MEDVEDEV'S THAW HITS AT RUSSIA'S LACK OF THE RULE OF LAW

COMMENTARY

 by Gordon Hahn

I have been arguing for some 20 months now that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev would begin a political thaw and gradually all power will be transferred to him from Premier and former president Vladimir Putin, who would give it up willingly or not.  I have been arguing for a long time as well that Medvedev's thaw - a second 'perestroika' of sorts - has already begun.  A Medvedian glasnost, minor political reforms, an ambitious privatization program set for next year, and reform of the penal system have all substantiated the claim.

Now Medvedev has targeted one of the most corrupt institutions in Russian government - the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  This decision to target the MVD - the first major institutional reform project of his presidency - is consistent with the logic of implementing great reforms. Medvedev's decision could impart greater impetus to his economic modernization and political thaw plans by removing a key institutional barrier to change and the rule of law.  Just as the CPSU was the main obstacle blocking Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, the MVD is most likely the main obstacle to reform in today's Russia, with the possible exceptions of the FSB and the GRU (Main Administration for Intelligence or military intelligence).

Also, the move against the MVD is long-awaited by Russian citizens. For years polls have shown that Russians regard the MVD as the most corrupt and dangerous force in their lives.  Outside of the 'Caucasus Emirate' jihadist terrorists, the MVD leads Russia in the violation of citizens' political, civil, and human rights.

Some have questioned the seriousness of Medvedev's MVD reform initiative, but a close look at it suggests it is indeed a concerted attempt to put the MVD in its place, to ensure it fulfills its police functions without massive corruption and incompetence, and turn it into an organ that inspires at least some trust among Russian people. The decree Medvedev issued ordering the reform was strikingly outspoken about the breakdown of the MVD as a functioning and reliable law enforcement body: "(I)n recent times incidents of the violation of legality and service discipline have occurred which are provoking a fundamentally negative reaction in society and diminishing the authority of government." The MVD is judged not to be "meeting contemporary requirements" and "needing modernization."

Medvedev's decree ordering the reform stipulates at least nine key changes to be prepared by March 31, 2010 and enter into force by January 1, 2012.  Thus, the decree envisages a two-year period during which the reforms will be designed and implemented, and they will come into force before the 2012 presidential election.  A period of such length is both necessary and sufficient for implementing a major reform in a country with a strong, reform-resistant state bureaucracy.

Two reforms are designed to sever regional governments' control over local departments of the MVD.  The first is to hand over all organizational and appointment power over the MVD to the federal executive branch.  The second is to terminate all regional funding for the MVD and concentrate all budget funds for the department in Moscow.  Although this strengthens an already hyper-centralized Russian state, it is necessary for undertaking any fundamental changes, which would be blocked in most regions by ambitious and corrupt governors and/or regional MVD chiefs.  Central control over some of the functions carried out by the MVD, such as investigation, is common in democratic states.  In the U.S., provincial or state departments of the FBI or Justice Department are not staffed or run by governors.

A third reform is designed to break the power of regional governors and MVD chiefs by requiring that the personnel that makes up the top command of regional MVD departments be rotated.  This could be effective in reducing regional resistance to the reforms and breaking up corrupt regional clans by limiting governor-MVD ties and disturbing the police cover for corrupt or criminal regional clans, which are often based in or penetrate regional MVD leaderships.

The fourth and fifth reforms are interrelated.  The former consists of 20 percent reduction in MVD personnel and a reduction in the number of regional deputy chiefs, with the money saved for their upkeep devoted to increasing the salaries of the remaining personnel. An increase in the salaries of MVD personnel has long been recommended by international and domestic corruption watchdog NGOs as crucial for reducing bribe-taking and abuse of office for profit within Russia's law enforcement organs.

A sixth reform ordering a review of the way housing is provided to MVD personnel may also be related to this problem.

A seventh orders changes to the MVD's structure and functions in order to streamline it by ridding its "two structures" as well as functions and presumably their corresponding structures that do or should not belong to the MVD.

An eighth reform targets the MVD's training academies and recruitment practices.  The former are to be streamlined, and the latter are to be transformed so they will take into consideration recruits' "moral-ethical and psychological qualities towards the goal of promotong the level of professionalism."

The ninth and a most important reform - one also related to personnel training but also crucial for Medvedev's anti-corruption policy - is "the realization of anti-corruption educational programs of professional and continuing professional education for the various categories of (MVD) personnel." (See Medvedev's decree at "President podpisal Ukaz 'O merakh po sovershenstvovaniyu deyatelnosti organov vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii'," 24 Dec 2009)

In a year-end interview shown on all three Russian state television channels, Medvedev described the purpose and goals of this reform in stark and ambitious terms, noting "there are needed and will be sufficiently harsh, serious changes." (Prezident Rosiii Dmitrii Medvedev: "Narod sposoben menyat'sya ne tol'ko iz-pod palki,"Izvestia, 27 December 2009)

Indeed, the comprehensive nature of the proposed reform outline suggests that this is not simply a PR action, as suggested by some observers, but might very well be a concerted effort to resolve one of Russia's most vexing problems - the lack of rule of law (See Nabi Abdullaev, "Kremlin Vow to Overhaul Police Rings Hollow," Moscow Times, 28 December 2009 and mark Galeotti, "Medvedev's Police Reform Is More About Control Than Reform," RFERL, 7 January 2010) Indeed, some liberal activists warmly welcomed Medvedev's initiative.  Head of the Moscow Helsinki Group Lyudmila Alekseyeva told journalists: "I am very happy that the president is dealing with this. Human rights activists have been talking about this for a long time." ("Russian politicians, experts divided on Medvedev's police reform," Interfax, 25 December 2009.)

The fact that this decree was issued in the middle of the winter holiday season suggests that Medvedev sought to catch off guard certain elements in Russian government.  It remains unclear whether Medvedev wanted to keep tandem partner, Premier and former president Vladimir Putin and/or the MVD and/or other siloviki off balance.  It is obvious that if any of these want to, they could be in a position to block or water down the design or implementation of these reforms, especially if they act in concert or with regional leaders. This is another thing, besides stealing, that Russian officials and bureaucrats are expert at and for which they have a strong historical record of success.

As one journalist noted: "If implemented, the reform...would amount to one of the most ambitious reforms of Russia's bloated bureaucracy since the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union." (Dmitry Solovyov, "Kremlin orders 20 percent cut to Russian police ministry," Reuters, 24 December 2009.)

As such, Medvedev's decree puts to rest the frequently heard but incorrect assertion that his presidency is one of words, while deeds and real power are reserved for the tandem's other half. (For example, see Nikolai Petrov's comments in "Medvedev Is Permitted 'Rhetoric,' Not 'Practical Decisions'," Svobodnaya Pressa, 28 December 2009, in Johnson's Russia List, 31 December 2009; Nikolai, Petrov, "The Virtual President," Moscow Times, September 29, 2009; and "Political Commentators Discuss 2012 Presidential Election Issue," Svobodnaya Pressa, 1 January 2010, in Johnson's Russia List, 2010-#4, 7 January 2010.)

Comments

[Mike Stacy]

With news coming non-stop, 24\7, what better way is there then to find someone, or some country, to demonize. It sells media. Cliche: If you throw enough fecus on the wall, weather true or false, some of it will stick. ms