There are other reasons why the issue has become a significant challenge:
- The possibility that US forces might
use the base to attack Iran or gather intelligence on China.
- The lack of the “trickle-down”
benefits that may have been expected.
- Concerns over the initial, possibly
corrupt, agreement with the former President of the Kyrgyz Republic.
- Growing scepticism about the
effectiveness and length of the Afghanistan operation.
- The conviction that Washington regards
the Kyrgyz Republic as a third-rate country to be taken for granted. Media
treatments that assume Bakiyev is Moscow’s puppet will not help this
impression.
CONCLUSION:
To regard Bakiyev’s decision (which may yet be reversed) as something planned
in Moscow is to grossly oversimplify the issue and make the common error of
singling out Moscow as the only party to the decision.
FURTHER READING: John
CK Daly: “The Manas Disillusionment”.
Photo source: www.defendamerica.mil

Note that in the new agreement (http://uk.news.yahoo.com/18/20090623/twl-kyrgyzstan-allows-us-to-keep-using-b-2802f3e.html) Bishkek appears to have got most of what it wanted:
1. A lot more money, not just three times as much for the annual rent but another $100 million for other programs.
2. The promise that the base "will be used for the transport of non-military goods of a commercial nature, including construction materials, medicine, fuel, water and clothing"; in short, nothing to do with Iran or China.
So, Bishkek has effectively negotiated an improvement from its point of view.
Posted by: Patrick Armstrong | June 24, 2009 at 08:01 AM