COMMENTARY
by Gordon M. Hahn
In the mid-1980s, the USSR’s last General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev instituted a policy of glasnost or openness in the Soviet media that allowed discussion of previously taboo topics. Gorbachev gradually expanded that policy and others took the ball and ran with it leading to the establishment of the first independent media during Gorbachev’s last years in power. Official glasnost in state media, in addition to the emergence of unofficial glasnost in independent media, helped to mobilize opposition and provoke splits within the Soviet regime which ultimately destroyed the regime and state.
During the tenure of Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency, accompanying thaw or liberalization policies (Perestroika 2.0), a somewhat similar glasnost has taken shape in the media. Medvedev signaled Glasnost 2.0 when he met with democratic opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta’s editor-in-chief Dmitrii Muratov and leading backer Mikhail Gorbachev months after his inauguration. Year 2011 was the peak year for Glasnost 2.0 so far, despite the fact that it was pivotal one for both the Duma elections of this year and the presidential elections of the coming year. The expectation induced by the U.S. mainstream media was that Putin would limit media freedoms more, not less, during such a period. He didn’t.
Although left out of almost all U.S. mainstream media and think tank analyses of Medvedev’s presidency, the recent media policies and subtle changes – Glasnost 2.0 – were substantial and helped spark the developing, though still potentially abortive, white revolution. Glasnost 2.0 has consisted of two basic elements: (1) continued protection of independent and quasi-independent media, especially the Internet and (2) greater glasnost in state media through both a liberalization of editorial policy for existing programs and the emergence of new politically-oriented talk shows. The former are regarded as the main sources of information for younger Russians, while the latter are seen as the main sources for older Russians.
Glasnost 2.0 and Freedom of Speech and Expression in Independent Media
Glasnost 2.0 has consisted first and foremost in continued freedom of speech and expression on the Internet. Russian and Western social networking sites like In Contact, Facebook, and Twitter were supported by Medvedev, who not only demanded that they remain free along with the rest of the Internet, but joined them (in contrast to the older Putin, who shows little interest in and even expressed disdain for them). Freedom on the Internet has allowed broader dissemination for more traditional independent media as well. The Internet, as a new television platform, gave birth to the oppositionist Rain TV project popular among the Medvedev and ‘white revolution’ generations. Long-standing websites of independent newspapers and semi-independent but nevertheless pro-democracy oriented television and radio stations like the eternal Novaya Gazeta and Ekho Moskvy radio and the newer REN TV became important organizational and communication resources for the white revolution’s December 2011 demonstrations on Bolotnaya Square, Sakharov Prospekt, and across the country.
Even as media became more strident in their openness and oppositional orientation, Glasnost’ 2.0 began to ever so slowly thaw politics, sparking cracks within the ruling group; yet the new media were not interfered with in any substantial way by the Medvedev-Putin tandem. In some cases – like Ekho Moskvy radio (which is also a major video, television, and Internet presence) – they continued to receive indirect state funding from Gasprom, the state gas company. Putin even supported the new glasnost and independent journalism, when he issued awards to oppositionist journalists in November 2011. Mikhail Beketov, who was beaten and left partially paralyzed for investigating the Khimki Forest highway construction scandal (at the center of which stand interests tied supposedly to the Kremlin) was honored. The democratic opposition newspaper Novaya gazeta’s Yelena Petrovskaya and opposition journalist Sergei Parkhomenko, were likewise honored (Alexander Bratersky, “Putin Awards Opposition Journalist,” Moscow Times, 2 November 2011). Similarly, the authorities initiated a new de-Stalinization effort to renew that which began under Gorbachev, by installing into the public school curriculum, including Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago, in 2009 and by announcing this year that a new cultural center on the history of the Gulag will be built in the center of Moscow (“Gulag Cultural Center to open in Moscow,” RIA Novosti, 3 November 2011,).
All of the above is known, but left unreported in the U.S. mainstream media. Less known and also left entirely unmentioned has been the ongoing “Glasnost 2.0” in Russian state-owned or state-controlled mass media.
Glasnost 2.0 in State Media
There has been an expanding glasnost on state-controlled television, where most Russians still get their political news. Old programs were allowed greater leeway in their discussions of political issues, and many new politically-oriented ‘infotainment’ programs. News and talk shows appeared to expand the envelope of permissible political discourse. For example, in October 2008, five months after Medvedev’s assumption of the presidency and the instutionalization of the tandem, the state channel ‘Pervyi Kanal’ (First Channel) premiered the infotainment-style talk show ‘Pust’ Govoryat’ (Let Them Speak) led by Andrei Malakhov and featuring discussion and analysis of various political and social issues (for a list of show topics see www.1tv.ru/sprojects/si=5685). A similar but more politically oriented program, Sergei Minaev’s ‘Chestnyi Ponedelnik’ (Honest Monday), began appearing on state-controlled NTV in September 2009 (for show topics see http://ponedelnik.tv/).
Among others more recently, Andrei Makarov’s new program ‘Svoboda i Spravedlivost’’ (Freedom and Justice or SiS), which began appearing in September 2011 on the state channel Pervyi Kanal stands out. In a turn of events reminiscent of the first perestroika era, SiS’s predecessor program Spravedlivost’ on REN TV was taken off the air a year prior after an edition highly critical of the MVD was aired. The reform/opposition-oriented Nezavisimaya gazeta awarded SiS as the second most notable television event of the year and acclaimed it a “program for those who have not unlearned how to think” that tries “not to skim the surface horizontally but dig extremely deep along the vertical” (a possible reference to Putin’s self-proclaimed ‘vertical of power’ system) and “seeks justice in the absence of freedom, while not hiding the deficit of freedom.” Makarov himself notes: “In my view, television is an amazing instrument and it is the only one that the boorish, the impudent, and briber-takers – the people who often represent the state – fear. I am convinced that the most effective cure for our society’s ills is the public and honest discussion of our problems and conversation without political exploitation and topics ordered from above” (“Tok-shou ‘Svoboda i spravedlivost’,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 December 2011).
Glasnost 2.0 in the Duma Elections and Post-Election Demonstrations
Glasnost’ has also been prevalent in the election campaign, the post-election debate about the scale of falsifications in the vote count, and the subsequent ‘Honest Election’ demonstrations on Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Prospect. Page 8 of the OSCE report on the elections noted several improvements towards creating a more even playing field for registered parties to run in the Duma elections. In particular, it noted: “Debates on national television were attended by all contestants and provided parties with one level platform for reaching out to voters”. Others noted that the debates were “sometimes marked by truly dramatic, breath-taking moments” ¬and “revived an interest in free politics and an uncensored media in Russia. The debates appeared genuinely free of taboos imposed from above. … Less than 48 hours before voting, the ‘Rossiya’ state TV channel aired a debate between the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and his opponent from the liberal Yabloko party, Sergey Mitrokhin, with Mr. Mitrokhin openly lashing out at Prime Minister Putin, President Medvedev, and their ruling tandem. While the tension in the audience was palpable, the broadcast was not interrupted and Yabloko's leader was allowed to continue without hindrance from the program host. Similar ideas critical of the ruling Putin-Medvedev duo were voiced by Mr. Mitroknin in an interview aired by the REN TV channel. … Russian TV proved it can air more than endless beauty contests, culinary lessons, and serials about blondes and macho-type secret agents. The election campaign marked a comeback for the hard-hitting political talk-shows” (Sergey Strokan, “The present is another country,” Russia Today, 17 December 2011, www.russiatoday.com).
Indeed, during the campaign Russian state channels also allowed harsh criticism of the Russian government outside of the Duma debates’ forum. On November 6th, a month before the vote, for example, state channel Rossiya’s program ‘Special Correspondent’ carried a discussion of several issues, including road safety, corruption, and Medvedev’s police reforms. One participant, Vladimir Solovyev, who himself hosts a television program on state television, castigated the authorities, in particular President Medvedev and MVD chief Rashid Nurgaliev, for not doing enough to see through the noted reforms. For example, Solovyev said that instead of President Dmitriy Medvedev “expressing outrage about everybody stealing,” the authorities should “start observing standards” and even “invite foreign specialists.” He noted: “We should not be shy to draw on the best Western experience and bring experts here. That is the path we followed in sport by bringing managers to Russia. Perhaps it is time to bring in ministers? Perhaps it is time to bring administrators to Russia. At least they are not yet as good at stealing as we are” (“Russian state TV debate speakers in rare criticism of government,” BBC Monitoring, 6 November 2011 citing the ‘Special Correspondent’ program, Rossiya 1, 6 November 2011).
After the elections, aside from the kind of unmediated glasnost evident in allowing the December 10th and 24th mass demonstrations to go forward, various Russian media, including the completely state-controlled channels, covered the demonstrations to one extent or another. State television and radio also provided airtime for open discussions of the demonstrations and elections results. For example, on December 21st SiS carried an open and wide-ranging debate on the December 10th demonstration on Bolotnaya Square.
On December 18th GazProm-owned and thus state-controlled NTV Mir channel’s ‘Tsentralnoe Televidenie’ (Central Television) program carried a brutally sarcastic and satirical review of Putin’s annual marathon press conference held three days prior. BBC Monitoring noted: “Pushing back the editorial boundaries further than it had ever done before, the latest edition of the programme also said that Putin's popularity had fallen sharply in recent years, showed him being heckled at a recent sporting event and even compared him to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, former Cuban leader Fidel Castro as well as a fictitious tyrannical ruler.” The following excerpts from the commentary of the program correspondent Aleksei Kudashov are instructive of the broadcast’s ironic and scaulding tenor (author’s inserted explanations with italics comments below):
“Nothing seems to have changed. The same set. The same crowd diluted with loyal guardians of sovereign democracy (the Putin era’s chief slogan). And it seems that the same country is glued to the screens. And the invariable picture of people's masses aligned in the shape of a crescent before TV cameras, which suggests that the choreographer of this act is a secret admirer of Yevgeniy Shvarts (Soviet author of the allegorical play The Dragon, in which residents of a city passively submit to a dragon’s autocratic rule).”
“Here is Vladimir Putin exposing swindles and kickbacks, not somewhere else, but in the government of the country whose president he was.”
“At some point, I even stopped wanting to join the rallies. With such a presidential candidate, there is no need for any opposition. A bit more and he would have himself exposed a certain party of crooks and thieves” (“a certain party of crooks and thieves” is a reference to the ruling Yedinaya Rossiya or United Russia party). (“Russian TV programme pours ridicule on Putin,” BBC Monitoring, 18 December 2011 citing the ‘Central Television’ program, NTV Mir, 18 December 2011.)
Conclusions
Two and a half decades ago, Glasnost 2.0 provided mind space, food for thought, inspiration, and hope for political change. In addition, the contrast between these with the less-open Putin presidency, sparked rising expectations––in addition to frustration with the slowness and limits of change under the tandem’s early liberalization policy in addition to its future plans. Thus, Medvedev’s first significant re-democratization proposals – made in his annual address to Russia’s Federal Assembly in mid-December – were late in coming. Similarly, during Gorbachev’s Perstroika 1.0 as well, the pace of reforms quickly began to lag behind the pace of public demands for democratization, economic growth, marketization, and federative reforms.
However, there are real differences between the dynamics of Perestroika 1.0 and Perestroika 2.0. The pent up demand for change today is not as great as it was then. In theory, the pace of reform can quickly catch up with present and rising expectations. Also, there is not nearly as far to go today in order to achieve the basic conditions of democracy and the market reforms that Russian citizens are beginning to demand.
On the other hand, glasnost and democratization remain inextricably linked, as they were earlier. If the demand for greater glasnost, indeed for independent media and fuller freedom of political expression were not part of the demands for democratization, the Kremlin could accelerate political and other reforms faster than media reforms––in order to slow down the growth of discontent and the demands to help it stay ahead of the curve. Unfortunately for the tandem, the two are inextricably interlinked.
The Kremlin’s job now is to negotiate with the opposition and/or keep up with a potentially accelerating rise in demands and expectations – this is the stuff of which revolutions and other modes of regime transformation are made.
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Gordon M. Hahn is Analyst/Consultant, Russia Other Points of View – Russia Media Watch; Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.; Senior Researcher, Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program; Visiting Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies; and Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group. Dr Hahn is author of two well-received books, Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002) and Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007), which was named an outstanding title of 2007 by Choice magazine. He has authored hundreds of articles in scholarly journals and other publications on Russian, Eurasian and international politics and publishes the Islam, Islamism, and Politics in Eurasia Report (IIPER) at CSIS at http://csis.org/program/russia-and-eurasia-program.
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