Russia: Other Points of View

RESPONSE TO ESTONIAN DEFENSE MINISTER'S ERRONEOUS ARTICLE

Problems of Expansionism: Russia, NATO, and Georgia

by Gordon M. Hahn

A September 10^th Wall Street Journal article by Estonia’s Defense Minister Urmas Reinsalu (printed below) demonstrates why NATO expansion has been the biggest among the US’s post-Cold War foreign policy mistakes––especially when it comes to Russia.  NATO expansion by the U.S. and other western countries, has made it impossible to fashion a balanced policy that takes into account the security interests of both Russia and its neighbors.  Moreover, it has brought more radically Russophobic countries in the former Soviet Union into NATO, prompting more expansion and thus Moscow’s continuing angst about the military bloc.  Minister Reinsalu presents a deliberately distorted view of the August 2008 Georgian-Ossetian-Russian war and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent statements regarding that war.

Minster Reinsalu claims that Putin “told reporters that he had approved Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia two years before it took place.”  But Putin said nothing of the sort.  Putin was responding to a journalist’s question at a press conference as to whether “Russia did not really have plan of action in the event of military aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia?” Putin responded: “There was a plan, and, in my opinion, this is no secret, specifically within the framework of this plan the Russian side also acted.  I already have spoken about this publicly earlier as well.  It (the plan) was approved and agreed upon by me.” 

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY, FRANCE AND RUSSIA?

REPRINTS

www.stratfor.com

by George Friedman

The idea of Germany having an independent national strategy runs  counter to everything that Germany has wanted to be since World War II  and everything the world has wanted from Germany. In a way, the entire  structure of modern Europe was created to take advantage of Germany's  economic dynamism while avoiding the threat of German domination. In  writing about German strategy, I am raising the possibility that the  basic structure of Western Europe since World War II and of Europe as  a whole since 1991 is coming to a close.
If so, then the question is whether historical patterns of German  strategy will emerge or something new is coming. It is, of course,  always possible that the old post-war model can be preserved.  Whichever it is, the future of German strategy is certainly the most  important question in Europe and quite possibly in the world.

Origins of Germany's Strategy

Before 1871, when Germany was fragmented into a large number of small  states, it did not pose a challenge to Europe. Rather, it served as a  buffer between France on one side and Russia and Austria on the other.  Napoleon and his campaign to dominate Europe first changed the status  of Germany, both overcoming the barrier and provoking the rise of  Prussia, a powerful German entity. Prussia became instrumental in  creating a united Germany in 1871, and with that, the geopolitics of  Europe changed.

What had been a morass of states became not only a unified country but  also the most economically dynamic country in Europe -- and the one  with the most substantial ground forces. Germany was also  inherently  insecure. Lacking any real strategic depth, Germany could not survive  a simultaneous attack by France and Russia. Therefore, Germany's core  strategy was to prevent the emergence of an alliance between France  and Russia. However, in the event that there was no alliance between  France and Russia, Germany was always tempted to solve the problem in  a more controlled and secure way, by defeating France and ending the  threat of an alliance. This is the strategy Germany has chosen for  most of its existence.

RETHINKING THE RESET

REPRINTS

Moscow Times, 01 July 2011

by Andrei Tsygankov

Since the reset button in U.S.-Russian relations has been pressed, Russia and the West have learned to cooperate on multiple issues from Iran and Afghanistan to nuclear arms control. Still, the momentum for improving Western ties with Russia seems to be caught in a holding pattern. It seems that both sides are increasingly frustrated with each other's policies.

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently condemned Russia for its sharp reaction to NATO's plans for a missile defense system in Europe. The Kremlin threatened to develop new intercontinental ballistic missiles that could spark a new arms race. Clearly frustrated, Rasmussen chided Russia's outdated thinking. "We are not a threat to Russia, we will not attack Russia, we will not undermine the security of Russia," he said.
The Kremlin, however, maintains that NATO's missile defense plans could undermine Russia's security as soon as 2020, when the system's fourth phase will be deployed. Moscow is suspicious of the fact that in response to the concerns it voices, it only receives vague, rhetorical assurances and other brushoffs.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Alarums past. In November, accepting an award, the well-known Russian media personality Leonid Parfyonov gave a speech excoriating the state of the news media in Russia: a culture in which reporters were a species of “state official” ever attentive to their “boss’s bosses”; one in which everyone understood there were stories that “that can be broadcast on television and those that cannot”. This attracted some attention together with mentions of reporters killed or harmed in Putin’s time. While there is no doubt a good deal of truth in what he said, charges of control or bias in what is and is not broadcast are not unknown elsewhere. He also intimated that Russian TV was being dumbed down. Well that’s hardly unique to Russia either. In my opinion, anybody who depends on the MSM in any country for his news is missing a lot and the New Media is winning everywhere. And in Russia, you can read criticisms similar to Parfyonov’s translated from foreign media on the Net if you want to. But the point is that, whatever mixture of truth and exaggeration there may have been in his observations, it seems that nothing has happened to him. He lives and thrives.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

NATO-Russia. A major change, at least on the rhetorical level. NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept. About Russia it said: “NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance… we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia… the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined”. Medvedev attended the last day and a  joint statement reiterated the above. Russia was invited to join a Europe-wide missile defence system. Medvedev welcomed all this at the press conference. Undeniably a major step forward in cooperation, quite unimaginable two years ago. But, given that I regard NATO as little more than a “rhetorical organisation”, implementation will have to come from bilateral activity. As a first result Moscow has signed an agreement that NATO’s military equipment can pass through Russia; in both directions it seems.

Corruption. Ella Pamfilova gives the most intelligent discussion of what she calls Russia’s “systemic corruption” I’ve seen so far, neither the extreme of “nothing is happening” nor that it’s all under control. (JRL/2010/216/2). Formerly human rights council head, she now heads the Russian branch of Transparency International (it is reported that she will receive the Order of Honour “for her longstanding productive government activity”). She said that before changes in 2008, Russian law had been completely inadequate. For her the principal problem is people “ensconced within the regime” feeding off state contracts. She was insistent that there must be the possibility of bottom-up action: media freedom is essential; informers must be protected; elections give the possibility of removing corrupt officials whereas, if appointed from above, “there is absolutely nothing that people can do”. The Web will also help. (“If you can electronically enrol your child in a kindergarten, who are you going to pay -- the computer?”). Visible arrests of important people are necessary: the effort has to be seen to “draw blood”. Worth a read.

US-RUSSIA RELATIONS

REPRINTS

U.S. - Russia Relations in Pre-Summit Flux

This report is republished with express permission of STRATFOR http://www.stratfor.com

Just days before the NATO summit in Lisbon in which Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama will meet, Medvedev has postponed his annual State of the State address from Nov. 22 to Nov. 30 to account for a possible shift in U.S.-Russian relations, according to STRATFOR sources in Moscow.

Over the past six months, Moscow and Washington had set many of their disagreements aside to achieve more critical goals. Russia wanted aid on its modernization and privatization programs, a cessation of Western support for Georgia and Ukraine, and a freeze on ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans in Russia’s periphery. The United States wanted Russia to sign onto sanctions against Iran and to drop support for Tehran, as well as provide increased logistical support for the war in Afghanistan. On all these issues, there was some sort of common ground found, meaning that Moscow and Washington seemed to have struck a temporary detente.

THE THIRD TURN

ROPV CONTRIBUTORS

by Patrick Armstrong

The hypothesis of this essay is that the conventional Western view of post-Communist Russia has passed through two cycles and is entering a third. While the first two were grounded mostly on what observers wished to see, the third is shaping up to be based more on reality.

Little Brother

As Tom Graham wisely observed some years ago: while no one will take seriously a country with a declining GDP, no one can ignore one whose GDP is rising. When the USSR fell apart in 1991, its extraordinarily centralised economy, whose links were now were blocked by new national borders, choked and died. Living standards sank, inflation exploded, the tax base collapsed, state employees went months without pay, factory employees were paid in kind, the social support system failed and the demographic decline that had begun in the Khrushchev period accelerated. All indicators worsened at once. This was the time when “free fall” was a favourite descriptor. A reminder of this period was a piece that appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in 2001, starkly entitled: “Russia is Finished.” Still available on the Net, it makes curious reading today.

THE NORTHERN TRIANGLE: U.S. - EUROPEAN RELATIONS AT ANOTHER CROSSROADS

COMMENTARY

By Gordon M. Hahn

In an October 25^th New York Times article “Will the U.S. Lose Europe to Russia?” John Vinocur notes the declining ability of the U.S. to shape politics in Europe and Eurasia, pointing out the decision by Russia, Germany, and France to act more autonomously on regional security issues: “The United States used to call wayward members of NATO back to the reservation with a whistle or a shout. It decided what was deviation from doctrine, and that decision was pretty much law.  When the Obama administration stamped its foot this time, no one snapped to attention. Rather, Germany and France, meeting with Russia in Deauville, northern France, last week, signaled that they planned to make such three-cornered get-togethers on international foreign policy and security matters routine, and even extend them to inviting other ‘partners’ ­ pointing, according to diplomats from two countries, to Turkey becoming a future participant.”

The irony here is that the very policy intended to prevent such a development – NATO expansion – has become the cause of this development.  The expansion of NATO to member-states of the former Soviet bloc Warsaw Pact produced the predicted results.  It split NATO into anti-Russian and quasi-pro-Russian camps; the former in the east, the latter in the west.  U.S. insistence on isolating Russia provoked a backlash from Moscow.  The Kremlin’s backlash scared Berlin, Paris, and even Rome, pushing them to find their own modus vivendi with the Kremlin.  In addition, the ongoing domestic and foreign policy changes in Russia, which few in the U.S. considered real, has opened up new vistas for cooperation between Russia and Europe.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

NATO. NATO’s courtship of Russia proceeds: now, according to the Secretary General, Russia is a “partner of strategic importance”. An earlier meeting between Russia’s CGS and SACEUR seems to have passed off productively. So maybe, although inevitably it will be concealed in NATO’s wooden language, the Lisbon summit may produce a breakthrough in relations – long overdue but welcome nonetheless. I could understand if Moscow, after 15 years of abuse and no longer the suppliant, were cool to NATO's overtures. But for the good of us all I hope it rises to the occasion.

Gas wars. Now that the zero-sum emotions are draining out of the gas price question, negotiations are quietly proceeding. Ukraine, which is in dire economic straits (the EU has just granted it a loan – after billions from the IMF), probably can’t pay the price previously agreed to (indeed one can wonder whether that’s where the loans have gone). So somewhat of a reduction appears to have been negotiated and a working group has been set up. In the meantime Moscow and Warsaw have quietly made an agreement. As another indication of the “Third Turn”, the EU Energy Commissioner proposed that Russian experts participate in developing the new European energy strategy. Amazing what you can do when you take geopolitical fantasies out of business discussions. The customers need the gas, Russia needs the customers: each has the upper hand, so to speak.

RUSSIA INCLUDES EUROPEANS IN UKRAINE ENERGY PACT

REPRINTS

This report is republished with express permission of STRATFOR http://www.stratfor.com

October 27, 2010

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart, Nikolai Azarov, held talks in Kiev on Oct. 27. The two countries signed several bilateral agreements, mainly focusing on energy. An oil transit agreement, shale gas exploration deal and pact on a joint nuclear venture were among the agreements signed. But STRATFOR sources in Moscow have said a more significant agreement concerning Ukraine’s natural gas system was not publicized to the media.

STRATFOR has documented Russia’s growing influence in Ukraine since the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich took office. This has included landmark deals including a lease extension for Russia’s naval base in Sevastopol in exchange for a significant reduction in the price that Russia charges Ukraine for natural gas. But Moscow has been looking to increase its control of Kiev’s most prized asset: Ukrainian state energy firm Naftogaz, which controls Ukraine’s pipeline and energy transit infrastructure. At first, Moscow and Kiev discussed merging Naftogaz with Russia’s natural gas giant Gazprom. However, internal politics in Ukraine and vehement opposition from the European Union stalled those talks. When Putin announced his trip to Kiev, it seemed those discussions could restart. Instead, STRATFOR sources in Moscow have said, the merger is off the table for now and another major deal was struck in Kiev — a private agreement between the European Union and Russia on how to run Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. An EU delegation just happened to be in Kiev on Oct. 27, and sources say the delegates were in on part of the Putin-Azarov talks.

Moscow decided that in order to make the Europeans feel more confident in Russia’s energy supplies, it would strike a deal with Brussels and not Kiev on the Ukrainian system. This accomplishes three things for Moscow. First, it assures the Europeans that though Ukraine is back in the Russian fold, Russia still has the incentive to involve the Europeans in energy matters concerning Ukraine. Second, it keeps any European discussion of Ukraine’s energy system between Moscow and Brussels instead of involving Kiev. Third, it reminds Kiev that from now on, the future of its energy transit system and any negotiations regarding the infrastructure will depend on Moscow