THE THAW CONTINUES

COMMENTARY

by Gordon M. Hahn

In a move reminiscent of the early years of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reign as Soviet leader and the beginning of his reform policy known as perestroika, the Kremlin and the ruling tandem of President Dmitrii Medvedev and Prime Minister and former President Vladimir Putin, in one or both of its parts, appear to be behind the new Moscow city government’s decision to begin to allow political demonstrations in the heart of Russia’s capitol more easily.  In this way, the predicted thaw continues (See Gordon M. Hahn, “Is A Russian ‘Thaw’ Coming?” Russia: Other Points of View, 18 April 2008,  and Gordon M. Hahn, “More Signs of a Possible Thaw Under Medvedev,” Russia: Other Points of View, 2 June 2008).  As importantly, it has been expanded now into a new arena – freedom of assembly.  Although this right began to be honored in the late perestroika era of the USSR and was fully realized in post-Soviet Russia during the 1990s, it was curtailed under President Putin in the mid-2000s, especially in Moscow.

However, the Kremlin tandem appears to have used the scandal leading to the replacement of Moscow’s long-time mayor Yurii Luzhkov with one of their own – former Tyumen governor, presidential administration chief and government apparatus chief Sergei Sobyanin – in order to begin opening up the public sphere and reduce tensions with the democratic opposition.

On October 25^th negotiations between representatives of the opposition, including Moscow Helsinki Group Chairwoman Lyudmila Alekseeva, and the Moscow city government yielded an agreement that will allow 800-1,000 demonstrators (depending on reports) representing the democratic opposition to hold their monthly ‘Article 31’ protest on October 31^st on Triumfalnaya Ploshchad’ in central Moscow.  The opposition had requested a limit of 1,500 protesters, and Moscow’s interim government had granted space for 200.  These protests have been held on the 31^st of every month with 31 days in order to call on the authorities to honor the right to freedom of assembly ensconced in Article 31 of the 1993 Russian Consitution.  However, in recent years these and other demonstrations were denied official permission by the authorities, held in technical violation of the law, ended in the detention of tens of demonstrators, and saw police beatings of demonstrators.

On October 23^rd, less than a week after Sobyanin was installed as mayor, an anti-Putin protest, led by opposition leader and chess champion Garry Kasparov, was held on central Moscow’s Pushkin Square unobstructed.  Hundreds, perhaps over a thousand participated, and the demonstrators were neither detained nor beaten (Tom Balmforth, “A Change of Strategy,” Russia Profile, 26 October 2010).  Again, the interim government gave official permission for the rally to be held.  The rally was organized by the Committee of Five Demands recently formed by the largely pro-democratic groups Solidarity, United Civil Front, and others.  Their five demands are: resignation of prime minister, dissolution of the State Duma and Federation Council, immediate free and fair elections, major staff overhauls in the police and secret services, and budget transparency (Nadezhda Krasilova, “Nezhdannaya ottepel’,” Novyie izvestia, 18 October 2010).

Leading democrats hailed the agreements.  Alekseeva called it a “step forward” (Alexander Bratersky, “Sobyanin Allows Larger 31st Rally,” Moscow Times, 26 October 2010).  Vladimir Ryzhkov called it “a victory for civil society” (Tom Balmforth, “A Change of Strategy,” Russia Profile, 26 October 2010).  The authorities had rejected the previous 11 requests going back to 2009 (Alexander Bratersky, “Sobyanin Allows Larger 31st Rally,” Moscow Times, 26 October 2010).

Evidence suggests that it was the federal authorities, not an independent decision taken by the new mayor, that have generated this new liberalization in policy.  President Medvedev’s newly appointed head of the Russian Presidential Human Rights Council, long-time liberal Mikhail Fedotov called for allowing such rallies and promised he would attend the Strategy 31 movement’s October 31 rally in order to monitor its progress along with Presidential Human Rights Ombudsman and former Russian Amabassador to the US Vladimir Lukin and Moscow’s own ombudsman Aleksandr Muzykantskii (“Russia's New Rights Chief Says 'Strategy 31' Rallies Should Be Allowed,” RFERL Russia Report, 26 October 2010).  This past summer Lukin condemned the Moscow police crackdown on a Strategy 31 protest and sent a strong letter to Medvedev urging the president to put an end to such spectacles.

In addition, it is unlikely that the Medvedev and/or Putin would have allowed the newly appointed mayor to make such decisions autonomously.  Even those who reject the idea of any Medvedevian thaw or even the possibility of one while Putin remains near the center of power or otherwise would be forced to acknowledge that the so-called ‘power vertical’ of centralized political management would not tolerate such local autonomy.  This faces them with the choice of either acknowledging that Medvedev and/or Putin are carrying out a slow albeit gradual liberalization policy or a decentralization policy at least with regards to the Moscow city government’s decisionmaking autonomy.  Either way, this adds another element to the ongoing thaw, about which we, at least, will keep readers informed.

Comments

[Alexei]

The only real opposition to existing system here in Russia are Communists. Had they won elections thay would have turned things around. And they enjoy complete freedom of meetings, their demonstrations at the time of former Soviet holidays are going as colorful as before.
The tiny but loud opposition that "fights" for freedom of meetings collect more reporters than followers. We see them in 15-million Moscow on TV but never among us, because they do not represent anyone in the society except former political figures surrounded by marginal teams.