Puppetry, Sham or an Inherently Russian Solution
by SHARON TENNISON
American journalists and pundits are obsessing over Russia's future governance - whether Medvedev will kowtow to Putin's whims, Putin will wrest power again, or Medvedev will challenge Putin and "become his own man." The following is another point of view.
First, this is Russia being scrutinized - not America or western
Europe - an easy point to forget when Americans are analyzing things
Russian. Second, it's helpful to remember that there has been no
experience with democratic governance in Russia over the past
thousand years - and Russians aren't quite ready to make that full
leap just yet. Thirdly, Russians were deeply burned by Yeltsin's and
the Oligarchs' version of democracy in the 1990s - which grew into
gross lawlessness, criminality and social collapse. They are quite
naturally leery of democracy experiments.
The current Putin/Medvedev coupling for governance is a practical
solution for today - for both Russian citizens and their leaders.
It's no accident that a high percentage of the country voted for this
combination.
Unlike the US, appointing leaders is deeply embedded in Russia's
traditions. Even in elementary schools, class leaders haven't emerged
organically. It's the Russian teacher who appoints a class leader,
and their peers have reportedly accepted this method for generations.
From classrooms to hospitals, military, institutes and to politics,
this is how leadership in Russia has evolved. Even today Russian
citizens aren't all that comfortable with the 'rough and tumble' of
electoral competition.
In 2003 I sat in a Moscow hall with 100 successful Russian
entrepreneurs, all CCI alumni from 30 Russian regions. They needed to
pick a leader and board for their new grassroots association. After
much difficulty, they said that they didn't want to choose, but that
they would accept whoever I would choose as their leader. I deferred
saying it was their association, not mine. A leader was reluctantly
arrived at, and it was even more difficult to select board members.
At last the board was selected, but unfortunately those chosen were
the weakest entrepreneurs in the room. Later in private I asked, why
were the weakest chosen? One offered, "Well, maybe so we could
control them," another, "We don't know whether we can trust the
strong ones," another, "Maybe power would corrupt them, if they are
weak it won't matter." In the months ahead, the leader chosen was not
supported, the board members were too inexperienced to lead - and
unfortunately, the first CCI association of entrepreneurs died a
natural death. This process had nothing to do with the native
intelligence or education of the entrepreneurs, or a desire for
autocracy - but everything to do with lifetimes of conditioning from
another perspective.
Puzzling over many similar situations, I have finally begun to accept
that unconscious elements are at work in Russian society which are
based on their long history and conditioning. When it comes to
change of leadership, elections and governance, the following play a
large role: 1) Russians find it quite difficult to promote themselves
and are suspicious when others promote themselves; 2) are overly
concerned what power will do to their peers or unknown contenders; 3)
don't like elevating one peer above another; 4) don't consider it
sport to compete with peers for power; 5) are comfortable when
someone whom they trust appoints others to positions of power; 6) if
someone has already proven themselves in situations of power, they
believe they naturally should continue; and lastly, 7) making changes
in leadership when things are operating well makes no sense to
Russians. It's obvious that all of this is the opposite to western
conditioning - and for Russians it is quite challenging if they are
expected to move quickly into even local selection of leaders.
Appointments or known candidates who will win, to date, are more
natural to Russians than getting into the thick of pre-election
competitions.
While Americans furl their brows and pen endless articles about Putin
appointing Medvedev and Russia's "devolving democracy", it would be
well to acknowledge that 70% and more of Russia's population sees no
reason to change leadership during this election year. They don't
understand why they should take a chance on new stock.... unless it
is someone who the leader himself appoints. Putin has proven himself
to the rank and file Russian. The 'why' is no mystery - Russia has
come out of a bottomless pit of devastation under his eight-year
tenure and he bodes well for their futures.
A high percentage of Russians are comfortable with Putin's
presidential transition strategy - so long as he stays close to
mentor his choice. This insures that the current direction will
continue. Americans can argue that Russia's media control distorts
what Russian citizens think and want from their president - but even
independent entrepreneurs who get their news from Internet, support
the Putin direction. To Russian citizens across most walks of life,
it would be unconscionable for Putin to retire to the ski slopes, now
that he has amassed the skills for handling the country internally
and externally.
Putin's relationship with Medvedev: again, this relationship has to
be viewed from a Russian perspective, not a western one. In Russia,
bonds form early in life: during school years, among those with roots
in the same university, or those who have worked together through
tough times - these roots create deep, life-long bonds. This is an
expected and accepted fact throughout Russia.
Putin and Medvedev have the same roots - they problem-solved,
side-by-side, in Petersburg during Russia's desperate 90s. Putin was
Medvedev's trusted mentor. In Russia this counts big. They are both
devoted to a practical vision and strategy for Russia. Such
relationships in Russia have a quality seldom found in the west.
Competition isn't an issue; deference, trust and respect exists
toward the elder - and trust, promotion and a sense of responsibility
for, is accorded the protege. Neither side will transgress these
bonds.
We in the west are so accustomed to "inevitable" competition between
alpha males and testosterone politics, that we really don't, or
perhaps can't, comprehend this special relatedness that occurs, not
infrequently, across Russia. Conversely, it is also true that outside
these, and other trusted relationships among Russians, a general
distrust of other fellow citizens exists - which mightily complicates
Russia's evolution toward development of real political parties and
electoral politics - but this reality remains to be covered in
another article.
My prediction in 2008 is that Medvedev and Putin will get along
collaboratively, with genuine give and take, with respect and trust -
and four years from now theirs will still be a relatively seamless
connection based on their long-standing friendship and on solving
Russia's pressing internal and external problems. Needless to say,
Medvedev will have no interest in "besting" his mentor and friend.
Since few, if any, western journalists and pundits understand this
type of relationship, they will continue to cobble together
sensational stories and manufacture evidences that there are grave
tensions between these two - which will say more about the west's
mentality than about the Putin/Medvedev relationship.
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