by Ned Cabaniss
The American and Russian perceptions of events in Georgia are radically divergent. From the American perspective, an aggressive, resurgent Russia aiming to reassert its control over elements of its former empire launched an unprovoked attack into Georgia.
Having defeated the Georgian army, Russia maintained military forces inside Georgia and demonstrated its true intent by recognizing the independence of segments of Georgian territory: South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
From the Russian perspective, Georgia launched an unprovoked attack on the autonomous region of South Ossetia. Georgian troops attacked the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and deliberately targeted civilians.
Russia intervened to prevent further widespread civilian casualties.
Since an earlier peace treaty between Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia had been abrogated by Georgia, and because both Abkhazia and South Ossetia wanted a complete break with Georgia, Russia recognized the independence of both regions.
History lesson
Some history: Abkhazia, Ossetia and Georgia were conquered and incorporated into the Russian empire in the early 19th century.
In 1922, following the Russian revolution, Ossetia was broken into two parts and the southern portion was put under the administrative control of the Georgian Republic (a republic of the newly formed USSR). Abkhazia also was joined with Georgia, but retained a significant degree of autonomy.
Following the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia wanted independence both from Russia and Georgia (although both regions have significant ethnic Georgian minorities that wanted to remain a part of Georgia).
Fighting broke out that lasted for almost a year, at which time an uneasy truce was declared. Russia helped broker a peace treaty and deployed a small contingent of peacekeepers to both regions.
Regions had autonomy
The legal status of both regions was unclear, but both had a large measure of de facto autonomy.
It appears that Georgian troops did attack first, that they did attack civilian targets in Tskhinvali, but the actual number of civilian casualties is unclear.
Following a roughly 16-hour interval, Russian troops intervened. Given that Russian troops had to a) learn of what was happening, b) decide how to respond, c) create a plan, d) round up troops, e) transport those troops from Russia to South Ossetia, the speed with which Russia responded strongly suggests that Russia knew ahead of time what Georgia was planning to do.
The Russian decision to recognize Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence is either a cynical plan to extend Russian influence at the expense of an independent nation (Georgia), or support for the legitimate aspirations of two cohesive ethnic groups with a long history of fighting for their independence (your conclusion will depend on your interpretation of regional history and your estimate of the actual level of indigenous support for separation from Georgia).
The two alternative explanations are not mutually exclusive.
NATO expansion
Whatever the short-term motivation for Russian intervention, there is a larger geopolitical context for interpreting Russian actions. Russians view the continued eastward expansion of NATO with growing alarm. Although we see that expansion as totally benign, Russians see it as a strategic threat. The possibility that NATO might expand to include Georgia and Ukraine, former Soviet republics that directly border Russia itself, is viewed by Russia as a potential strategic catastrophe.
My own guess is that Russia would use force to prevent that from happening. Thus, regardless of other considerations, it’s possible to interpret the Russian incursion into nominally Georgian territory as a pre-emption of Georgian efforts to join NATO. If true, that significantly raises the stakes on Western plans to extend an offer of NATO membership to both nations, a course of action apparently endorsed by both of our current presidential candidates.
Whether one views Russia as a re-emerging expansionist threat or an increasingly self-confident state determined to ensure its strategic security may be irrelevant.
Western interests
In either case, given our current relative weakness in this particular dispute, one might think it prudent to mitigate our rhetoric, delay plans to formally invite either state to join NATO, and explore other less confrontational paths for supporting the continued independence of both states.
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Ned Cabaniss is a retired U.S. Army colonel. For much of his 30-year career, he served as an intelligence officer, specializing in Soviet military and political issues, and is a fluent Russian linguist. He is a member of the Asheville's Citizen-Times editorial advisory board and lives in Fairview, North Carolina.
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