COMMENTARY
by Gordon Hahn
Many Western analysts and policy makers continue to insist that the Barack Obama administration's 'reset' efforts in U.S. relations with Russia are doomed to insignificance or outright failure. To be sure, U.S. and Western interests diverge from Moscow's on several key issues, but at the same time policies are under review in both Washington and Moscow. On the most important issue - Iran's nuclear weapons development program - Moscow has sought to protect its economic interests in Teheran by limiting the harshness of UN sanctions and offering a way out of the conflict by proposing the shipment of spent nuclear fuel so that Iran cannot enrich it for weaponization. Iran's rejection of the plan puts Moscow in a corner, and a moment of truth is coming for the Kremlin in which it will have to make the Hobson's choice between its relationship with an unreliable and internationally irresponsible Teheran and an eternally distrusted West. This issue will ultimately make or break the reset.
However, in other vital areas, either considerable progress is being made or differences are being clarified in an effort to reduce them towards the goal of reaching at least second order agreements. In arms control, an interim bridge agreement is likely with ratification of a treaty making significant cuts in both parties' nuclear arsenals. On non-proliferation, Washington and Moscow appear to be on the same page, but the inability of either side to rein in Iran, South Korea, and China puts the regime at risk such that the global zero is likely to remain unattainable in the mid- to long-term. This means that Russia and the U.S. will retain nuclear arsenals and will have to continue to work on maintaining a nuclear balance.
Some argue that the logic behind the Obama 'reset' policy is doomed to stumble and fail in two areas: the balance of power in the post-Soviet space and Putin's preference for an aggressive and ultimately anti-Western foreign policy.
Regarding Russia's neighbors in the post-Soviet region, many observers continue to locate the cause of U.S.-Russian tensions in the red herring of Russia's neighbors' independence and sovereignty. The independence and sovereignty of the former Soviet republics is not an issue for Moscow. The issue is the use of these countries' independence and sovereignty by the West, in particular Washington, to expand NATO - the world history's most powerful military bloc - to Russia's borders. By militarizing our policy of buttressing democracy and free markets in post-communist states in the mid-1990s, we discredited the motives behind our democracy-promotion policies. Whereas, the West saw NATO expansion as a means to buttress democracy and free markets in the post-communist world, Moscow came to see the democratization and colored revolutions (two different phenomena, incidentally) as a mechanism for opening the way to NATO's further expansion. The U.S. appears to have temporarily shelved NATO expansion. The longer this policy holds, the fewer and farther between will be Russian-Western tensions and conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
Some argue that the logic behind the Obama 'reset' policy is
flawed in that it is only Washington that is prepared to revise past policies;
the tandem is a fiction, and Moscow's continued antagonism towards the West is
guaranteed by Putin. Along this vein,
CSIS
Russia Program Director Andrew Kuchins recently asked "(w)hy should we expect Mr. Putin to effectively repudiate many of his foreign policy positions that constitute his political legacy of nearly a decade as Russia's leader?" The answer is quite simple: The tandem or, according to the logic just mentioned, Putin is overturning many of Putin's prior domestic policies. Witness the massive de-nationalization and privatization program Moscow has set for 2010, the aggressive if still difficult anti-corruption campaigns, Medvedev's small but not insignificant political reforms accompanied by the promise of more, and the more cooperative attitude towards human rights organizations and the democratic opposition, including the appointment of some of them to gubernatorial posts in the regions.
If Putin's domestic policies can be substantially revised, why cannot his foreign policy be also revised. One need only recall, the change in direction of Russian policy after 9/11. Indeed, some changes have recently occurred in Russian foreign policy, including Moscow's unilateral offer to open an air corridor over Russia for lethal supplies to U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and its follow through on its idea for a new European security cooperation agreement with a recent and sufficiently interesting draft treaty offered by the Kremlin for further deliberation along with the U.S. and Europe.
Therefore, prudence and the U.S. national interest would
suggest maintaining a more open mind than some would propose regarding Moscow's
intentions and capacity for new thinking.
Russia is still in a state of flux. This offers opportunities for changing its perception of,
and policies towards the West.
Issues like Iran will soon force hard decisions on all parties, and the
Kremlin is still in a position to make the right choice - one in favor of the
progressive West over regressive rogue states in the East and South, like Iran and
Venezuela. Its responsiveness to
President Obama's policy overtures on arms control, non-proliferation, and
supply corridors to our forces fighting the war against jihadism suggests
positive movement is possible.
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