COMMENTARY
By Gordon M. Hahn
There can be no doubt that the thaw under the presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev we foresaw three years ago has occurred. Several recent changes have reconfirmed the liberalizing trend. With the new law ‘On the Police,’ a first step has been taken in refoming the police, and subsidiary laws and reforms are set to follow. Medvedev is moving to amend his anti-corruption legislation for the fourth time. This time a truly major measure has been proposed: bribe-taking and bribe-giving will be punished by a fine of up to one hundred times the amount exchanged in any one bribe. A Russian official caught taking a bribe will either have to pay 60 to 80 times the amount of the bribe and be banned from holding public office for three years, or pay 50 times the bribe and serve a prison sentence of five to 10 years. Bribers will be fined 15 to 60 times the bribe. Bribes in an amount over 1 million rubles will pay a fine of 80 to100 times the amount of the bribe or 70 times the bribe and a prison sentence of 8 to 15 years. Fines for any one bribe cannot exceed 300 million rubles.
Moreover, arrests for corruption are hitting higher ranking state officials. For example, MVD Lieutenant General and head of the Coordinating Bureau for Fighting Organized Crime and Other Dangerous Crimes on the Territroy of the CIS Aleksandr Bokov was arrested in January for an attempt to embezzle $4 million. Masses of expensive icons, jewelry, and other riches were found in his 50-room home (“General A. Bokov okazalsya uchastnikom raspila imushchestva YuKOSa,” RBC, 28 January 2011). When a major illegal gambling ring was uncovered the investigation found that the top officials of Moscow Oblast’s Prosecutor’s Office and MVD were covering for the organized crime group involved (“Ot FSB u kazino sorvalo kryshu,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, 14 February 2011.) In December Russia’s Investigative Committee placed State Duma Deputy from the LDPR, Ashot Yegiazaryan, on the international wanted list on charges of embezzling $10 million worth stock in Centurion Alliance (Marina Baranov, “Ashot Yegiazaryan obyavlen v mezhdunarodnyi rozysk,” Kommersant, 27 December 2011). This is the first time a Duma deputy has been charged with corruption since Sergei Mavrodi was arrested, tried and imprisoned in the 1990s for stealing billions of dollars through an illegal pyramid scheme. In short, the fight against corruption appears to be getting very serious.
Excluding the Khodorkovskii case, about which more may soon be in the offing, there have been several fair court decisions of late that go against the grain of the Putin era. A critic of former Tatarstan President Ministmer Shaimiev was released from prison, where he was sitting for supposedly slandering the president by writing a book. To this case can be added the Moscow Arbitration Court’s decision that blogger and anti-corruption crusader Alexei Navalny has the right to examine documents from Transneft. Last year Navalny published materials alleging $4 billion worth of fraud at Transneft through articially high prices for pipeline construction (Andy Potts, “Legal crusader heralds 'complete victory' in Russian courts,” Moscow News, 15 February 2011).
Surely, more needs to be done to move Russia from its soft form of authoritarianism to democracy, but a substantial liberalization is underway; one that can pave the way for democratization perhaps as early as during Medvedev’s second term.
As we have noted before, liberalization has given birth to its usual child: division within the regime’s ruling elite. The split is being facilitated by the more liberal tone and open style of Medvedev’s leadership and by a new glasnost on even state media. These have reduced the fear that outspokenness will lead to politically-motivated repression in the form of firing or investigation, trial, and conviction on trumped up charges. There have been numerous examples over the last year. A short list includes rock singer Yurii Shevchuk’s confrontation with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin last summer; television producer Leonid Parfenov’s criticism of Russia’s stale state-controlled television; and the testimony at the trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky by former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and SberBank Chairman and former Economics Minister German Gref.
This year has seen even more striking evidence of the recession in fear and splits within the regime, with liberal elements close to Medvedev demanding more democratic practice. At a press conference held in connection with his 80th birthday, former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev harshly criticized the political system constructed by Putin, saying: “We have everything a parliament, courts, a president, and a prime minister, but these all are to a great extent just an imitation.” In an interview on party state-owned Ekho Moskvy, Gorbachev warned: “If things continue the way they are, I think the probability of the Egyptian scenario will grow, but here it could end far worse.”
More importantly, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin told an economic conference that “the coming elections will serve as a test for the government.” It is important that “the elections themselves are fair and honest and all leading political forces and representatives of society are represented in the elections.” “(T)here are formal rules, but they are being bypassed as we got used to living by 'understandings', not by the laws.” “Only this will give the mandate of confidence that is necessary for economic reforms.” “If a lack of confidence emerges, we will be unable to fulfill our tasks properly.” “(T)here is a very weak system of management in the country, in particular in the government.” This last comment could be taken as direct criticism of government chairman Putin.
In January Igor Yurgens, the head of the Institute for Contemporary Development established by Medvedev, urged Putin not to attempt a return to the presidency: “People won't understand why Russia can't choose a new, more modern-looking person who is more open to the outside world. Everyone is fed up at seeing the same face.” “When a single person stays in power for a long time, even if he is a very good person and was brilliant at the start, there needs to be a change.” There certainly are those who would like to see Putin replace Medvedev; they are most numerous among the siloviki – the FSB, military, and especially the now embattled MVD.
Finally, there was the courageous judge’s assistant Natalia Vasilieva, who came out acknowledging that the verdict in the recently completed second Khdorkovskii case was dictated ‘from above.’ That Vasilieva is not exactly a member of the elite underscores the point that fear is residing, as the liberalization proceeds.
These are the strongest articulations to date supporting democratization and the continuation of the Medvedev presidency and its attendant liberalization strategy. Kudrin, Yurgens, and presidential economic advisor Arkadii Dvorkovich lead an informal liberal wing within the Russian government and presidential administration. As the elections approach and slow limited reforms continue, division within the elite is likely to grow. Should this happen, then an imposed transition co-managed by Medvedev, Putin, and the several factions of the Russian elite will become difficult if not impossible. At that point, the only possible outcomes will be a revolution of uncertain outcome or a rapid negotiated full transition to democracy.
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