WHY PUTIN WILL NOT RETURN TO THE PRESIDENCY….NOT IN 2012 ANYWAY

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn 

As Vladmir Putin’s presidency was coming to an end, the Washington indeed Western consensus was that Putin would seek a way to remain president, despite the Russian constitution’s limit on no more than two consecutive presidential terms. 

Invoking Putin’s and the Russians’ native khitrost’ or cleverness, experts exclaimed far and wide that rather than simply ignore the constitution’s two-term limit, Putin would force through constitutional amendments or laws that would allow him to remain in the Kremlin.  He also might leave temporarily appointing a puppet as an interim placeholder so technically he would not violate the limit on no more than two consecutive terms.  Even if Putin decided to forego the presidency, experts explained, he would anoint a hardline successor from the FSB, someone like Sergei Ivanov, to continue Russia’s inevitable turn away from democracy and foreign relations with the west.  Instead, Putin left the Kremlin and backed Dmitrii Medvedev, the most liberal high ranking figure in his administration, as his choice for president.

Now we are beginning and will continue to hear through the year that Putin is destined to return to the presidency.  Only an announcement of the tandem’s decision to continue with Medvedev or turn to a third candidate will quell the incessant and typically prejudiced speculation.

The fact is, however, it is very unlikely Putin will return to the presidency for both obvious reasons and some more obscure reasons. First, if Putin wanted to hold the office further, he would have found a way to stay or would have returned a year or so after Medvedev’s assumption of office.  He has stated that he is tired of the burden and foreign policy.  Consistent with this, Putin eschews summits with foreign leaders abroad and frequently even at home.  This means that Medvedev is playing an important role in foreign policy decisionmaking and more likely is playing the decisive one.  Putin, to be sure, also plays a key role.  There is probably an equally shared stewardship in domestic policy. 

Medvedev’s key role plus his growing comfort with the presidency requires that there be a compelling reason for Putin’s return, which will naturally ruffle some feathers.  Medvedev is far more popular in the West than is Putin.  For Western political and business leaders and thus the prospects for Western investments in Russia, Putin’s return would require substantial explanation and justification. 

Domestically, Medvedev’s growing activeness, confidence, and willingness to contradict Putin demonstrartes that he wants to remain president.  Calls for Medvedev to retain the presidency from liberals close to him, like Igor Yurgens and economic advisor Arkadii Dvorkovich, attest to a growing independence and boldness within the liberal camp.  Putin’s return would spark liberal defections from the Kremlin and the Moscow establishment, thus splitting the elite. 

Moreover, recent elite articulations and public opinion polls show that significant parts of the Russia’s elite and public are shifting their preference to Medvedev.  A December 2010 Levada Center poll showed that since summer Putin’s electoral supported had declined from 36% to 31%, while Medvedev’s had grown from 17% to 21%.  Putin’s still greater popularity cannot be a compelling reason for his return to the presidency, since the gap would be more than eliminated by Putin’s endorsement of Medvedev (Gazeta.ru, 13 January 2011, www.gazeta.ru and Interfax, 14 January 2011, www.interfax.ru).  Medvedev’s trust rating temporarily pulled even with Putin’s at 41% in October (www.levada.ru/press/2011012703.html).

The economic downturn, pervasive corruption, the Khodorkovskii conviction and aftermath, the Khimki forest and highway scandal and other factors are growing opposition sentiment in Moscow public opinion.  A recent survey found that 7 percent of Muscovites supported the new Freedom Party, while only 2 percent supported it nationwide (Nikolai Petrov, “United Russia Facing a Crisis Of Confidence,” Moscow Times, 18 January 2011).  In another survey, the tandem’s combined approval rating fell to its lowest in years: 75% with 40% for Putin and 35% for Medvedev; it was once at 90% (www.levada.ru/press/2011012703.html).  As during the perestroika period – and contrary to the general view – the split of the elite and public opinion in the center, Moscow, is what destroyed the Soviet regime and state, not the nationalist uprisings in the periphery.  The divisions in Moscow crippled administration and fractured the peripheral elite and bureaucracy into warring clans more concerned with stealing parts of the ship of state rather than saving it from sinking. 

Putin and certainly Medvedev must realize that Putin’s return could be as dangerous for political stability as would the radical reforms against which they frequently warn.  Indeed, for now at least, Putin supports Medvedev’s mini-thaw and promises of more democratization.  You cannot have it both ways: Putin is in charge, and it is only Medvedev’s thaw.

Notwithstanding this, Putin has become the symbol of stagnation, Medvedev of modernization; Putin – the symbol of corruption, Medvedev of the struggle against it; Putin – leader of the elderly ‘television party’, Medvedev – the youthful ‘Internet party’;  Putin – eternal Russia, Medvedev – ‘change and hope’.

So changing the configuration of the tandem by way of Putin’s return to the presidency there must be a compelling reason.  For the moment there is none.  Challenges such as the nationalist pogroms in December and the recent terrorist bombing at Domodedovo airport, should they persist or deepen might be sufficient, but such a scenario is unlikely for the moment; and therefore so is Putin’s return.  Liberalization will continue, and ‘eternal Russia’ will again change.

Comments

[mark sleboda/the Scythian]

You say that, "Putin has become the symbol of stagnation, Medvedev of modernization; Putin – the symbol of corruption, Medvedev of the struggle against it; Putin – leader of the elderly ‘television party’, Medvedev – the youthful ‘Internet party’; Putin – eternal Russia, Medvedev – ‘change and hope’".

Who would you say has written this false and ideological determinisitic narrative (the West or the wealthy Moscow elite or both) and to what purpose? And is this narrated perspective the perspective of the so-called 'international community' (ie the West), the wealthy elite, or of the Russian people? IE - Why should we buy into it?

[Samuil]

Путин - сильная личность с высоким интеллектом, а таких боятся, чему свидетельство массированная атака западных СМИ. Зомбированному, американскому истеблишменту нужен в России - второй пьяный Ельцин и тогда бесконтрольной, агрессивной гегемонии США ничто не будет угрожать. Российская элита и народ видит, слышит, знает об этом и поэтому не отпустит популярного Путина до тех пор, пока не увидит такую же, достойную замену. Так, что все старания американских неоконов канут в Лету. Успокойтесь.

[Dispatcher]

If you read the Medvedev's body language which he cannot hide and compare it to that of Putin's you'll see how unconfident and insecure is the first and how assertive and cocky is the second. It is absolutely clear in Russia who controls whom and who is in the control of the situation in general. It is absolutely of no significance whether Mr.Putin regains the Presidential credentials next year or not while he pulls all the strings. He may or may not return to the Presidency according to his own understanding of the situation, and no polls or speculations have no value to him. Comprehend that at last, you poor Western "analysts"!

[Valeriy Dzutsev]

Whatever the formal title of Putin, he rules the country. Is there any doubt about it? I have no idea what made the author of this article think, that this situation will change in 2012. In fact it may change if Putin decides to ascend to the president's position to formally run the country, but there is no indication, Putin is stepping aside. Mr. Hahn talks about "1-2 years and Putin could have come back to power", it seems to completely drop from the author's narrative though, that in the fall 2008, when the economic crisis started to take heavy toll on the Russian economy, amendments were made speedily to extend presidential term to 6 years. The amendments, it must be said, could have been applied only to the next president, not the one in power, ie not to Medvedev.

[valentine akishkin]

Putin's Reign of Fear
‘Putin’s authoritarian soul’
‘Putin’s authoritarian steam roller’
These are just only a few of the headings of articles under which western media has been inexhaustibly spreading coverage related to Vladimir Putin – Russia’s former president. This list could be incessantly expanded as there seems to be no end to the thorny epithets that western media is ready to ‘honour’ a person who, during a very short historical period, pulled Russia away from the fringe of total disintegration and impoverishment. The destruction of Russia’s sovereignty was set off by a group of ‘radical homebred populists’ possessing themselves as democrats fondly supported by western policy- makers during Eltsin’s drunken reckless reign. These impresarios of political theory set democracy as an end in itself aspiration and a remedy to all. They gave no care to the consequences of disorder, nihilism and anarchy that inevitably would follow the fall of a communist regime. Chechnya’s cut-throat democracy was another heritage of that God forsaken time immensely supported by western mass media. Cut-throats were called insurgents fighting for the liberation of their country. Today, they are better known as radical extremists and terrorists. Irresponsibleness and disintegration were at their height while the liberals kept insisting that democracy and market economy were the self-activating instruments that would automatically bring well-being and wealth. Reality proved that there is a measure to all.
Now, to the question of who is running Russia and who will run Russia after the next Presidential elections in Russia? There should be no speculation on calling Medvedev more liberal than Putin, these two chaps are in perfect harmony and will be ‘authoritarians’ as much as the situation requires and liberal within the boundaries of common sense. There is no reason to weigh them on their posture to democracy; they both vitalize the same spirit and inspirations and are walking a mutually agreed pathway which regardless of all the thorns and bruises will inevitably bring Russia to prosperity and well-being.
The overwhelming majority of people inhabiting Russia today will vote PUTIN; let nobody in the west have the faintest doubt about it. Thus, I would advise the author of the above article to save his breath and practice his verbal creativity on something of more functional value rather than grasping at straws while trying to look like a cat that swallowed the canary.

[TimorphiuS]

Да уж ребят.... Что ж вы на западе все так переживаете за судьбу России? Не ужели вы нас так боитесь?

[Мефодий]

Тимофей! Не позорь Россию! "Неужели" - пишется вместе. Научись своему языку, а потом предлагай Западу - бояться или смеяться.

[Виктор]

Путин вернется.

[Max]

He just did :)