COMMENTARY
By Gordon M. Hahn
In an October 25th New York Times article “Will the U.S. Lose Europe to Russia?” John Vinocur notes the declining ability of the U.S. to shape politics in Europe and Eurasia, pointing out the decision by Russia, Germany, and France to act more autonomously on regional security issues: “The United States used to call wayward members of NATO back to the reservation with a whistle or a shout. It decided what was deviation from doctrine, and that decision was pretty much law. When the Obama administration stamped its foot this time, no one snapped to attention. Rather, Germany and France, meeting with Russia in Deauville, northern France, last week, signaled that they planned to make such three-cornered get-togethers on international foreign policy and security matters routine, and even extend them to inviting other ‘partners’ pointing, according to diplomats from two countries, to Turkey becoming a future participant.”
The irony here is that the very policy intended to prevent such a development – NATO expansion – has become the cause of this development. The expansion of NATO to member-states of the former Soviet bloc Warsaw Pact produced the predicted results. It split NATO into anti-Russian and quasi-pro-Russian camps; the former in the east, the latter in the west. U.S. insistence on isolating Russia provoked a backlash from Moscow. The Kremlin’s backlash scared Berlin, Paris, and even Rome, pushing them to find their own modus vivendi with the Kremlin. In addition, the ongoing domestic and foreign policy changes in Russia, which few in the U.S. considered real, has opened up new vistas for cooperation between Russia and Europe.
Thus, in June German Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed that the European Union and Russia establish their own Political and Security Committee. At September’s powwow at Deauville President Nicolas Sarkozy called for establishing an E.U.-Russia economic space “with common security concepts.” Just before Deauville, Russian ambassador to the E.U., Vladimir Chizov, stated that Russia desires an institutionalized relationship with the E.U. Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. All of these steps appear to be micro-efforts to answer the spirit of Medvedev’s macro-proposal for the creation of a new security architecture for Europe and Eurasia. This architecture was to include the U.S., but the Washington has ignored Medvedev’s original proposal and has taken no micro-steps to compensate.
For all of U.S. President Obama’s progress towards a reset in U.S.-Russian relations, the reset has been largely limited to the bilateral relationship, with some bleed over into NATO-Russian relations. The new level of NATO-Russian cooperation on issues such as Afghanistan is in for the most part local and limited to furthering U.S. and Russian interests. Europe is less threatened by the Afghanistan issue than the two former superpowers. Europe is more interested in Russia. But the Obama administration, as the author points out, has shown little interest in Europe. Although the administration has, in our view, conducted an intelligent Russia policy, there is a sense that the president is not interested in a reset of U.S.-Russian relations so much as he is in using Russia as part of the solution to his Afghan quagmire or a vehicle for posing as a nuclear savior.
The author complains that Moscow is “getting a pass” from the administration on three issues: its cozying up to the Caracas cowboy Hugo Chavez, its support for comely Anna Chapman and the other spies recently booted from U.S. shores, and backing for a decline of the dollar. In our opinion, all of these policies are Moscow’s way of saying ‘here’s for NATO expansion and the colored revolutions in our backyard.’ Moscow will only make compromises with Washington to the extent Washington makes compromises with Moscow, and for a while there will be some lag on Moscow’s side as the ‘burn factor’ lingers from the nearly two decades of American indifference to, if not defiance of Russia’s interests.
The most serious problem raised by the author – U.S.’ angst about Europe dealing independently with Russia on security issues, has a very simple solution: join them. Washington must ‘trilateralize’ the Russian-European bilateral efforts by taking steps itself to probe Medvedev’s security architecture proposal just as Europe is doing. This can be done outside NATO or by strengthening Russia’s role in NATO.
Although NATO membership for Russia cannot be put on the table again just yet, the Kremlin could be notified that if the thaw continues and more serious steps follow on political liberalization and democratization, then the U.S. will be quick to respond positively to any interest in Russia’s entry into NATO. Such a step could encourage Russian liberalization and democratization and, more importantly, serve as a signal of Washington being serious about forging Russia’s integration into the West this time. It will also require that Moscow desist from its more odious inclinations to flick Washington’s nose, now that it has the chance, such as coddling Chavez.
In the meantime, a deal to ease tension between the U.S. and Russia could involve a trilateral understanding to freeze NATO expansion until Russia joins, a Russian promise to limit arms and nuclear energy cooperation with certain rogue actors like Chavez and perhaps others outside the Western hemisphere, and the development of U.S., European, and Russian trilateral negotiations regarding ways to gradually step up security cooperation between the three players.
The first opportunity to meet the vitally important international security challenge of integrating Russia with the West was badly botched in the late Soviet years and during the 1990s. The emerging opportunity must be handled adroitly and not lost.
ARTICLE IN QUESTION
New York Times
October 25, 2010
Will the U.S. Lose Europe to Russia?
JOHN VINOCUR
PARIS The United States used to call wayward members of NATO back to the reservation with a whistle or a shout. It decided what was deviation from doctrine, and that decision was pretty much law. When the Obama administration stamped its foot this time, no one snapped to attention. Rather, Germany and France, meeting with Russia in Deauville, northern France, last week, signaled that they planned to make such three-cornered get-togethers on international foreign policy and security matters routine, and even extend them to inviting other "partners" pointing, according to diplomats from two countries, to Turkey becoming a future participant.
That can look like an effort to deal with European security concerns in a manner that keeps NATO, at least in part, at a distance. And it could seem a formula making it easier for Russia to play off absolutely no novelty here the European allies against the United States, or NATO and the European Union, against one another.
But there's more detail in the theoretical Euro-Atlantic apostasy department: Add Chancellor Angela Merkel's proposal, made in June, that the European Union and Russia establish their own Political and Security Committee, and President Nicolas Sarkozy's intention, enunciated in Deauville, to establish an E.U.-Russia economic space "with common security concepts."
Just before the Deauville meeting, Vladimir Chizov, Russia's ambassador to the E.U., leapt ahead of the Merkel/Sarkozy plans and told a reporter that Russia now wants a formalized relationship with the existing E.U. committee on foreign and security policy. "I don't expect to be sitting at every committee session," he said, "but there should be some mechanism that would enable us to take joint steps."
As for the Obama administration stamping its foot, what it came down to was a senior U.S. official saying: "Since when, I wonder, is European security no longer an issue of American concern, but something for Europe and Russia to resolve? After being at the center of European security for 70 years, it's strange to hear that it's no longer a matter of U.S. concern."
So, a follow-on burst of European contrition? I asked a German official about it. He spoke of German and French loyalty to NATO. And he said, "I understand there are American suspicions.""But," he added, "the United States must accept that the times are changing. There are examples of it having done this. Why wouldn't it accept our view in this respect?"
The official did not list them, but there are obvious factors explaining the French and German initiatives.
A major one is President Barack Obama's perceived lack of interest and engagement in Europe. His failure to attend a Berlin ceremony commemorating the end of the Cold War and his cancellation of a meeting involving the E.U.'s new president has had symbolic weight.
At the same time, the U.S. reset with Russia and the administration's willingness to treat President Dmitri A. Medvedev as a potential Western-oriented partner has given the Germans and French the sense they were free to act on the basis of their own interpretations of the changes in Moscow.
In this European view, the United States has become significantly dependent on Russia through its maintenance of military supply routes to Afghanistan and its heightened pressure, albeit in wavering measure, on Iran. Because the reset is portrayed by the administration to be a U.S. foreign policy success, criticism from Washington of Russia is at a minimum.
Consider this irony: the more Russia makes entry into the E.U.'s decision-making processes on security issues a seeming condition for deals the French and/or Germans want (think, for example, of France's proposed sale to Moscow of Mistral attack vessels), the more the impression takes hold that the administration's focus for complaint about the situation has been off-loaded onto the Europeans.
Example: Ivo H. Daalder, the United States' permanent representative at NATO, gave a speech in Paris last week in which he skipped the over Russians' maneuvering, but described as "baffling" and "very strange" that "NATO doesn't have a real strategic partnership with the E.U."
True enough. On the other hand, Russia is getting a whole series of passes: Ten days ago, when Mr. Medvedev offered Hugo Chávez of Venezuela help to build the country's first nuclear power station, the State Department expressed concern about technology migrating to "countries that should not have that technology" but added (bafflingly), that the relationship between Venezuela and Russia (for years Iran's supplier of nuclear wherewithal) "is not of concern to us."
Last week, more of the same. When Mr. Medvedev bestowed Russia's highest honors at a Kremlin ceremony on a group of sleeper spies who were expelled from the United States last July, a State Department spokesman turned away a reporter's question with a "no comment." Washington chooses not to say anything either about Mr. Medvedev's support, repeated in Deauville, for Mr. Sarkozy's plan, as next year's president of the G-20 consultative grouping, to focus its attention on limiting the dollar's role as the world's reserve currency.
In the Deauville aftermath, the Americans have preferred applauding Mr. Medvedev's decision to come to a NATO summit meeting in Lisbon next month, following U.S. congressional elections. He is not expected to announce Russian participation in or endorsement of a U.S.-initiated antimissile shield for Europe the United States' notionally organic bond in strengthening the alliance's trans-Atlantic future yet the Russian president's appearance as a guest on NATO's turf could be seen as an important gesture of real cooperation.
Still, for all the Americans' concern about Europe dealing with Russia on its own, there hardly has been a corresponding public statement from the administration that's a call for caution about Moscow's interest in setting up rivalries between NATO and the E.U. For David J. Kramer, a former senior State Department official with responsibility for Russia, the new circumstances show "the Russians now have far more leverage in the U.S. relationship than they should."
It was unexpected in the circumstances, but at a briefing in the run-up to the Deauville meeting the administration liked so little, a French presidential source put a big asterisk more than Washington does openly next to France's desire to create "an anchorage in the West" out of "fragile" indications of change in Russia.
"We do not have assurance there is a permanent strategic turn," the Élysée Palace said.
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