- and short- range missiles doesn’t bother it. On the other hand, Russia’s UN Ambassador said that it would complicate nuclear disarmament. I have often wished the Russian Foreign Ministry would get a better grip on its people and stop this dribble of confusing and partially contradictory statements. Mind you, NATO’s no better:  it is asking for help while encouraging Tbilisi’s NATO aspirations. What message will any of the suspicious people out there take from these pairs of statements?

EU Report. The report was published last week. It is probably not a coincidence that the next day PACE rejected Tbilisi’s motion to deprive Russia of voting rights. Nino Burjanadze has accused the government of covering up the report; while Saakashvili has hailed it as complete vindication some Georgians are claiming that Russian money is to be found there.  I regard it as rather little, rather late, naïve and incomplete; my argument is here. But at least it knows who started the war.

THE EU REPORT: LITTLE AND LATE

COMMENTARY

by Patrick Armstrong

The long-delayed Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia was finally issued on 30 September, 13 months after the war. It is to be found here: Vol I (Introductory); Vol II (Report); Vol III (Submitted material). In what follows quotations are from the BBC-supplied version (which is somewhat faster loading). Generally speaking, I regard it as rather little, rather late, naïve and incomplete. It is also excruciatingly delicate – even precious – in what it says and what it avoids saying. It concludes with a number of unexceptionable, but rather vague, recommendations.

It is incomplete because it, evidently seeing the conflict as one between Georgia and Russia as other commentators have, leaves the Ossetians out. While the authors feel it useful to give some historical background on Georgia, going back to the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783, there is no equivalent discussion of the Ossetian (or Abkhazian) point of view. But, if asked, Ossetians would certainly speak of their unwillingness to be part of Georgia and refer to earlier Georgian attacks in 1920 and 1991. Their arguments for independent status (here is Abkhazia’s) should be heard out even if they are to be refuted. Tendentious perhaps but a significant factor in Ossetian (and Abkhazian) perceptions. The fact is that the Ossetians, rightly or wrongly, do not want to be part of Georgia, fought for their independence when the Russian Empire collapsed, were placed in the Georgian SSR by Stalin-Jughashvili, tried to be excluded from it when the USSR collapsed, fought another independence war and, very probably, stopped the Georgian attack before the Russian forces got there (some Tskhinvali combat footage at 7:50). To leave their point of view out of the Report is to be incomplete. Added to which, the discussion about their citizenship (the authors assert that they were Georgian citizens) is to altogether ignore their contention that, while they were certainly Soviet citizens in 1991, they never agreed to becoming Georgian citizens. Indeed the world recognised Georgia, in the borders that Stalin gave it, while the disputes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were actually going on.