COMMENTARY
By Gordon M. Hahn
The removal of Sergei Mironov from the office of speaker of Russia’s Federation Council (the upper house of Russia’s parliament or Federal Assembly) on May 18, 2011 has great potential to widen the fissures within the Russian elite being provoked by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s reforms and the upcoming federal elections cycle. Mironov was Russia’s third highest ranking official on paper, that is – according to the Russian constitution, and was a part of the larger St. Petersburg group that has ruled Russia since Putin’s assumption of the presidency in May 2000.
Mironov was recalled from his office by the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly which seconded him to the Federation Council as one the regions’ two constitutionally-mandated senators; he was then elected council chairman with Putin’s imprimatur in December 2001. The recall vote occurred in rapid fire fashion after reports appeared that the deputy head of Medvedev’s presidential administration in charge of politics, Vladislav Surkov, was attempting to recruit Mironov’s Fair Russia Party (Spravedlivaya Rossiya or SR) as a platform for a Medvedev run for the presidency independently from the preference of his mentor, Prime Minister and former president Vladimir Putin.
An additional explanation may be that St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matvienko needed to weaken Mironov due to his popularity in the northern capitol that posed a threat to the chances of Putin’s United Russia party winning a majority there in the upcoming Duma elections. The SR was positioned to possibly become Russia’s second-ranked party, if it could have taken advantage of the decline of the Communist Party and steal part of United Russia’s electorate as well. Now Mironov intends to take a seat surrendered by a colleague in the State Duma from the deputies’ group of the SR, which is likely to be much weakened.
As an important member of the Petersburg clan and Russia’s ruling elite, Mironov’s removal continues the trend of a growing divide within the ruling elite. This does not yet amount to the kind of major regime split that could destabilize the state or lead to a regime transformation about political scientists speak. However, the risk of such a split grows every time another top member of the elite moves into opposition to Putin, his return to the presidency, or the Medvedev-Putin tandem as a whole.
What a destabilizing regime split will need is a leader who challenges the system whether from above or below. It was precisely Boris Yeltsin’s defection from the ruling CPSU, his assumption of power in Russia, and his alliance with the burgeoning revolution from below against both hardliners and soft-liners in the communist regime that led to his revolution from above and the collapse of Soviet regime and state in the early 1990s.
A little bit of Mironov’s recent history reminds one of Yeltsin’s. Like Mironov, Yeltsin was a maverick in the outer circle of top leaders when he moved to challenge the CPSU’s conservative wing. Near enough to Gorbachev and his reformist inner circle in 1986-87, Yeltsin chose to risk a break with the reformers in his famous speech at the October 1987 CC plenum by criticizing both Gorbachev and the leader of the conservatives and Gorbachev’s top competitor Yegor K. Ligachev. That got him booted off the Politburo, in which he had been a candidate not a full member, though he remained a member of the CPSU’s Central Committee, the outer circle of power.
From there Yeltsin moved into popular politics made possible by Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, especially the 1989-1990 semi-free elections to the congresses and soviets, and Gorbachev’s decision to appoint him as deputy construction minister rather than, say, ambassador to Madagascar, which allowed him to remain in Moscow. From there, he moved into strong opposition to Gorbachev demanding an immediate transition to democracy and eventually carrying out a full-fledged revolution––granted, one he led from above. Using the Russian state apparatus, he created a Russian presidency and ran for and won it, using his more enhanced powers to weaken the party-state. Then, in the aftermath of the failed hard-line coup against Gorbachev, he finished the job, destroying the remnants of the Gorbachev’s reformed and liberalizing party-state.
Likewise, Mironov is a leading figure but not part of the inner circle of either tandem member. A Petersburger for sure, but not one of the siloviki (though the siloviki are in decline under Medvedev), he was a kind of candidate member of the ruling Petersburg clan. Mironov, like Yeltsin, has now been jettisoned for his criticism of the ruling party and the leadership’s, in particular, Putin’s policies. For example, he has repeatedly called for reinstating the popular election of regional chief executives to which Putin put an end. Like Yeltsin, Mironov remains in a position to take a seat in the State Duma, an outer circle within the power elite, since current Russian law would allow him to take the seat of a party member who gives up his or her seat to him. He could even run for president using his Fair Russia party’s status as a faction in the State Duma to put forward his candidacy.
Mironov has some personality traits reminiscent of Yeltsin. He is a maverick compared to the rest of the Petersburg ruling group, has shown an individualistic streak, and more than most Petersburg clan members tends to support greater pluralism, sharply criticizing the United Russia party and many Kremlin policy preferences. This said, it is not at all clear whether Mironov would take the risk to move into full opposition to Putin and/or Medvedev. If there is any compromising material on Mironov, it is likely to appear should he make such a move.
In his farewell speech to the Federation Council, however, Mironov hit hard. He reiterated his support for a return to the popular election of governors; something Medvedev agreed was possible in the longer term at his recent Skolkovo press conference. More strikingly, he charged United Russia with persecuting him and others who supported contrary policies and trying to “bribe” regional SR deputies. Most importantly, Mironov pledged to fight and break United Russia’s “monopoly” on power: “One Russia has openly launched a witch-hunt. It is removing undesirable people, people who think differently, and people who disagree with its conservatism. Of course, I will devote all of my time and all of my work to putting an end to the monopoly of one party in our country” (“Ousted Russian speaker urges direct polls for governors, attacks ruling party,” BBC Monitoring, 25 May 2011, citing NTV Mir, 25 May 2011). He made a very similar speech to the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly a week earlier (see www.spravedlivo.ru/news/first_face/379.php). This sounds like 1990 all over again.
It will be interesting to see if Medvedev takes any steps to support Mironov or, as is less likely, join his party. If so, then the regime will have suffered a more serious, even fatal blow to its unity.
Despite all the signs of tension, competition or at least jockeying for position within the tandem, however, there is still no clear evidence of the kind of final break that would lead to aggressive moves on the part of each side. Instead, both sides seem to be negotiating by proxy and cryptic signals, while positioning pieces in the event of a conflict. Medvedev appears reconciled to preserving the tandem while fighting to return to the presidency. Putin remains undecided but intent on preserving his privilege of anointing the next president.
Medvedev’s recent decree enhancing the Security Council’s powers may have been a signal to Putin, but one with a two-edged sword. The council secretaryship (or chairmanship – a separate issue) and leadership of the United Russia party could extend Putin’s status as informal ‘national leader’ for a few more years until his age overcomes his ego and he decides to leave the political stage. However, it could also be a mechanism by which Medvedev seeks to assert his control over the siloviki by appointing an ally as its secretary and reorganizing its membership by replacing the heads of the various siloviki departments in preparation for a confrontation with Putin in the less likely event he should decide to risk openly challenging his long-time patron.
We will know that an open break has occurred if one or more of the following occurs: Medvedev unilaterally declares his candidacy for the presidency; leaks about corrupt practices of Putin or his very closest associates emerge (this could be done by people in Medvedev’s inner circle on their own sparking an open break); or Medvedev expresses his support for Mironov, the SR, or the liberal Right Cause party.
However, a cooperative resolution of the tension between the tandem’s halves perhaps remains simple. Putin resists the temptation to return that his ego drives him towards and agrees to retain the status quo; Medvedev returns the favor and reappoints Putin as premier or as secretary of an enhanced Security Council.
Comments