by GORDON HAHN
Outgoing President Vladimir Putin’s decision to become chairman of the United Russia party, in addition to Prime Minister (PM) atop the Russian government, marks another step toward a constitutional shift apparently intended to buttress his power vis-à-vis his handpicked successor, president-elect Dmitrii Medvedev.
Since Medvedev’s election, President Putin has been anything but a lame duck. He has created the foundation of a Kremlin diarchy divided between himself and Medvedev. Simultaneously, he has begun transferring power within Russia’s political system to the premiership, which he will soon occupy. If this attempt is to balance power between the two offices, it remains to be seen whether it can be maintained for the duration of Medvedev’s presidential term, and whether comity between the dyarchs will last. Putin’s moves may be intended to ensure his position in case he and Medvedev begin to view things differently. A falling out cannot be excluded, since their bureaucracies will inevitably battle over turf, resources and ultimately, political supremacy.
Russia’s constitution makes possible the kind of super-presidential power enjoyed by Putin during his presidency, but the constitution is flexible enough to allow various configurations of power within Russia’s political system. This is complicated by Russian political culture’s tendency to vest real power in personalities rather than in institutions. All this suggests the potential for bureaucratic challenges leading to constant institutional reorganization, and in the worst case, the kind of incapacitation that helped destroy the Soviet state in the late 1980s.
Most recently, Putin took over the chairmanship of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, the ‘party of power.’ Previously, the party was managed by Putin through the first deputy head for political affairs, Vladislav Surkov.
Surkov masterminded the transformation of United Russia and the political system into a one-party dominant system along the lines of Japan, Mexico, Taiwan, and South Korea until their respective reforms in the 1990s. It is worth noting that these countries retained good, sometimes extraordinarily close relations with the U.S. In addition, Turkey, which democratized in the 1950s, was still a single-party dominant state when it became a NATO member. States undergoing profound socio-economic and political reorganization often choose single-party dominant systems to achieve stability.
Putin’s takeover of United Russia accomplished several tactical tasks. First, should there be a falling out with the President, Putin would be able to block any effort to remove himself from the premiership (United Russia enjoys a majority of 317 deputies out of the Duma’s 450 deputies).
Second, in the post, Putin will control the party’s personnel appointments and political and legislative activities for the State Duma, and the overwhelming majority of Russia’s regional legislatures. United Russia could draft and ensure the passage of almost all legislation at federal and regional levels. Hence, Putin will have control over personnel policy and lawmaking across the country. On the other hand, President Medvedev could veto federal legislation passed by the Duma; however, United Russia’s extraordinary majority in the Duma could override presidential vetoes.
Third, United Russia’s majority in the Duma is a ‘constitutional majority.’ United Russia is likely to control two-thirds of the Federation Council’s senators, which means that the elements are in place for amending the constitution should it be deemed necessary.
Prior to his United Russia gambit, President Putin engineered a change in his original system of ‘executive vertical’ power by changing the status of regional governors putting them under the control of the PM as well as the President. In addition, the PM controls the system for rating regional governors’ performances. This system will work with the seven Presidential Envoys in the federal districts, which select regional gubernatorial nominees for confirmation. It will allow the PM to control lawmaking in the regions, and it will allow United Russia regional branches to reject gubernatorial nominees if Medvedev holds converse preferences.
In such case, Medvedev could use presidential power to establish his own patronage clans. The Russian president can, according to law, dissolve and call new elections to a regional parliament if it rejects his nominee for regional governors thrice. Since Putin and Medvedev will consult closely on these issues, such cases will be rare initially, but could threaten to snowball later if their opposing bureaucracies do battle over major issues.
It is possible that Medvedev’s other lever for managing the regions, the seven Presidential Envoys, could be transferred to the control of the PM. With this, Putin could amend the present legislation on gubernatorial selection such that candidates are elected by and from the regional parliament without presidential nomination. If so, this would signal Putin’s desire to wrest this key political function from Medvedev’s purview.
As chairman of the Russian government, Putin will control a vast hierarchical ‘vertical of power’ from the White House down through regional offices of the federal ministries to the city and district administrations. The government can both introduce federal legislation and control implementation. With additional levers of power available to the PM for controlling the federal legislature and the regions through United Russia, the balance of power within Russia’s political system appears to have shifted in favor of the incoming Premier, if not the premiership. United Russia’s control of the federal and local parliaments gives him considerable control over personnel and legislative policy.
Medvedev’s trump card is control over the ‘power ministries’ – the security, military, police, prosecutor’s, and justice system’s bureaucracies and armed services – or so-called ‘siloviki’.
Here the current arrangements reveal a glaring self-contradiction. Putin, the former silovik (as a former KGB officer and FSB chief), is running Russia’s civilian governmental bureaucracy and a political party, while President Medvedev, the civilian professor’s son, has constitutional authority over the siloviki power players. How this will play out is anyone’s guess.
Dr. Gordon M. Hahn - Senior Researcher, Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program and Adjunct Professor, Graduate School of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California and Senior Researcher, Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), Akribis Group. Dr Hahn is author of Russia’s Islamic Threat (Yale University Press, 2007) and Russia’s Revolution From Above (Transaction, 2002).
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