COMMENTARY
By Gordon Hahn
Washington Post's October 3 editorial sunk below the paper's already dismal record of partisanship and Russophobia, by falsifying the causality and conduct of the August 2008 Georgian-Russian Five-Day War. In this particular editorial the WP built its grossly one-sided narrative using not just its traditional practice of negligent and intentional omissions, unsupported and unsupportable claims, and inaccuracies, but also downright lies. Let's take each in turn.
The editorial's first charge against Russia is that it had been "overtly preparing for war for months before its troops began their rampage." Of course, the fact that any nation prepares for war does not mean it wants war. In fact, quite often the contrary is the case: states prepare for war to deter it. Deterrence is most likely to be the purpose, if war preparations are undertaken "overtly" as Russia's were, and as the WP itself acknowledges. The WP editorial omits that Saakashvili had been planning for war in secret, according to several Rose revolutionaries and former allies of Georgian President Saakashvili, including a former parliament speaker and a former defense minister. Indeed, according to the latter, who participated in Georgia's war planning, Saakashvili had been developing war plans to forcibly reintegrate both South Ossetia and Abkhazia not for months, but for years. It is likely that Russian secret services were well aware of Saakashvili's plans, and the Kremlin planned accordingly. Naturally, the WP leaves out these inconvenient truths, for they would spoil the WP's Russophobic narrative of Russia's eternal, all-encompassing blame for every problem facing the post-Soviet and post-communist states. The fact is that the five-day Georgia-provoked war was the tragic consequence of the messy Soviet state construction and collapse compounded by leadership lapses in Tbilisi, Tskhinvali, Washington, Moscow, Brussels and Strasbourg.
The WP editorial's next claim is that Russian troops engaged in a "rampage" during the counter-invasion of South Ossetia. This is a rather odd claim, since the number of casualties on the Russian and Ossetian sides exceeded those on the Georgian side. In such a case, would not the Georgian side have to be charged with a rampage to keep things fair and balanced? However, facts are, the Georgians intentionally targeted civilians by indiscriminately firing hundreds of highly inaccurate GRAD artillery shells on South Ossetia's capitol of Tskhinvali all through the night of August 7-8. What would the Georgian troops have done had they not failed in their apparent attempt to seal off the Roki Tunnel blocking Russian forces from entering South Ossetia?
The WP claims next that "Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin made clear from the outset that his goal was to overthrow the pro-American government of Mikheil Saakashvili." Further in the piece there is a reference to Putin's effort to "subjugate" Georgia. There is no evidence to substantiate this claim. How did Putin make his goal of removing Saakashvili "clear from the outset"? Where is the quote? Did he call for Saakashvili's resignation? No. Did he seek to arrest Saakashvili by occupying Tbilisi when it stood just 30 miles from thousands of Russian troops? After all, the Russians had just routed the retreating and disorganized Georgian army? No. If Putin sought to "subjugate" Georgia why did he not occupy the country when he had a chance? Finally, little force have been needed to remove Saakashvili from power at that moment, given Saakashvili's already plummeting popularity? Where is the evidence for the WP editors' claims? None. Of course, it is easy to offer one-sided conclusions: One has only to make up his or her mind and refuse to ask hard questions, or examine alternative explanations, or do investigative research. This is exactly the approach of the WP on any story on Russia.
The WP editors' next claim is that the U.S. "rightly condemned at the time" the "open hostilities" that "began… on the night of Aug. 7, 2008," which the editorial follows by noting that the EU report "documented a long lead-up of provocative acts by Russia and its local allies in South Ossetia and Abkhazia." The only "open hostilities" on the night of August 7th were undertaken by the Georgian side. U.S. condemnation came only after Russia entered the war. The only U.S. condemnation of Georgia's actions at the time came from Ambassador John Byerly, the America's ambassador to Moscow, who was quickly forced by Washington to qualify his comments. More importantly, the EU report also documented and blamed Georgian conduct for paving the road to war.
The EU Commission's report comments: "This Report shows that any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus solely on the artillery attack on Tskhinvali in the night of 7/8 August and on what then developed into the questionable Georgian offensive in South Ossetia and the Russian military action. The evaluation also has to cover the run-up to the war during the years before and the mounting tensions in the months and weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. It must also take into account years of provocations, mutual accusations, military and political threats and acts of violence both inside and outside the conflict zone. It has to consider, too, the impact of a great power's coercive politics and diplomacy against a small and insubordinate neighbor, together with the small neighbor's penchant for overplaying its hand and acting in the heat of the moment without careful consideration of the final outcome, not to mention its fear that it might permanently lose important parts of its territory through creeping annexation. We also notice with regret an erosion of the respect of established principles of international law such as territorial integrity, and at the same time an increased willingness on all sides to accept the use of force as a means to reach one´s political goals and to act unilaterally instead of seeking a negotiated solution, as difficult and cumbersome as such a negotiation process might be" (Report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. I, pp. 31-32.)
The EU Report also criticizes the West's, particularly U.S. support for Saakashivili's military buildup and political line of restoring Georgia's territorial integrity. It also criticizes Europe's and responsible international organizations' failure to resolve the dispute between Georgia and the two breakaway republics. Almost everything in the EU report, including the charges against Moscow, was mentioned in ROPV's discussion of the war in the days and weeks following the war (SEE Gordon M. Hahn, "The Making of the Georgian Five-Day War: A Chronology of Military and Violent Events, June-August 7, 2008," Johnson's Russia List, #173, 24 September 2008; Gordon M. Hahn, "The Making of the Georgian-Russia Five-Day August War, June - August 8, 2008," Russia: Other Points of View, 22 September 2008; Gordon M. Hahn, "Georgia's Propaganda War," Russia: Other Points of View, 5 September 2008; and Gordon M. Hahn, "Georgia's Propaganda War (Long Version)," Russia - Other Points of View, 5 September 2008. See also the exchange of views on the August war that took place on Johnson's Russia List between Professor Gordon M. Hahn, on the one hand, and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's chief PR consultant and two U.S. military officers, on the other hand, at Russia: Other Points of View through the link.)
But none of the above is acknowledged in the WP editorial, or in any of their articles on Russia, for the simple reason that for the Washington Post, it's imperative that Russia is blamed for this war and any other geopolitical aspect in which they may be involved.
The WP omits that the report condemned Georgia's massive and indiscriminate bombing of innocent civilians in Tskhinvali and its use of cluster bombs as a violation of international human rights law and the laws of war. The report mentioned some evidence from independent studies but did not conclude that Russia used cluster bombs. Russia has denied it, while Tbilisi and the report acknowledge Georgia's use of the banned explosive devices.
The WP quotes from the EU report that, "(M)uch of the Russian military action went far beyond the reasonable limits of defense." It also quotes the EU report's condemnation of "irregular armed groups on the South Ossetian side that would not or could not be adequately controlled by regular Russian armed forces' committed violations of international law, including the ethnic cleansing of Georgians."
Regarding the South Ossetian irregulars' 'ethnic cleansing', it needs to be asked if these violations were driven by revenge sparked by the Georgians' massive and indiscriminate bombing Tskhinvali citizens. The report does not decisively pinpoint Russian forces' responsibility for the Ossetians' conduct, noting they "would not or could not be adequately controlled" by Russian forces, which were also likely outraged by the Georgian bombing. Additionally, as the EU report acknowledges to its credit, "revenge and private motives are also relevant in explaining the torching of ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia" (Report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Vol. II, p. 369.)
Here, revenge means retribution for Georgia's massive and indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Tskhinavli.
The WP's assertion that "relations between Russia and all of its other neighbors have deteriorated" since the war is simply false. Russia's relations with most of its neighbors remain as they were before the war. In some cases - China and Kyrgyzstan - relations have gotten closer. Kyrgyzstan has approved a second Russian military base to be established there, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which includes other Russian neighbors Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia) approved the Russian initiative to establish a joint rapid reaction force. Relations with Poland, though it is not Russia's direct, bordering neighbor, have also recently improved. Instrumental in this, was Putin's visit to Poland and his statements at the WW II anniversary celebrations in Warsaw, which prompted the Polish Catholic Church's cardinal to call on Poles to forgive Russia for its past transgressions against Poland. Most curiously, the Post also neglected the improved U.S.-Russian relations under President Barack Obama, whom it otherwise supports wholeheartedly.
The Post editorial's final paragraph is truly special and deserves full quotation: "That doesn't mean the danger of further Russian aggression is over. Mr. Putin still claims the right to a 19th-century-style sphere of influence extending to Georgia, Ukraine and other nations of the former Soviet Union. If U.S. support for those countries is seen by Moscow to slacken, another war will soon follow."
Lastly, the charge about Russia's alleged lust for a "19th-century-style sphere of influence" is already a legend of sorts. What Russia seeks is a friendly border for its country - not lined by members of the world history's strongest ever military alliance - NATO. It is NATO expansion (unmentioned in the editorial) plus Washington's manner of democracy promotion, that has driven Moscow's growing angst and cantankerousness since the mid-1990s. It is NATO expansion that created the tense tectonics pitting post-Soviet Russian neighbors against Russia, aggravated Georgian-Ossetian tensions, sparked the Georgian-Russian war, and may possibly bring "another war" soon to follow.
In the year since the war, none of the counterpoints I have raised have ever been allowed to be printed on the WP's increasingly disreputable pages. The WP's biased pages are driving its declining readership, the only positive aspect in its sordid decline.
ARTICLE IN QUESTION:
Washington Post
October 3, 2009
Editorial
Verdict on a War. A European fact-finding mission provides more reason for Russia to regret its invasion of Georgia.
EVEN BEFORE the shooting ended, Russia's invasion of Georgia last year prompted an international debate about who bore responsibility for the conflict. For many in the United States, the answer was fairly obvious: Russia, after all, had been overtly preparing for war for months before its troops began their rampage, and Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin made clear from the outset that his goal was to overthrow the pro-American government of Mikheil Saakashvili. But many Europeans were reluctant to allow their relations with Russia to be soured by a small country in the Caucuses. So at the impetus of Germany, an independent "fact-finding mission" was established.
The results, released Wednesday in a lengthy report, won't please the hard-core partisans of either side. But they ought to be particularly disappointing to Mr. Putin and his apologists. Written by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, the report rejects Russia's main claims about the conflict, finds it guilty of sponsoring or tolerating human rights crimes, and asserts that any country that follows Moscow's lead in recognizing two provinces of Georgia as independent nations will itself be violating international law.
The report finds that "open hostilities" began with a Georgian attack on the capital of the rebel province of South Ossetia on the night of Aug. 7, 2008 -- an act that the United States rightly condemned at the time. But the mission also documented a long lead-up of provocative acts by Russia and its local allies in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moscow's claim that Georgia committed "genocide" and thus justified its invasion, the report says, was false; moreover, "much of the Russian military action went far beyond the reasonable limits of defense." The mission also confirmed that "irregular armed groups on the South Ossetian side that would not or could not be adequately controlled by regular Russian armed forces" committed violations of human rights law and possibly war crimes, including the ethnic cleansing of Georgians.
A year later, Mr. Putin's attempt to subjugate Georgia looks like one of his worse blunders. Only two other countries -- Nicaragua and Venezuela -- have recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Mr. Saakashvili remains in office, and relations between Russia and all of its other neighbors have deteriorated. Now even Mr. Putin's European Union advocates will be hard-pressed to defend his actions.
That doesn't mean the danger of further Russian aggression is over. Mr. Putin still claims the right to a 19th-century-style sphere of influence extending to Georgia, Ukraine and other nations of the former Soviet Union. If U.S. support for those countries is seen by Moscow to slacken, another war will soon follow.
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