Missile Defence.
Medvedev
has formally announced,
after some confusion (again!) from various spokesmen, that the deployment of
Iskander Missiles to Kaliningrad has been cancelled (they never were actually
deployed – it was always conditional).
Yesterday the Foreign Minister Lavrov said that the new
US plans presented no risks for Russia, good conditions were present for dialogue
and that Moscow and Washington would soon hold talks on missile defence. Of
course: Moscow was concerned when the idea was to stop ICBMs, but defence
against medium- and short- range missiles doesn’t bother it. On the other hand,
Russia’s UN Ambassador said
that it would complicate nuclear disarmament. I have often wished the Russian
Foreign Ministry would get a better grip on its people and stop this dribble of
confusing and partially contradictory statements. Mind you, NATO’s no better: it is asking for help while encouraging Tbilisi’s
NATO aspirations. What message will any of the suspicious people out there
take from these pairs of statements?
EU Report. The report was
published last week. It is probably not a coincidence that the next day PACE rejected Tbilisi’s
motion to deprive Russia of voting rights. Nino Burjanadze has accused
the government of covering up the report; while Saakashvili has hailed it
as complete vindication some
Georgians are claiming that Russian
money is to be found there. I
regard it as rather little, rather late, naïve and incomplete; my argument is here.
But at least it knows who started the war.
SSNs. It was announced that by
the end of next year, RosAtom will have dismantled 191 out of 198
decommissioned nuclear submarines; at the moment it has destroyed 166.
Sayano-Shushenskaya
HEP accident. RosTekhNadzor has announced the result
of its enquiry. Terrorist attack has been ruled out but a full slate of blame
is laid: design, operation, repair and lack of training. Anatoliy Chubays, head of the
electricity monopoly 1998 to 2008, is taking some of the
blame.
Loans. The Finance Minister
Aleksey Kudrin has said
that Moscow will not disburse the remaining US$500 million (of a US$2 billion)
loan to Belarus and will not lend Ukraine US$5 billion; he added, however, that
Moscow fully supported IMF actions. The reason given was that Moscow should
assess the chance of repayment. Given that Ukraine has already received US$10.6
billion of a US$16.4
billion IMF loan and Belarus received US$2.46 billion with another billion
likely on its way, this may be a prudent decision. It’s not shortage of money: Russia
has plenty in the kitty (the Reserve Fund is
US$76.37 billion, National Welfare Fund US$91.86 billion and international
reserves of more than US$400 billion).
De-nationalisation.
The
Finance Minister said
that the government intends to sell the shares in companies that it purchased
during the crisis. The only timeframe
he gave was “the medium term”.
Things you won’t
hear about. Last week customs officers in Krasnodar claimed to have
prevented an attempt to smuggle MiG-29 components to Syria. Russian rescue
teams arrived in
Sumatra on Sunday in response to Wednesday’s earthquake.
Karabakh. Maybe (maybe)
some movement here. An Azerbaijanian official is quoted as saying that Armenia
and Azerbaijan should be able to use the Lachin Corridor jointly.
Access from Armenia to Karabakh would have to be part of any genuine settlement.
Meanwhile the Turkish PM is quoted as saying
that Ankara and Yerevan will be signing an agreement on Saturday re-opening the
border and establishing relations. I believe that Ankara could play a very
important part in resolving the Karabakh issue. One of the lessons of the South
Ossetia war is that these gifts of Stalin’s cartographical skills should not be
left to fester.
Transdnestr. Speaking of
Stalin’s cartography, with the coming to power in Moldova of politicians who at one
time or another called for Moldova’s absorption into Romania (the casus belli
of the Transdnestr wars), it is prudent to look at that issue. And the
mediators (Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE) did call for the
resumption of talks. There is a doable solution that has been floating around –
high autonomy for Transdnestr with the option to secede should Moldova join
Romania – and hopefully it just needs some pressure to make it happen. The last
thing we need is more nonsense about how it’s all Moscow’s doing. But, again,
the “Georgia lesson” is, I believe, gradually sinking in.

Comments