Russia: Other Points of View

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Luzhkov. Medvedev dismissed Luzhkov as mayor of Moscow on Tuesday and appointed his 1^st Deputy Vladimir Resin pro tem. The reason given was that he had lost confidence in Luzhkov. Luzhkov thereupon resigned from the pedestal party. As usual, some in the Kommentariat are trying to spin this as evidence that the Duumvirate is cracking, but Putin seemed quite comfortable with the decision. So now what? I see three possibilities from Medvedev’s side. 1. Luzhkov, who is 74, is allowed to go quietly into retirement. 2. He is given some face-saving appointment. Either seems to be more likely (based on past practice) than the third which is that a corruption prosecution is opened against him, his wife or both. Putting them on trial would send a very strong signal that Medvedev is serious about corruption and that even the highest are subject to the law. (And, come to think of it, not doing so would send quite a different signal). But, any prosecution has to be transparent and competent (the last being in rather short supply among government prosecutions: vide YUKOS and Budanov). It’s a pity that it ended this way: I think Luzhkov did a great deal for his city but it would have been better had he stepped down a term ago. I believe that what’s really happening here is that the Team is forcing out those regional heads who think they own their jobs. While Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, the other recently departed leader-for-life, has his future worked out  – he was just re-elected head of FIDE  –Luzhkov is still grumbling and has invoked the Russian version of Godwin’s Law. Something not much noted is that there have been more name changes at the top than elsewhere: for example, in 1996 Yeltsin ran against Zhirinovskiy, Zyuganov and Yavlinskiy; in 2000 Putin ran against the three. Only the last had departed the political scene (and not at his own desire) when Medvedev ran in 2008. Luzhkov had been mayor since 1992 and Ilyumzhinov president of Kalmykia since 1993. A lot has happened since then.

ZAKAEV: THE WHOLE STORY

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

The Associated Press and other U.S. mainstream media have been reporting the arrest of former head of the Chechen government-in-exile by Polish authorities in recent days. Zakaev, who arrived in Warsaw for a congress of Chechens, was soon released and is not to be extradited to Russia.  Russian authorities want to try him for his activities as a separatist fighter and then a member of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) insurgency which became a largely jihadist movement. This began in 2002 after the ChRI’s forces defeat on the traditional battlefield in the second Russo-Chechen war.  Specifically Zakhaev is charged with murder and organizing a revolt, among others.  Polish authorities stated that they decided not to extradite Zakaev because he had received political asylum in Great Britain.

Unfortunately, the media have not covered the full Zakaev story, ignoring his long record as the ChRI insurgency’s culture minister and in the second war, ‘foreign minister’ and a likely key funder.  They report only that Zakaev fought in the first war (1994-1996); this is true but it leaves out a great deal.  During the inter-war period of Chechnya’s quasi-independence under the Khasavyurt peace agreement with Moscow, Zakev served as the head of the ChRI’s Central Bank; a bank that likely received funds from the hostage trade industry that members of the ChRI government and some of its field commanders developed during this period.  The Central Bank’s funds disappeared when Zakaev left for abroad.

ISLAM, ISLAMISM AND POLITICS IN EURASIA REPORT No. 25, Sep 29, 2010

by Gordon Hahn

Monterey Institute of International Studies

CONTENTS:

• UMAROV OFFICIALLY RELEASES THE DISSENTING CHECHEN AMIRS FROM THEIR COMMANDS
• CE TERRORISM STATISTICS FOR AUGUST AND JANUARY THROUGH AUGUST, 2010
• THE CE’S AND NOKCHICHO VILAIYAT’S LATE SUMMER SUICIDE BOMBINGS
• PROFILE OF ‘SEIFULLAH’ ANZOR ASTEMIROV, PART 4: CONCLUSION - ASTEMIROV’S LEGACY
• ANNOUNCEMENT: GORDON HAHN INTERVIEW WITH ‘ROSBALT’

To access the full report, click Download KAVKAZJIHAD_MonTREP_IIPER_25_Sept_2010

RUSSIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS FORM A NEW COALITION

United we stand, but for what?

by Eugene Ivanov

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines.)

I know what former President Ronald Reagan would have said had he learned that Russian liberals decided to unite: "There you go again."

Indeed, anyone watching Russian politics couldn’t escape an acute sense of déjà vu upon learning that four Russian opposition leaders – Mikhail Kasyanov, Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, and Vladimir Milov – have signed an agreement to form a new coalition named "For Russia without Lawlessness and Corruption." Other similar coalitions appeared and then rapidly disappeared in the past, loosely following Russia’s election cycles: Committee 2008 (2004), The Other Russia (2006), National Assembly (2008), and Solidarity (2008). Given that the faces of the four co-founders look all too familiar (perhaps, only Vladimir Milov, the leader of the "Russia’s Democratic Choice" movement, could be counted as a relative new-comer) there is little reason to expect that this time around, something will be different.

U.S. LAUDS RUSSIA ON BARRING ARMS FOR IRAN

REPRINTS

New York Times, Sep 22, 2010

by David E. Sanger and Andrew. E.Kramer

UNITED NATIONS — The White House praised Russia’s president, Dmitri A. Medvedev, on Wednesday for publicly barring the shipment of an advanced antimissile system to Iran, even as American diplomats here discussed a plan to reopen negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. 

The Russian announcement and the effort to revive a diplomatic engagement that fell apart a year ago came as President Obama arrived in New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly and laid out what he called an ambitious new approach to American development assistance for the world’s poorest countries. 

“The days when your development was dictated by foreign capitals must come to an end,” Mr. Obama said from the well of the United Nations, the first of two speeches there over two days, drawing applause from nearly 190 nations attending the Millennium Development Goals summit meeting. 

THE SPEEDING TROIKA

REPRINTS

By Andrew Kuchins

Russia Beyond the Headlines, Sep 21, 2010

A week of travel with the Valdai Discussion Club in Russia makes one feel as though he were along for the ride on Gogol’s Troika. We were in constant motion on planes, trains, boats and buses from Sochi to Moscow to St. Petersburg and further north into Karelia. The subject of much of our discussions and my further ruminations was Russia’s past and current efforts at modernization, a task that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has made the top priority for his leadership. Like the metaphor of the speeding troika for Russia that Nikolai Gogol immortalized in his novel “Dead Souls” more than 150 years ago, there is no consensus in Russia about what the latest attempt at modernization should consist of.

The notion of modernization was the main topic of our three-day conference, during which nearly 100 Russian and international experts and journalists on the riverboat Kronstadt discussed “Russia’s History and Future Development.” Two striking impressions emerged from these discussions. First, there was no agreement about the definition of modernization. Some participants emphasized the importance of diversification of the economy away from its heavy dependence on the export of hydrocarbons and other natural commodities. Often this was tied to the notion of re-industrialization with a particular emphasis on high technology and innovation. Others put a higher priority on the improvement of governmental, social and economic institutions to improve efficiency and raise Russian competitiveness. Others placed at the forefront attention to the development of human capital.

THE NEXT RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

REPRINTS

The Independent (UK)

September 13, 2010

Just because Starbucks has come to Moscow doesn't mean that citizens of the biggest nation on earth enjoy real political freedom - and now they are ready to do something about it. 

Mary Dejevsky reports

Something is stirring in Russia, but it is hard to divine quite what it is. After a week spent travelling, mostly in the north-west of the country, in the company of Western Russia-watchers and Russian intellectuals, politicians and journalists - this year's Valdai group meeting that culminated in the annual question-and-answer session with Vladimir Putin - I found Russia caught between its past and its future, still uncertain which way to go. There is scant hint of destructive social tension; the special troops routinely mobilised to counter banned demonstrations seem out of all proportion to the threat to law and order from those claiming the right to free assembly. The buzzword is "modernisation", which was launched into the post-Soviet lexicon a year ago by Putin's successor as President, Dmitry Medvedev. Since then, Russians everywhere on the political spectrum have tied themselves in knots trying to define it. Among intellectuals, there is widespread disappointment. 

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Luzhkov. The number one story in Moscow these days is the future of Mayor Luzhkov. It is highly probable that the present campaign against him is blessed by the Kremlin. It is rumoured that the object is to get him to go quietly. Luzhkov is a powerful man but that’s a lot of pressure. I expect that he will “retire at his own request for personal reasons” as they used to say (vide Ilyumzhinov). There is a style to the way the Team handles these problems: Nazdratenko was ousted as governor in 2001 with the excuse of poor handling of power failures and appointed head of the State Fishing Commission (where he served at Putin’s pleasure); that pleasure ended in 2003. The Team evidently agrees with Lyndon Johnson’s advice on tents. Nazdratenko is still in the tent, but far off in the corner. What’s happening here I think (most commentators didn’t notice Ilyuzhinov’s departure) is that, bit by bit, the Team is getting rid of people who thought they had jobs for life (and, of course, who aren’t as loyal as they might be. But that’s politics and power the world over.)

THE KREMLIN-LUZHKOV BATTLE FOR MOSCOW AND THE THAW

by Gordon M. Hahn

The recent power tussle between the Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev and Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov is another sign that the Medvedev-Putin thaw, spearheaded by the president is creating fissures within the ruling elite.  Regime splits and mobilization of opposition forces are common features of periods of liberalization in Russia and elsewhere. Today’s political fissures above and political mobilization below are likely to intensify as the Kremlin tries to get its ducks in a row before the federal election cycle––and the tandem’s decision regarding who will run for president: Medvedev or Putin.

The splits predictably are occurring along fault lines left over from the pre-Putin and early Putin eras.  Readers may recall that Mayor Luzhkov was a leader of the Fatherland party that joined three powerful regional leaders – besides Luzhkov, it included then St. Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev, then Tatarstan President Shiamiev, and then Bashkortostan President Murtaza Rakhimov.  Thus, Luzhkov has never been an insider of the Putin elite, and tensions persisted between the mayor and the Kremlin, despite Luzhkov’s willingness to join Putin’s United Russia party and play ball according to his rules.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION WEEKLY SITREP

By Patrick Armstrong

Will he, won’t he? Because the only subject about Russia worth discussing seems to be this: Medvedev’s and Putin’s remarks at Q&A sessions have been parsed to create head scratchers on whether Putin will stand for President again. But, this speculation fails to take into consideration the simple fact that, had he wanted to, Putin could be President right now. All it took was the amendment of Art 81.3. No one can doubt that he had enough influence to have arranged that; but he didn’t. That is the fact these speculations ignore: why would he have fashioned this elaborate rigmarole of four years of Medvedev just so he could get back to the top again after a few bare chest events and harpooned whales? There must have been a reason for his decision (I now believe my 5^th hypothesis to be correct). Secondly, we have a recent clue: “I am fed up with foreign policy”. The President’s job has a lot to do with foreign policy (and Medvedev’s personal style is better suited to today’s requirements); obviously Putin is saying he’s had enough of that. After years of observation I am convinced that Putin usually says what he means and means what he says. Therefore, I believe that, barring some catastrophic event, Putin will not run for President again. My prediction, therefore, is that Medvedev will run again and that, at the completion of his second term, some other member of The Team will be put forward (and win). But it’s the same team that has been in charge since 2000 and it has the same program. (By the way, as evidence that it’s a team, note that Sergey Ivanov – the “next President” in 2007 – is quietly plugging away.) There remains a considerable amount of popular support for The Team and there are no real challengers now or in the immediate future. This situation will not last forever, but it ought to endure another ten years or so.