COMMENTARY
by Gordon Hahn
The Washington Post for once published a relatively balanced article in comparison with its usual standards, granted it was aritten by a Russian (Masha Lippman, “In Russia, growing rumblings of discontent,” Washington Post, 9 April 2011). There were, however, two interesting aspects about the article: (1) it continued to hide from its readers that reforms are already underway in Russia and have been for over two years; and (2) the article’s content was almost identical and in some ways more tame than many Russia print media articles calling for democratizing political reforms.
On the first issue, the article included: A more pro-Western and America-friendly foreign policy, police reforms, the institution of Miranda rights, prison reforms, allowing opposition demonstrations of all stripes in downtown Moscow, a significant de-statization or privatization program of state-owned companies, removal of high government officials from the boards of major state-owned companies, an increasingly robust anti-corruption regime, and the decriminalization of white collar crimes and many other lesser crimes - 68 in total. The fact is that these reforms have occurred and are continuing. Liberal Russian human rights activists have long called for them, and now endorsed them. Unfortunately until now, the U.S. ‘papers or record’ have failed to record them for American readers.
None of this is to say that Russia does not still have a long way to go before they will be seen as democratic and that they are reasonably respectful of all of its citizens’ civil, political, and human rights. It is to say that the Washington Post and other U.S. mainstream media have a vested interest in exaggerating the harshness of the Russian regime and have been engaging for years in what can only be called massive journalistic malpractice and corruption.
This becomes quite clear when one examines their claims that there is no freedom of information, media, or speech in Russia. Before reading the excerpts below from Russian newspaper and other media and comparing them to the recent WP article included below, please keep in mind that the alleged ‘absence of freedom of information, speech, and media in Russia’ also includes a completely free Internet and many free and independent albeit small or local radio and television channels.
Excerpts:
“D.A. Medvedev proposes that the situation in the country requires serious, near radical systemic changes. He has his own views on the most important internal and international problems, and substantively, which are stylistically distinct from Putin’s position.
“From this collision, which has so puzzled numerous political scientists, there is a miraculous way out – the implementation of maximally democratic presidential elections with the participation of both Putin and Medvedev equally along with other candidates, whether it be Nemtsov, Kasyanov, Limonov or Nevalnyi, not to mention the already eternal ‘statists.’
“Such elections, given good personal relations between Putin and Medvedev, can be carried out extremely correctly, with the organization televised debates without the inclusion of the limitless administrative resource and total propaganda for one candidate” (Nikolai Arsenevich Glubinskii, “Velikii, no, mozhet byt’, poslednii shanc,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 April 2011).
Excerpts from an article by Igor Yurgens, a close advisor of Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev and the director of a think tank the chairman of the board of which is Medvedev, published in the well-read Nezavisimaya gazeta daily newspaper:
“There is a two-party system, by definition, almost everywhere now: in America, Britain, and in France, despite all the nuances of coalition. And if we want the same, it is time to choose among people who are right-wing in their views: that is, ownership is primary, human rights are unconditional, of course, but the state is secondary in this sense, and its regulatory role amounts one-hundred-percent to freedom, moderation and tolerance…”
“The period of stabilization, which is linked to Putin's name, has passed, and very well, he left the presidential post in 2008, which was certainly its peak. …
“Further stabilization is a kind of stagnation. Even Putin himself has changed the algorithm in a sense, and stopped talking to the West about what "we will cut off" and when. But if he wanted to become a modernizer in another incarnation, he would first have to give up his entire inner circle because they are definitely not modernizers, they were honed for another job.”
“…The population "at large" will not believe anything if the flashing lights are not removed, if people do not move closer to this population, and release Mikhail Khodorkovskiy. These are two or three of the steps out of the many steps that we are talking about.”
“(T)he young people especially, have such an impression in connection with these gadgets, the Internet, the knowledge that has made such progress, the movies they watch, that anything is possible technologically and technically. The method of morphing, and they already think that you can be different now, and here and now. In 3D this, incidentally, is not so far from the truth. Both politically and socially, they are already sensing that I cannot do anything, there is no social elevator, nor potential prospects. But there, in the virtual world, I can do anything, whereas here in reality, I have no chance of even being heard. This Tahrir will come if nothing is done. They have started to slightly open up opportunities, but you get the impression that we have another 120 years for opening things up a bit. So I am afraid of this, errors in the timing over the long-term. We are now starting to do other things. In an area where the president is doing his duty - reforming the army, foreign affairs, and feeling his way over breakthroughs with modernization. But no one is explaining this to the people. (This is needed) (e)specially, in a situation which is presented as ‘the elder one has brought in the younger one and is watching how he is doing’" (Igor Yurgens, “Ya za Medvedeva, potomu chto vizhu v nem ryad kachestv,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 April 2011).
Excerpts from an article published by the state-owned Russia Today channel written by Nikolai Svanidze, a popular Russian TV commentator and radio talk show host and a member of Russia’s largely president-appointed Public Chamber:
“(T)he results of recent polls were released suggesting a drop in the popularity of the ruling party, as well as a considerable decline in the Russian public's interest in politics on the whole.
“The latter is not surprising at all. As the saying goes, public interest in politics depends on politics itself. Unfortunately, politics today has been reduced to a bare minimum, evoking neither signs of life, nor a sense of truth. Most people are firmly convinced that they are being deceived and that the elections are faked, mostly because they present a poor range of alternative choices. The opposition does not have any real access to national TV channels, which are currently the main media resource in Russia. There is no real confrontation of positions, programs and positions. The ruling party traditionally uses so-called "administrative resources". As a result, the exact same people have been in politics for a long time. Of course, politics in and of itself has nothing to do with the problem ¬- it's just that in the absence of real political competition (a problem the president himself has alluded to many times), many think that's exactly what politics is. …”
“I find this kind of situation extremely dangerous. The thing is that, all of the above notwithstanding, interest in politics is a way for the people to ‘let off some steam.’ If, however, the people do not have an alternative choice for which they can vote at elections, first they demonstrate total passivity and political indifference, but once life or personal problems force them to express their opinions, and there if no legal path available for them to do so, the result is elementary -¬ they take to the street. And for Russia, this threat is very real.
“Of course, public officials are constantly saying that the positions of opposition liberal politicians today are extremely weak, and therefore it's unclear why they should be given a platform on national TV channels. However, one should keep in mind that it is these very same public officials that have contributed a great deal to the weakening of those positions themselves, and continue to do so. Not only have they been preventing the opposition from gaining any ground for a long time now, but they have also been exercising the full power of their propaganda machine. This was particularly obvious during the recent parliamentary, and later, presidential election. Of course, given the absence of solid liberal roots, the application of such labels as "thieves" and "American spies" does not add any popularity to the liberal wing.
“The danger of such politics is that the opposition in Russia is far from being comprised of only liberals. And given the absence of real political competition and powerful pressure on liberals, the strengthening of populist, left-wing nationalistic, and even fascist movements becomes inevitable and much more prominent. They are born out of social and ethnic hatred, and unlike liberals, they are much more dangerous ¬- both for society and for the authorities” (Nikolay Svanidze, “Restoring the political balance: government support for the opposition,” Russia Today, 8 April 2011, www.russiatoday.com).
Therefore, we have an equally if not more critical assessment of the situation in Russia than that which appears in the WP appearing in media under a Russian regime that is supposedly one of the least democratic in the world. The difference is that the Russian media covers the reforms being carried out under President Dmitrii Medvedev, while the U.S. mainstream hides them.
Indeed, the ‘relatively balanced’ WP article omitted tha fact that the various studies calling for democratization were produced by think tanks close to Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Indeed, the CSR, whose report Lippman focuses on, is an advisory body to the prime minister and is state-funded. It is ‘odd’ that was left out of the article, considering the U.S. mainstream media is still intent on hiding the fact that reforms are underway in Russia. Given all this, the question arises: Who really has a better picture of the situation in Russia, the American or Russian people?
ARTICLE IN QUESTION:
Washington Post
April 9, 2011
In Russia, growing rumblings of discontent
By Masha Lipman
Masha Lipman, editor of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Pro et Contra journal, writes a monthly column for The Post.
MOSCOW - For three months the approval ratings of Russia's top leaders have declined ¬ a trend that is generating talk here of a looming political crisis. Recently, two thinkers from the prominent Center for Strategic Research, Mikhail Dmitriev and Sergei Belanovsky, joined the ranks of the critics, calling for reforms that would generate a competitive political environment, restore public trust and improve economic policies.
For the time being, the Kremlin appears determined to maintain its monopoly on politics and policymaking and an economic model based on the centralized distribution of revenue from Russian resources. But public approval of Prime Minister Vladi¬mir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev is indeed waning. Putin's approval rating, which for more than four years had not dropped below 76 percent, is at 69 percent, according to Levada Center polling. Medvedev's public assessment, closely linked throughout his presidency to his patron's, has fallen to 66 percent. Levada Center data also indicate that for the first time in several years, the number of Russians who think the country is moving in the wrong direction exceeds the number who believe it is on the right track.
The souring public mood is spurred in part by a growing sense of insecurity as people realize their relative well-being is precarious and by mounting exasperation at social injustice and bureaucratic corruption and impunity. A Levada poll last year found that more than 70 percent of Russians believe civil servants routinely defy the law. Citizens' contempt for the police has become all but a matter of national consensus.
Public anger and frustration are fairly vocal online and in non-government media outlets. Blogger Aleksey Navalny, a prominent civic activist, is leading a campaign to expose government corruption. Poems making fun of the top leaders have been posted online. The Web is filling with criticism ¬ some thoughtful policy analysis, some plain poison.
Several reports from think tanks and even public statements from officials have pointed out the urgent need for serious political reform. Modernization and sustainable development will be impossible, they argue, unless Russia's political monopoly and arbitrary rule are replaced by pluralism and the rule of law. Dmitriev and Belanovsky, for instance, cautioned against "lighthearted and dismissive perception of the first alarming signs of emerging political crisis." The "business as usual approach will not work," they warn, calling for a dialogue between government and the people.
Dmitriev and Belanovsky may be alarmist. Putin and Medvedev's approval ratings are still at levels that many world leaders would envy. And the Russian people still show little appetite for political organization or activism. Russians have long accepted the pattern of alienation from politics and do not claim a role in shaping the course of policy. Some critics might perceive citizens' grumbling as a harbinger of change or political crisis, but for many Russians such complaints are a way to let off steam ¬ while staying away from action. Figures such as Navalny may stir up the blogosphere, but recent polling suggests barely a small percentage of the public follows bloggers.
Still, it would be wrong to dismiss the shift in public complacency. As is its custom, the government has increased social spending ahead of the next election cycle. But the economic slowdown has imposed limits on state spending ¬ and when cutbacks come, the risk of unrest will rise. Civic outrage over government corruption, social injustice and lawlessness may further aggravate economic frustrations; grievances that had been expressed verbally may burst into street protests.
With a system of increasingly inefficient governance and an alienated society, the risk of such tensions is permanent ¬ if hard to assess. To reduce it the government has thrown money at problems and relied on political manipulation. Slowed economic growth and rising public frustration are chipping away at those options.
Thus critics are calling for less governmental control and for policies that would ensure sustainable development and growth. If people's incomes were not directly tied to the government budget and spending, traditional paternalism would be gradually overcome. That requires a fair business environment, regulated by law and due process, and mechanisms of public accountability preventing, or at least tempering, abuse of office.
Despite the risks of growing discontent, the Russian leadership will hardly listen. Even if leaders are convinced that easing control would foster robust development, their immediate goal is preserving their monopoly on power. In today's Russia, power and property are tightly entangled. Losing power can be the first step to losing assets ¬ or even freedom.
And with the price of oil once again over $100 per barrel, Putin can maintain a firm grip on power and still avert broad public discontent for a while.
The fates of Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the Egyptian and Tunisian leaders who ruled for decades but waited too long to loosen their regimes, may be a cautionary lesson ¬ but the example of Mikhail Gorbachev may be more apt. Gorbachev chose to ease controls when the Soviet Union was in dire straits. Within a few years he lost his post as well as his country.
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