COMMENTARY
by Andrei Liakhov
Any presidential campaign is very expensive. It is a universal rule of modern politics that the better funded candidate always wins. This is equally true of the US, Russia, France, Lithuania, Austria. I randomly selected countries with different political systems and different structure of the electorate. This rule becomes even more important where there are no major political differences between candidates’ platforms. However any, even the best funded candidate, needs a well organized and oiled election machine to persuade the electorate that he is the best of available choices. These are the basic starting points of any election campaign.
Where one of the candidates is an incumbent head of state, the track record of his last office is important, but not crucial (Bush Sr. is not a suitable example as Clinton campaign was much better funded and organized, and I cannot find a recent example of a better funded incumbent president losing his second election campaign). Although establishment support usually plays only a very modest role in a developed society, any CIS elections are often heavily influenced (if not determined) by the establishment throwing its collective support behind a chosen candidate.
Medvedev has to consider all of these factors before deciding whether to run as an independent:
1. Funding – Before moving to civil service Medvedev owned quite a large chunk of a very large and very successful forestry business (Ilim Pulp) which he allegedly sold for (on various estimates) anything between US$350 million and US$500 million. Which is enough of course to secure his grandchildren’s future (if and when he has any), but hardly sufficient to win the 2012 Presidential race. Rumors (and nothing is ever confirmed or denied or established beyond any reasonable doubt) have it that since becoming a civil servant and following his accession to the very top of Russia’s bureaucratic food chain Medvedev has acquired interests in the Russian gold industry. Irrespective of whether it is true or not even the most average of investment managers could have easily doubled DAM’s wealth right up to 2008. However (a) presidential races are very rarely funded from own pockets; and (b) even DAM’s own pocket may not be sufficiently deep. In his years of presidency he has failed to build (unlike VVP) relationships which could generate the required US$1,5 billion to secure the election;
2. Same is true of organization required to win – none of the political parties associate themselves with DAM and his recent chaotic firings of civil servants certainly did not put nomenklatura behind him. I strongly doubt that the Right Force under Prokhorov has the organization and discipline required to run an effective election campaign. Needless to say that it does not have an appeal to the bulk of the Russian electorate and it is strongly doubtful that DAM and Prokhorov could turn it around before the polling date;
3. Both nomenklatura and big business dislike DAM for a variety of reasons. His performance record was chequered even before the 2008 election (National Projects was a spectacular failure, so is Rosnano, the reform of the Armed Forces is not producing any meaningful results, “High tech Russia” remains largely a fig of DAM’s and Dvorkovitch imagination and his U turns on Libya and Iran badly misfired). Thus there are no good reasons either for the support of the establishment or for high popularity ratings.
4. On top of everything else he remains to be seen (and for the first two years of his presidency he was not noticed to be trying to get out) largely to be in the shadow of VVP. His image never progressed away from a that of a “Zitz Chairman” (to use Ostap Bender terminology). He has failed to develop a compelling image of a strong determined independent leader with his own agenda.
Dmitry Medvedev was thrown to the very top ill prepared and well before his political maturity. Unfortunately, he failed to learn on the job. He is intelligent enough to understand all of this. The biggest intrigue currently is whether his vanity will prevail over reason. This question is, I think, beyond comprehension of any, even most learned and experienced Kremlinologists.
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