by Eugene Ivanov
While Russia’s hardliners have so far kept silent on the subject, the job of torpedoing the
emerging Obama-Medvedev dialogue was taken by members of Russia's
"democratic opposition." In a testimony before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, former presidential economic adviser,
Andrei Illarionov, called the collaboration between the two countries America's
surrender and warned that it may
lead to a "war with unpredictable and nasty results."
Illarionov was seconded by the former chess
player and now the leader of the opposition,
Gary Kasparov, who, writing for The Wall Street Journal, suggested that
"Vladimir Putin's
regime is fighting for its political life"
and the only outcome of the rapprochement between Washington and Moscow
would be helping "the Russian autocratic regime survive."
It must be acknowledged that Kasparov has been
predicting the imminent collapse of the "criminal Putin regime" for
the past five or six years.
On the US side,
the drive to "exit" from U.S.-Russia relations was led by
those agitated by the concept of a “grand bargain”, a deal that the
American president supposedly offered, in a letter, to his Russian counterpart:
Russia's cooperation in stopping Iran's nuclear program in exchange for
abandoning a planned U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech
Republic.
A number of reasons were put forward
to argue that the "grand bargain” was a bad idea. It was said,
for example, that any concession to Russia would be viewed in Moscow as a
sign of U.S. weakness and even desperation. We were also reminded
that “Medvedev still takes orders from Putin” and, regardless of what a deal he would be willing
to strike, he may not be able to deliver.
Please note that Obama’s letter to Medvedev
wasn’t made public, and no one really knows what kind of a “bargain”,
if any, was offered. (President Obama has denied
that he suggested an Iran-MDS "swap", and so has Medvedev).
But in the surreal world that the Washington politics is, chimeras
often substitute reality. Thus, 46 House Republicans sent to Obama a letter of their own
condemning the alleged deal on the MDS. In particular, the
authors of the letter pointed out that any discussion of the MDS architecture
without consulting U.S. allies in Europe would amount to "undertaking a
surprisingly unilateral action."
In the spur of the moment, of course, no one
has pondered over whether Russia was interested
in a "grand bargain” in the first place. (I guess that
when a parent of an ill-behaving child wants to punish him by
withdrawing a dessert, it's automatically assumed that the child wants the
dessert direly).
In reality, the last time Russia was
willing to contemplate any "bargain" with the U.S. was in
2002, when then-president Putin decided -- over significant
resistance from parts of Russia's political elites -- to invest heavily in
his good personal relations with then-president George W. Bush.
The NATO occupation of
Kosovo was forgiven, as was United States' abrogation of
the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. The NATO expansion
into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was silently accepted, as was the
deployment of American military bases in Central Asia.
What did Putin get in return? Attempts to
further enlarge NATO into Ukraine and Georgia and plans to place elements of
the MDS in Poland and the Czech Republic. When Putin delivered his famous
2007 Munich speech,
many erroneously interpreted it as a call for a new Cold War. In
fact, it was a cry of a man who felt betrayed.
Obviously, President Medvedev isn't going to
repeat the mistakes of his predecessor. Early on in his presidency, he made
it abundantly clear that the vectors of his foreign policy point to Europe and China, not to the United
States. Besides, as I wrote before, Medvedev's position with
respect to a long-term U.S.-Russia cooperation is unknown, and early signs
show little passion for a substantial Washington-Moscow dialogue.
Although Medvedev repeatedly said that he looked
forward to productively working with Obama on a number of issues, it
remains to be seen whether this positive attitude is more than a
clever tactical move. The Obama administration is determined to
improve U.S. relations with both China and Russia's "support group"
in Europe (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain). Russia obviously doesn't
want to miss the boat by staying on the sidelines of the renewed international
conversation.
As a recent meeting between U.S. Secretary
of State, Hillary
Clinton, and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, has
clearly demonstrated, there is one issue that represents the top priority for
Russia: nuclear arms control. I dare to predict that for the coming
months, the renewal of the START treaty will be the only
serious topic the Kremlin is willing to discuss bilaterally with the White
House. The contrast can't be starker between the deal Russia is really
looking for -- with START's legally binding and subject to
verification agreements -- and the amorphous and opaque "grand
bargain" that the Washington neocons may seek
to deprive Russia of.
This is not to say that Medvedev will refuse to
talk about Iran. However, Russia's cooperation on this and other
issues isn't likely to come in a "package"; rather, it
will be arranged as a menu a la carte.
And as anyone familiar with
the retail business knows, dishes a la carte usually come at a higher price.
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