REPRINTS
By Andrei P. Tsygankov
San Francisco State University
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 58, No. 1, March-April, 2011, pp. 28-44.
Abstract
Russia has been creating flexible international coalitions in order to achieve its central objective of becoming an independent center of power and influence.
Russia is never as strong as we fear and never as weak as we hope.
Klemens von Metternich
1. Introduction
From Europe to the Middle East and Asia, scholars and politicians are increasingly recognizing the prominent role of Russia in international affairs. From a weak and inward-looking nation of the 1990s, Russia has emerged into a power that is capable of defending its international prestige using available economic, military, and diplomatic means. It has exploited its energy clout to expand Russian relations abroad and cemented its military presence in the strategic area of the Southern Caucasus by defeating Georgia’s attack on South Ossetia. By mobilizing its soft power, the Kremlin has also contributed to reversing the colored revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. After being seriously hit by the global financial crisis, Russia has quickly recovered as an important international player.
Russians themselves have often presented their successes as the historically inevitable return of Russia to the rank of a great power. At least until the global economic crisis, and certainly immediately following the crisis in the Caucasus, such rhetoric was supported by the official declarations that projected Russia to become the world’s fifth largest economy, free from dependence on exports of oil and a full-fledged member in a multi-polar international order, by 2020. As far as Western observers of Russia are concerned, they remain divided. While some view Russia as weak and unable to form a coherent strategy, others warn that the Kremlin is increasingly effective in challenging the West’s position in the world. The United States’ attempt to “reset” relations with Russia has yet to change this dualistic perception of Moscow’s motives.
The argument pursued in the paper is neither nor skeptical, nor alarmist. I argue that since the 2000s, Russia’s central objective has been to become an independent center of power and influence by creating flexible international coalitions. The country has largely recovered from the chronic illnesses of the 1990s by gaining a greater confidence and reviving important attributes of a great power. Using various foreign policy tools, the Kremlin has succeeded in building pragmatic alliances within the former Soviet region and across the world. As successful as this strategy has been, Russia is not in a position to become a rising great power relative to growing international challenges, such as the continued expansion of the Western and Chinese influences in Eurasia. The fact that Russia continues to muddle through is not a guarantee that such will be the case in the future. I arrive at this conclusion by evaluating Russia’s international objectives against the tools and outcomes of its foreign policy. Following the literature on grand strategy and foreign policy, I analyze both the hard and soft dimensions of Russia’s power.[ii] Traditionally, grand strategy has been viewed as a long-term plan to match military and economic capabilities,[iii] yet scholars have also paid attention to domestic and institutional aspects[iv] and, more recently, to ideas and visions[v] behind grand strategy.
In my assessment, Russia’s success may only be preserved if the Kremlin acts on some existing opportunities and if it is more effective in explaining these objectives to the outside world. Assertive in defending its core interests, Russia must also serve as an advocate of multilateral arrangements towards achieving international peace and security. If Russia is to succeed in escaping the alternative -- an unstable society, dwindling population and truncated sovereignty – the Kremlin should learn how to better combine assertiveness and international recognition.
The article is organized in six sections. The next section reviews the Western debate on Russia’s strategy. I then describe Russia’s objectives by focusing on consensus within the foreign policy elites, views of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, and the official documents. The following two sections analyze key tools available for conducting Russia’s strategy and offer a preliminary assessment of it, respectively. In my assessment, the tools of Russia’s foreign policy are impressive, yet prescribe a greater reliance on soft, rather than hard, power in achieving global and regional influence. The final section reflects on the prospects of Russia’s strategy in the light of existing international challenges.
To access the full report, please click here Download PPC Revised Feb11
Comments