PUTIN'S POLITICAL PERESTROIKA: CONSTRUCTING A SYSTEM, OBSTRUCTING THE STREET

COMMENTARY

By Gordon M. Hahn

Amidst his ongoing crackdown on the more irreconcilable (in some cases, radical street opposition leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued some aspects of Dmitrii Medvedev’s political liberalization or ‘perestroika 2.0’.

         

Medevedev proposed a number of important liberalizing political reforms prior to the December 2011 Duma elections. Riots and subsequent mass demonstrations erupted which were led by a coalition of democratic, nationalist and socialist organizations.  Almost all of the reforms were implemented before Putin’s return to the Kremlin.  Of the two that were not, the most important was Medvedev’s proposal to return to the pre-Putin “Yeltsin era” electoral system for the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament.  Under that system Duma deputies were, and now will be elected again (in 2016), in two ways. First, 225 deputies are elected according to the percentage of votes given to political parties; the other 225 elected in single-mandate districts.

In his first term, Putin abolished the single district voting, so that all 450 deputies were elected according to the party list balloting.  At the time, many people were critical of this ostensibly undemocratic move. Previously many commentators had argued for a purely party or ‘proportional representation’ vote, in order to develop Russia’s historically weak political parties.  New criticism of the return to the mixed party-list-district system now asserts that the plethora of opposition parties will result in new liberalized party registration procedures that will divide the opposition vote and leave their parties outside the parliament and on the streets as before. 

It remains unclear why Russia’s opposition parties can’t merge and reduce their numbers to create a coalition of large democratic, nationalist, socialist opposition parties, thus avoiding the atomization problem.

The ‘white ribbon’ opposition’s leaders proposed a solution to atomization in meetings with then President Medvedev a year ago: allow the creation of election blocs consisting of several parties.  Under such a scheme, parties and blocs would comprise the list of parties for which voters could cast their ballots in the party list (for the voting half of the Duma vote). 

In a marathon press conference in December Putin called for a discussion of this idea, signaling he might accept such a compromise.  Now it has been included in the draft law that will return Russia to the mixed Duma election system.  Plus, there is a proposal that the barrier (which party blocs will have to reach in order to gain a share of Duma seats) will be set at 7 percent instead of the 5 percent barrier for individual parties.

In sum, it appears Putin is making a significant compromise with the opposition and allowing the liberalization of the electoral system as proposed by Medvedev, to carry forward. 

Given the crackdown on some opposition activists and leaders, how does one explain Putin’s liberal moves.  First, it is clear that he takes the opposition’s political potential seriously, and is wise enough to accommodate it to some extent.  At the same time, by opening up the system, the Kremlin can draw into it the more moderate opposition elements and thereby perhaps split and weaken the strength of the street opposition.  In addition, by pressuring the more radical elements prevalent among the nationalists and socialists with the threat of criminal investigations (such as those being leveled against Aleksandr Navalnyi) in addition to the risks of exorbitant fines for violating demonstration laws and agreements, Putin may drive the more democratic and risk-averse elements into the system, thus isolating the beleaguered irreconcilables and radicals. 

As insurance, Putin retains the option of permitting or encouraging more election fraud to compensate for any decline in United Russia’s share of the vote.  However, this option has become less feasible because of the mobilization of opposition groups in general, since the opposition coalesced in response to real and perceived cheating and because of increased activism in voting monitoring by such groups as the League of Voters.

Another reform of the political system that Putin has seen through is a new system for electing senators. The Russian constitution requires that one senator from each region be selected by the governor, and the other selected by the regional legislative assembly. As has been noted elsewhere, last spring Russia returned to the election of governors after having had them appointed for  several years.  Now a regional gubernatorial candidate is allowed to select a list of three senatorial nominees, one of whom (if he wins) will become the executive branch senator for that region.

The legislative branch’s senator must now be elected from among its deputies, whereas before, under a system instituted by Medvedev, the legislatures could select any elected official from the region.  Importantly, the new law requires that senators have lived in the region they wish to represent for at least five years. 

During Putin’s first two terms, senators were selected who had never step foot in the region they were expected to represent, and the Kremlin exerted pressure on governors and regional legislators to select Putin favorites.  For example, the Republic of Tyva’s two senators were close associates of Putin’s from St. Petersburg.  Moreover, Putin has stated recently that direct elections of senators could become the norm in the future.

         

In sum, the Kremlin’s continued reforms of the political system appear to be half of a two-tier strategy of carrot and a stick in relation to the opposition.  On the one hand there is the carrot: the electoral system is being opened up, and the possibility of real opposition forces taking a significant number of seats in the Duma exists.  On the other hand there is the stick of continued harassment and the possibility of potential imprisonment of opposition leaders and activists.

One question remains unanswered: Is the two-tier strategy a reflection of confusion or division within Putin’s inner circle––or his own way of maintaining stability throughout Russia?

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Gordon M. Hahn is Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch; Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC; Senior Researcher and Adjunct Professor, Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program; and Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group. Dr Hahn is author of two well-received books, Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) and Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), which was named an outstanding title of 2007 by Choice magazine.  He has authored hundreds of articles in scholarly journals and other publications on Russian, Eurasian and international politics and founded and writes the CSIS Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER) at https://csis.org/node/33013/publication.