Statement: Different points of view are reflected in the following Stratfor Analysis on Central Europe's Longstanding Fears, followed by Sharon Tennison's IMHO which was sent to Stratfor.
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From Stratfor:
German Chancellor Angela Merkel met with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in Munich on Thursday. The meeting produced talk of a Russian-German manufacturing alliance, a 500 million-euro ($704.7 million) joint investment agreement, several business deals that included infrastructure and transportation development, and a lot of chatter on Europe's energy issues, such as the proposed Nord Stream and Nabucco natural gas pipelines. The business deals are further evidence of a burgeoning relationship between Moscow and Berlin that is evolving into more than just a partnership of convenience based on German imports of Russian natural gas.
More important than the nitty-gritty details of the talks (none of which were wholly unexpected) was the fact that the German and Russian leaders were meeting shortly after both met with U.S. President Barack Obama. If one was ignorant of Germany's status as an unwavering U.S. ally, with troops in Afghanistan and nearly 70 years of pro-American foreign policy, it might be tempting to conclude that Merkel and Medvedev were comparing notes on their visits with Obama - which could constitute a level of geopolitical coordination far more important than deals to build new rail cars. In other words, Berlin and Moscow could be seen as getting quite close to each other, to a degree that cannot be accounted for solely by Germany’s energy dependence on Russia.
But this is exactly how ex-communist states in Central Europe perceive the relationship between Berlin and Moscow, precisely because they do not consider Germany to be a staunch and unwavering U.S. ally. In fact, Central European states - Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania - see much in German foreign policy that might be drifting away from the United States. For this group of countries, the NATO alliance has not proved to be the warranty against geopolitical instability they had hoped it to be. In fact, since Central European states have been taking part in NATO, Russia has freely manipulated domestic politics in Ukraine and the Baltics, intervened militarily in Georgia and played energy politics with the entire region, through natural gas cutoffs to Ukraine.
Through each episode of Russian brinkmanship, NATO has remained on the sidelines, unwilling to intervene. During the Russian intervention in Georgia in August 2008, Germany even tried to minimize NATO's reaction and, since then, has vociferously opposed expanding the alliance to include Ukraine and Georgia.
In light of concerns about Germany's commitment to their defense and NATO's ability to stand up to Russia, a group of 22 former leaders from Central and Eastern European states wrote a letter to Obama on Thursday, imploring him not to abandon them in the face of continued Russian meddling in the region. The letter specifically referred to the U.S. plans to build ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, stating that canceling the program "can undermine the credibility of the United States across the whole region."
For now, the United States is remaining silent on the BMD issue in order to see whether it can win any short-term concessions from Russia, particularly where Afghanistan and Moscow’s help in curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions are concerned. Central European states fear that their concerns about Russian power and their own security could be overruled by American interests in the Middle East. Leaders therefore want a firm commitment from the United States to the region, exemplified through the positioning of the BMD system in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Russian and German domination are familiar themes for Central Europe. Since both Germany and Russia historically have had interests in the region, states often looked to outside protectors with no immediate designs for the territory - examples include the inter-war U.K.-Polish and Little Entente (between France and Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) alliances. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a similar arrangement was made with the United States through NATO, or so the states of Central Europe had hoped.
However, the reality is that neither the Little Entente concept of the 1920-1930s nor the U.K.-Polish alliance prevented the region from being overrun by combined Russian and German invasions. Now, the Central Europeans are feeling abandoned by the one power that could provide security against the traditional German-Russian threat: the United States. The question, however, is whether Central European leaders will perceive the U.S. stall as a temporary realpolitik move or permanent abandonment. And if they perceive permanent abandonment, will the region’s leaders continue to write concerned letters to the U.S. president, or will they begin forming a security alliance amongst themselves - with the implicit purpose is countering Russia's presence in the region?
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Central Europe's Longstanding Fears by Stratfor
IN MY HUMBLE OPINION
by Sharon Tennison
July 19, 2009
Stratfor appears to be caught in zero-sum, 20th century mentality from
which it cannot free itself. Consequently Stratfor's interpretations
miss several key points re the German and Russia relationship. Stratfor
ignores the constructive role Germany has played in Russia since the
USSR's meltdown. It was Germans who shipped in tons of food a month to
feed Russia's orphans during the bleak 90s. It was German companies who
held the notes on equipment sold to Russian entrepreneurs during their
worst years of the 1990s. Today Russia is Germany's fastest growing
export market. It is Germany that Russian citizens trust and admire
for their realistic and methodical business acumen, not America any
longer. German-Russian bridges were being built, not in order to sink
the Atlantic alliance, but because the two countries had common
understandings and common needs. Just this week in Petersburg I heard
an intelligent, educated Russian saying that Russia needs a German
President! - he was serious. Perhaps the most important reality in
this relationship is that... Merkel is an East German, and she
understands and works with Russia in a way that others cannot or will
not. And it's working. America would do well to take lessons.
We at CCI have long pointed out that Germany's relationship with Russia
is about more than energy politics, it's about economics. It's not
sinister, it simply makes good sense for both countries. To zero-sum
proponents, this looks dangerous to America's hegemony; from a win-win
perspective (where nations aren't pitted against each other vying for
power) this is a plus for the entire globe.
As for Central Europe, since when did a major power identify with tiny
countries, to the detriment of relations with another major power? What
do we owe these countries? Haven't we supported them financially since
the 1990s? Can't we be honest with them and say that our taxpayers can
no longer afford to subsidize them? What do these countries offer to
the US other than to "contain" Russia - which is not needed? Do they
expect to have permanent patrons - surely not?
During the dysfunctional family's disintegration, they chose to align
with a far-away rich uncle - and have been dependent ever since. Of
course they want this relationship to continue, but it can't - times
and situations have changed. This is the 21st century, we are
borrowing to keep our own industries functioning - they cannot expect
us to be their roofs any longer. They need to get over their "hate
Russia" mentality, which became more exaggerated over the years to
please the rich uncle. Let's be realistic. It's time for them to
figure out ways to get along with their former family like all small
nations must (i.e. Central America) - and certainly stop kicking Russia
in the shins every chance they get.
In the early 1990s, the Eastern European countries' private
entrepreneurs were all getting along fine with Russia's entrepreneurs.
If uncle had not injected himself into their natural inclinations,
there would be millions of business links between them today. But no,
in order to plant wedges between these countries and Russia, many
mechanisms were created to prevent working relations from flourishing.
I know, I was there. We were training Russian entrepreneurs in
American companies at the same time and I heard the lamenting. It's
tragic what the US interrupted- the trade would have been good for
entrepreneurs across the entire region. Zero-sum politics always comes
back to haunt - will we ever learn this lesson?
Russia does not want any of these countries under its umbrella. Your
continuous case about big Russia harassing all of these small countries
doesn't add up. Let's face it: 1) If countries don't pay for their
energy, if it's cut off, it's not energy politics - it's bad business;
2) If a country invades another, and they are attacked back, they will
suffer consequences - and by the way, when has any country's
retaliation to any invasion ever been proportional? Check out the
Powell Doctrine. Please stop ignoring who invaded whom. What is the
logic to this?
Only the tip of the iceberg of double standards, double speak, slanted
innuendos, calling black white and white black, is touched upon here.
When I first subscribed to your service, you were analyzing all
situations relative to the US and Russia fairly evenly. It seems that
Stratfor has changed considerably over the past three years. What can
account for this?
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