Russia's approach to the Middle East is based on a worldview that is fundamentally different from the one shared by the West.
The currently dominant discourse in Russia is that of a culture that incorporates both Western and Eastern influences while preserving its own distinctiveness. As supporters of the so-called "civilizational approach", they insist on protecting Russia's distinct values, and their foreign policy debate is increasingly framed in cultural categories.
The Kremlin has identified two prominent threats to its vision of Russia as a civilization at the intersection of the Western and Islamic worlds. The first of these threats is radicalized and militant Islam. Russian analysts and politicians often speak of special relations with Muslims but differentiate between moderate and radical Islamists. President Vladimir Putin has expressed his respect for traditional Islam, saying that it is integral to Russia's religious, cultural and social fabric. Putin has also made a point of separating moderate Islam from "all forms of religious intolerance and extremism."
Putin speech. At the St Petersburg Forum. On a recurrent theme, he said that the economy must reduce its dependence on hydrocarbons and that foreign investment was necessary: “This is why we feel that creating an investment climate that is not just favourable, but truly better and more competitive, is a key issue in state policy.” A commissioner for entrepreneurs’ rights, Boris Titov, has been named (he immediately said he would press for pardons for the many in jail for economic crimes – including Khodorkovskiy. I wonder how that will play out). The government will reduce its holdings in state-owned companies. Medvedev received much attention at the start of his presidency for talking about Russia’s “legal nihilism”; well, here’s Putin: “Unfortunately corruption is without exaggeration the biggest threat to our development”. Same team, same program. In fact there are those who think Putin came back as President because only he has the muscle to take on corruption. There is a hint in the speech that he takes the G20 more seriously than the G8. An important speech to read and not read about: making Russia a more attractive place for foreign investment will be a high priority. He’s not naïve: “a fairly difficult and ambitious goal, given our position today”.
Today’s Video. Putin is a believing Christian. I heard that a long time ago and here’s a video collection.
The cards are re-dealt. After the usual considerations, negotiations and calculations, the re-shuffle is probably complete. There is a new government with many new faces. A new Security Council – most positions ex-officio. Defence is unchanged (many thought Serdyukov was going to go) but there is a new Interior Minister (police reform has proved to be somewhat unfinished). Sergey Lavrov continues as Foreign Minister. True to his habit, Putin has sent no one into the darkness; many of the old faces being “kicked upstairs”. Neo-Kremlinologists are scrying the auguries but as far as I can see, we have the same Team, with new people moved up from the “farm teams”. What ought to be apparent, after more than a decade’s observation, is that Putin has created a remarkably collegial, discreet and effective team. He’s had a few former insiders join the opposition but (I can’t resist) nothing like Saakashvili who has seen almost every former minister, associate and ambassador go into the opposition. Further thoughts coming Friday here.
Demographics. More good numbers: births up and deaths down and a fertility rate that is rising into the middle of developed countries. Anatoly Karlin has a discussion and summary of the first quarter’s numbers. The improvement is clearly not a “blip” but it’s not yet clear whether it is long-term. I have a question. We know that fertility rates can change suddenly (vide the “baby boom” in Canada and the USA after the war and the dramatic drop in Quebec in a few generations). All kind of personal factors come into play: national pride, hope (or not) for the future, affluence, education, religious beliefs and many more – millions of individual decisions that are mysteriously in step. My speculative question is this: might it be possible that positive factors are coming together in Russia and that its fertility rate might continue to grow? A few generations of Europe with negative fertility and Russia with positive would make a different world Something to watch.
Demonstrations. The opposition movement is losing steam. As we have seen before in post-Soviet Russia, it is one thing to agree on dislike of the present regime but quite another to agree on what comes next. An association of former ins wanting to get back in, communists, nationalists and “new young people” do not have very much in common. The two pre-eminent leaders (or actors: are there any “leaders”?) now appear to be the hard left Sergey Udaltsov and the anti-corruption (and rather nationalistic) Aleksey Navalniy. They agree on their dislike of Putin &Co and people from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Is that enough to make a match? Perhaps, nationalism and socialism have co-existed before. Meanwhile the anti-Putin demos are getting smaller and, in some cases we see a return to the provocative demos (ie no permit or breaking the permit) that characterised opposition protests in the Luzhkov days. Western reporters breathlessly write these up and diplomats huff but, really, now that it is clear that protesters can assemble in the tens of thousands so long as they do what they apply to do, what is the point of provocative demos? Udaltsov is calling for “a march of millions” for the day before Putin’s swearing in but it seems very unlikely that anything like that will turn out. It’s over for the moment: a VTsIOM poll indicates interest is waning. And, the basic premise that the Duma elections were stolen has still not produced any convincing evidence. And even less so in the case of Putin’s victory. Amusingly, some media people have set up a mock Facebook group “Journalists Against Demonstrations”. Presumably if they hold a “Demo against Demos” they won’t cover it.
Some attention has been paid to an address to the Russian people on 23 November in which President Medvedev set out Russia’s possible reaction should its concerns about the European Missile Defence system not be accommodated. For once, the Western media reported it reasonably accurately with most news outlets echoing the BBC’s heading: “Medvedev sees arms race if missile shield not agreed”. A conditional statement: if this, then that.
Several events this week prompt a reconsideration of a potential deal breaker in the U.S.-Russian ‘reset’ or thaw, and the failed policy of NATO expansion without Russia which was adopted by the Clinton Administration in the mid-1990s.
First, the anniversary of the Five-Day August 2008 Georgian-Russian War passed with Georgia still deprived of 30 percent of its perceived territory––and Abkhazia and South Ossetiya set on a long road to real independence. This was the price Georgia paid for its own hubris and the West’s clumsy interference in a region it poorly understands. That interference was driven by the policy of NATO expansion, which militarized American and Western democracy-promotion efforts and piqued Russian resistance to them.
In addition, American policy was driven in large part by the anti-Russian biases of many U.S. post-sovietologists, analysts, and journalists when it comes to assessing Russia’s relations with its own minorities and former Soviet nationalities. Often, these relations are caricatured on the model of the white hats and the black hats. The Russians are cast as the nasty black-hated nationalistic imperialists, while the peoples like Georgians and their nationalist leaders are cast as the good guys, ‘beacons of democracy.’
Since the reset button in U.S.-Russian relations has been pressed, Russia and the West have learned to cooperate on multiple issues from Iran and Afghanistan to nuclear arms control. Still, the momentum for improving Western ties with Russia seems to be caught in a holding pattern. It seems that both sides are increasingly frustrated with each other's policies.
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently condemned Russia for its sharp reaction to NATO's plans for a missile defense system in Europe. The Kremlin threatened to develop new intercontinental ballistic missiles that could spark a new arms race. Clearly frustrated, Rasmussen chided Russia's outdated thinking. "We are not a threat to Russia, we will not attack Russia, we will not undermine the security of Russia," he said. The Kremlin, however, maintains that NATO's missile defense plans could undermine Russia's security as soon as 2020, when the system's fourth phase will be deployed. Moscow is suspicious of the fact that in response to the concerns it voices, it only receives vague, rhetorical assurances and other brushoffs.
When my son was a toddler, he believed that the wind was caused by trees moving their “arms” (that is, branches) and that the wind would stop once the trees kept their “arms” still. The proposition that the recent attempt at US-Russia détente – unnecessarily given the fashionable term “reset” – is driven by the will of President Obama, or even by the “pragmatism” of such minor officials/academics as Michael McFaul, Washington’s next ambassador to Russia, is surely just as childish.
Any adult with an ounce of understanding of history and the basic laws of economics knows that America’s post-war empire has fatally overextended itself and that it needs urgently to adjust its global ambitions in line with the brutal reality of its economic bankruptcy. A state which has managed to run up unsustainable fiscal deficits and sovereign debt and whose political system, moreover, is so dysfunctional that it does not yet understand the seriousness of its condition (never mind being able to begin to deliver a credible way out of the crisis) is not equipped to embark on another Cold War with Russia.
Police Reform. According to the Minister, one third of the top police officers did not survive the screening and have been dismissed – 119 of 335. That is not a trivial percentage and to my mind shows the effort is real. The idea was that the senior officers would be vetted by the Presidential Administration and juniors by the seniors – perhaps it would have been smarter to wait until the seniors’ vetting was over before beginning the juniors. But the effort isn’t over yet.
Court activity. Lots of activity in the legal system. In old cases, the Moscow City Court announced that it would hear an appeal against the new jail term for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev on 17 May. This follows last week’s Supreme Court ruling that their pre-trial detention was not legal. Perhaps we will see a reduction in sentence or maybe even an acquittal. Valeriy Borshchev, of the presidential council on human rights, said that that body’s investigation showed that charges against Sergey Magnitskiy (who died in pre-trail detention 18 months ago) were fabricated. Meanwhile, in Switzerland, a money-laundering probe against a former Russian tax official has been opened at the request of the company with which he was associated. In on-going cases, two defendants accused of the murders of Stanislav Markelov and Anastasia Baburova in January 2009 have attempted suicide; the verdict was supposed to come out today. And in coming cases, the Russian Audit Chamber says it will sue the former Bank of Moscow president, Andrey Borodin, for US$1 billion (the sum he is supposed to have extracted from Moscow City). Medvedev’s campaign against “legal nihilism” presumably excludes pre-determined verdicts, fabricated evidence and requires punishment. We will see how these work out. Meanwhile Medvedev signed into law an extension of defence lawyers’ rights.
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