Russia: Other Points of View

THE RESURRECTION OF THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE RISE OF RUSSIA'S PROTEST MOVEMENT

COMMENTARY

By Gordon M. Hahn

Historically, the intelligentsia has held a special place in society, that of bearing the national conscience and democratic ideals.  Both in Russia and elsewhere, the rise of civil society and a protest movement usually is sparked, or at least prefaced, by the rise of a protest sensibility among its intelligentsia.  Of course, not all leaders of the intelligentsia have been, or are today, pro-democratic or pro-Western.  The great writer Fyodor Dostoyevskii, for instance, was a 19^th century Russian traditionalist.

Traditionally, the Russian intelligentsia has been defined as a politically active class of intellectuals, often liberal and opposed to Russia’s typically authoritarian order; the conscience of the nation and general population which is limited in its ability to express its aspirations and push the regime.  It usually includes those who use their minds rather than their hands, for their livelihoods––in particular writers and poets, literary critics, philosophers, musicians, actors, and journalists among others.

As early in the post-Soviet era as the mid-1990s, there was much lamenting about the death of the Russian intelligentsia, and this has continued into the 2010s.  Recently, Ivan Sterligov noted the intelligentsia’s “impotence and volutary capitulation to the Putin regime” (Ivan Sterligov, “Megascience, Megagrants, and Microsuccess,” Nauka i Tekhnologii Rossii, www.strf.ru, 29 December 2011.)

ISLAM, ISLAMISM AND POLITICS IN EURASIA REPORT NO.50, 25 JANUARY 2012

by Gordon M. Hahn

CONTENTS

RUSSIA

• ТРИУМФ ИМАРАТА КАВКАЗ: Имарат Кавказ как Уникальная Фундаменталистская Модель - Автор - ИСЛАМ ТЕКУШЕВ (in Russian, English translation forthcoming)

• MORE VIDEOS FROM DAGESTAN VILAIYAT AMIRS AND QADIS

• CE-AFFILIATED REPORTS NUMBER OF JIHADI ATTACKS AND CASUALTIES IN THE FIRST ELEVEN MONTHS (JANUARY THROUGH NOVEMBER 27^TH) OF 2011 

CENTRAL ASIA

•  ISLAMIC BRIGADE ‘JUNDALLAH AL-KHALIFAT’ CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR KAZAKHSTAN ATTACKS

IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted.  Research assistance is provided by Yelena Altman, Sara Amstutz, Mark Archibald, Michelle Enriquez, Seth Gray, John Andrew Jones, Casey Mahoney, Anna Nevo, Daniel Painter, and Elizabeth Wolcott.  IIPER accepts outside submissions.

To access the full report, click here  Download Hahn_IIPER50

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Putin platform. An article in Izvestiya lays out the outlines of Putin’s election platform. And perhaps we have a clue as to why he thinks he must return as President. It’s one of the most concise statements of his desire for gradual reform he has ever given us. “A recurring problem in Russian history has been the elites’ desire to achieve sudden change, a revolution rather than sustained development. Meanwhile, both Russian and global experience demonstrates how harmful these sudden historical jolts can be… This is balanced by a different trend, a diametrically opposed challenge – in the form of a certain inclination to inertia, dependency, the elites’ uncompetitiveness and high levels of corruption.” Perhaps he feels that only he has the political muscle to steer between these twin shoals. He reiterated the long list of achievements since 2000 when many “foresaw one future for Russia: bankruptcy and breakup.” In short, vote for me, you know what I’m doing, you’ve seen what I’ve done. He promises more such pieces. I was also interested to see what I believe to be his first public reference to Khattab – a figure not as well known in the West as he should be.

ALEXANDER LITVINENKO: THE WHO-DONE-IT-FRAUD -- WAS HE REALLY MURDERED?

by William Dunkerley

The ubiquitous "who murdered Alexander Litvinenko" news story has turned out to be a fraud.

In late 2006, world media outlets were reporting that the former KGB spy was murdered on orders of Vladimir Putin. It was one of the biggest, most sensational news stories of the time. Now a new video turns that account upside down.

The video shows that Litvinenko wasn't a spy, he never worked for the KGB, and the claim that Vladimir Putin ordered the murder is not fact-based. It was merely an allegation made by an arch-enemy of Putin's. What's more, the London coroner hasn't ever concluded that Litvinenko was even murdered. 

The widely-disseminated news stories about Litvinenko don't match the facts. The stories appear to have been fabricated.

The Who-Done-It Fraud video is the first in a series of supplements to my recent book entitled The Phony Litvinenko Murder. The book examines the media coverage of the purported poisoning of Litvinenko by radioactive polonium.

GLASNOST’ 2.0, PERESTROIKA 2.0, AND THE NASCENT WHITE REVOLUTION

COMMENTARY

by Gordon M. Hahn

 

In the mid-1980s, the USSR’s last General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev instituted a policy of glasnost or openness in the Soviet media that allowed discussion of previously taboo topics.  Gorbachev gradually expanded that policy and others took the ball and ran with it leading to the establishment of the first independent media during Gorbachev’s last years in power.  Official glasnost in state media, in addition to the emergence of unofficial glasnost in independent media, helped to mobilize opposition and provoke splits within the Soviet regime which ultimately destroyed the regime and state.

During the tenure of Dmitrii Medvedev’s presidency, accompanying thaw or liberalization policies (Perestroika 2.0), a somewhat similar glasnost has taken shape in the media.  Medvedev signaled Glasnost 2.0 when he met with democratic opposition newspaper Novaya Gazeta’s editor-in-chief Dmitrii Muratov and leading backer Mikhail Gorbachev months after his inauguration.  Year 2011 was the peak year for Glasnost 2.0 so far, despite the fact that it was pivotal one for both the Duma elections of this year and the presidential elections of the coming year.  The expectation induced by the U.S. mainstream media was that Putin would limit media freedoms more, not less, during such a period.  He didn’t.

 

ISLAM, ISLAMISM AND POLITICS IN EURASIA REPORT NO.49, 30 DECEMBER 2011

by Gordon M. Hahn

CONTENTS

RUSSIA

• ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF JIHADI ATTACKS, JIHADI-RELATED INCIDENTS, AND ATTENDANT CASUALTIES IN THE FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF 2011
• CE GALGAICHE VILAIYAT QADI ABU DUDZHAN POSTS SECOND VIDEO IN SEVERAL MONTHS
• 2011: YEAR OF GROWING TENSIONS AND DIVISIONS WITHIN AND AROUND RUSSIA’S OFFICIAL ISLAMIC CLERGY
• DAGESTAN VILAIYAT’S OFFICIAL WEBSITE PUBLISHES TRANSLATION OF BIN LADEN’S LETTER PRAISING KHATTAB

CENTRAL ASIA

•  IJU VIDEO APPEAL FROM KAZAKHSTANI MUJAHEDIN IN WAZIRISTAN

IIPER is written and edited by Dr. Gordon M. Hahn unless otherwise noted.  Research assistance is provided by Yelena Altman, Sara Amstutz, Mark Archibald, Michelle Enriquez, Seth Gray, John Andrew Jones, Casey Mahoney, Anna Nevo, Daniel Painter, and Elizabeth Wolcott.  IIPER accepts outside submissions.

To access the full report, click here  Download Hahn_IIPER49

EMERGING MARKET FUND FLOWS: RISING OIL PRICE MAY AGAIN BOOST RUSSIA FLOWS

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

by Chris Weafer

Reticent optimism. Investors started the New Year with a net aggregate investment of $465 mln into emerging market (EM) funds in the week ended Wednesday according to data collected by EPFR Global. That is up from the net redemption of $309 mln during the last week of 2011 and ends a six straight week of losses during which investors withdrew $11.2 bln from EM funds. The weekly flow, although positive, is a lot less than the $3.4 bln invested into EM funds during the first week of 2011. Investors are hopeful that the current low valuation base across EM equities provides a good basis for performance this year but clearly remain wary of the threat to global growth posed by the unresolved euro zone debt crisis.
 
EMEA funds again worst hit. That caution is also reflected in the fact that all of the new money invested into the asset class last week went into the relative safety of EM Balanced Funds while all country specific funds reported continuing net redemptions. EM Balanced funds attracted $841 mln, or 0.25% of AUM in that category) while Asia country funds lost $703 mln (-0.06% of AUM), LatAm funds shrunk by $176 mln (-0.17% of AUM) and EMEA funds lost $188 mln (-0.48% of AUM) and

MULTI-CONFESSIONAL EDUCATION IN HYBRID-REGIME RUSSIA

COMMENTARY

by Gordon Hahn

The cacophony of condemnation that comprises U.S. mainstream media’s coverage of Russian society and politics does not reflect the ambiguous nature of Russia’s relatively soft authoritarian form of rule.  Sometimes referred to as ‘hybrid’ regimes, Russia’s and tens of other regimes around the world combine some aspects or degree of democracy and authoritarianism.  The regime in Vladimir Putin's Russia is such a hybrid regime, though one that is predominantly a soft, albeit, authoritarianism. 

Given the hybrid nature of Russia’s regime, an objective media, it would be expected, should offer readers, viewers, and listeners a balanced picture that only slightly highlights the authoritarian over the democratic in Russian politics.  Since the U.S. mainstream media choose to highlight only the negative, authoritarian aspect of Russia, it falls to others to raise some of its democratic or at least less authoritiarian qualities.

PERESTROIKA 2.0 CONTINUES: RUSSIA’S DECEMBER THAW AND THE RETURN OF POLITICS

COMMENTARY

by Gordon M. Hahn

December was especially warm in Moscow this year.  No, I am not talking about the weather but oddly enough about Perestroika 2.0 and the politics of the tandem’s ongoing thaw or liberalization.  Due to their failure to eliminate unfairness, administrative resources and cheating from the Duma elections’ registration, campaign, and voting processes, mass demonstrations followed the vote, forcing the tandem of President Dmitrii Medvedev and Prime Minister, former president Vladimir Putin to accelerate the thaw.

The U.S. mass media and most analysts would have led you to expect a bloody crackdown and trials and executions by commissar-chaired tribunals in reaction to such demonstrations.  Instead, the Kremlin took the exact opposite tack, by strengthening the Perestroika 2.0’s liberalization policies and trying to meet the spirit if not the letter of the demands coming from the ‘white,’ ‘white ribbon,’ or ‘snow’ revolution and an increasingly disgruntled young and not so upwardly mobile Russian middle class, about which we have also written.

Just as during Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika 1.0, public opposition is forcing the regime to make concessions and reconfigure the political system, so too has the tandem’s previously slow and gradual Perestroika 2.0 provided space for mobilization and rising expectations for change.  Although the regime has not quite yet met the rising white revolution halfway, it has taken steps to address the opposition’s complaints about the closed, soft authoritarian nature of Russia’s managed ‘democracy’ and the cheating and falsification that occurred on December 4^th during the Duma election voting and counting processes. 

EQUITY FUND FLOWS: EM PORTFOLIO ALLOCATIONS TO RUSSIA TURN NET POSITIVE

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

By Chris Weafer

Investors remain wary of EM risk. Investors cut exposure to emerging market equity funds again last week, extending the run of redemptions to a sixth straight week. Even though economic indicators in the US and elsewhere have generally been positive in recent months, investors clearly fear that the euro zone debt crisis may escalate and affect all major global economies. But the net total taken out last week was only $308 mln and that was a big improvement on the $4.3 bln redeemed the previous week.
 
Portfolio managers reversed a long negative trend. Investors in Russia dedicated funds also reduced exposure for a sixth straight week, withdrawing $109 mln compared to $139 mln the week earlier. But an encouraging sign is the fact that portfolio managers in the big EM regional and thematic funds allocated new money to Russia last week for the first time in eight weeks. The allocation was small at $18 mln but compares with a net withdrawal of $274 mln the week earlier. Portfolio manager allocations have always been a leading indicator of fund investor activity in subsequent weeks.
 
EM investors moved to safety of Balanced funds. According to the EPFR Global report, for the week ended Wednesday, traditionally one of the quietest of the year, investors allocated new money to EM Balanced funds ($759 mln, or 0.25% of AUM) in a move to safety away from country specific bets. Asian regional funds lost $703 mln (-0.36% of AUM), LatAm funds lost $176 mln (-0.4% of AUM) and EMEA lost $188 mln or 0.6% of AUM. All major country funds reported net redemptions equal to approximately 1.0% of AUM.
 
Russia attracted over $4.4 bln in early 2011. For the year (see graphs on next page), Russia country funds were significantly less affected by investor redemptions than their major EM peers. India country funds lost $3.8 bln in redemptions through 2011, China funds lost $3.2 bln and Brazil country funds lost $2.2 bln. In contrast, Russia country funds only lost $166 mln for the full year, mainly because these funds attracted over $4.4 bln in the first four months of 2011 while peer group funds have seen a steady flow of redemptions all year.

To access the full report, click here  Download WeeklyEquity_Fund_Flows_Dec_29

A COMMENT ON RUSSIAN PROTESTS

REPRINTS 

by Nick Petro

www.opendemocracy.net

The Putin regime has little to fear from the latest public protests which, despite drawing large crowds, are apolitical. True politics will only become possible in Russia when both the opposition and the regime focus on the tedious work of practical politics, says Nicolai N. Petro in his highly-personalized view of recent events. 

To continue reading, please click here  http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/nicolai-n-petro/russia%E2%80%99s-smouldering-white-revolution

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Medvedev speech. He gave his annual speech to parliament last week. As is customary he started with achievements. Quite a list in fact: improvements in the economy overall, in the demographic situation, poverty reduction, military improvement. All true enough, albeit presented as positively as possible. But, in the present situation, his proposals for political reform are the most interesting. And, given the continuing existence of The Team, we may assume that these have Putin’s approval and will become law. The principal ones – and, he said, more will be coming – are the return to direct election of regional heads, the creation of a proportional voting system for districts (sounds like a return to the previous system of half individual representative and half party vote) and the reduction of the numbers of signatures required to register a party or presidential candidate. Instructions were given to the government and a bill on the last was sent to the Duma. The condition for candidates and parties to produce millions of signatures was inherently bogus and brittle. Specialists in collecting or producing the signatures appeared: the results were suspect and the authorities could always find enough fraudulent signatures to disqualify whom they wanted. So a reduction in the number required will be an improvement but better still would be to allow all registered parties to nominate a presidential candidate. Will the easier registration requirements apply in the presidential election? Not clear although one of his advisors is quoted as saying they will. If so, there could be a multitude of candidates competing for the “liberal” vote. This will have the benefit of demonstrating to Western observers infatuated with the parade of “liberals” that few of them have either support or programs.

Other changes. Putin has ordered web cameras be established at all polling stations immediately and transparent ballot boxes will be bought and provided.

RUSSIA WEEK: NEW GAME - NEW RULES

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

by Chris Weafer

"The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of blessings;

the inherent virtue of socialism is the equal sharing of miseries"

 Winston Churchill 

There are three events in the diary for this week that have significance for Russia’s markets as we head into 2012. The first of those is the migration of the RTS cash equity business to MICEX today. The second is the first session of the new, and likely more demanding, Duma on Wednesday. The third is the next mass protest planned for central Moscow on Saturday. All have potential implications for government policy, foreign investor activity in, and perception of, Russia assets and for some specific stocks and themes. 

These events come after a generally good news week for the investment story in Russia, which, because of the dominance of external drivers and political risk dominating the headline in international media, had less of a market impact than they deserved. Russia’s WTO membership application was approved after almost eighteen years of negotiations; PM Putin made a few, but significant concessions during his televised Q&A session; macro data confirmed a steadily improving growth trend in the economy and national balance sheet that is already one of the best in the world. The decision taken by OPEC ministers also creates a better basis for assuming an average oil price of between $100 - $110 p/bbl for 2012, albeit we may still see Q1 weakness before Mid East regional risks rise again in Q2.

As western markets now head into the usually quiet Christmas and New Year holiday, there should soon be less external impact on the domestic market and the domestic news headlines will be more of a dominant driver. But, before we get to that period, there is the potential for a few more external bumps as, e.g.  the war of words continues over the rating agencies review of European sovereign ratings debt ratings and we get the usual end-year populist statements from political leaders across the region. Euro area Finance Ministers will hold a conference call later today to try and advance the rescue talks. The death of North Korea's leader also adds an additional element of uncertainty into already nervous markets. Asia's bourses are lower across the board at mid-session today as investors again prefer the dollar as the haven asset. One month Brent is at $102.69 p/bbl, copper is off 0.9%, gold is dowb 0.3% at $1,597.6 per ounce, silver is off 2.1% and the dollar-euro rate is at $1.3015.

To access the full report, click here  Download Russia_Week_Dec_19

ISLAM, ISLAMISM AND POLITICS IN EURASIA REPORT NO.48, 12 DECEMBER 2011

by Gordon M. Hahn

CONTENTS

RUSSIA

• CE AMIR UMAROV ISSUES WARNING TO TURKEY’S GOVERNMENT AS CHECHENS CONTINUE TO SETTLE SCORES ABROAD
• ‘KHAMZAT’ ASLAN BUTYUKAEV – CE AMIR UMAROV’S NAIB?
• THE DECLINE AND DECIMATION OF THE INGUSHETIYA MUJAHEDIN’S ‘GALGAICHE VILAIYAT’
• CE DAGESTAN VILAIYAT’S KIZLYAR JAMAAT (NORTHERN SECTOR) AMIR MAJDA CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR KILLING OF INFORMER
• CE DV KIZLYAR JAMAAT QADI USAMA ISSUES VIDEO STATEMENTS
• RARE JIHADI-SILOVIKI SHOOTOUT IN KARACHAEVO-CHERKESSIYA
• PRE-OPERATION VIDEO OF AUGUST 2010 TSENTAROI ATTACKERS
• ALLEGED HIZB UT-TAHRIR ISLAMI OPERATIVES ARRESTED IN DAVLEKANOVO, BASHKORTOSTAN

 CENTRAL ASIA by Yelena Altman and Gordon M. Hahn

 

• JIHAD COMES IN FORCE TO KAZAKHSTAN
• SIXTEEN MEN JAILED IN UZBEKISTAN FOR MEMBERSHIP IN TERRORIST GROUP
• RAIL-LINE BLAST ON UZBEKISATN SIDE OF UZBEK-AFGHAN BORDER
• 28 JAILED FOR TERRORIST GROUP INVOVLEMENT IN TAJIKISTAN
• AUGUST 2010 TAJIKISTAN JAILBREAK FUGITIVE CAPTURED
• THREE CONVICTED FOR IMU MEMBERSHIP IN TAJIKISTAN
• UZBEK LEADERS SENTENCED TO PRISON IN KYRGYZSTAN
• A VIDEO OF ANDIJAN EXPLOSION POSTED

To access the full report, click here  Download Hahn_IIPER48

1991 and 2011: THE SECOND RUSSIAN REVOLUTION'S SECOND WAVE BEGINS

COMMENTARY

By Gordon M. Hahn

Russia's modern revolution appears to be at the start of its second wave.  I have been writing for many years now about the possibility of a second revolutionary or transformational wave, the recent thaw or liberalization ongoing in Russia, and the arrival of 'Perestroika 2.0' cautiously carried out under Dmitrii Medvedev's presidency under the watchful eye of Prime Minister and former president Vladimir Putin (Gordon M. Hahn, “Putin’s Stealth Authoritarianism and Russia’s Next Revolutionary Wave”, RFE/RL, Regional Analysis, 15 April 2004, Volume 4, Number 14; 22 April 2004, Volume 4, Number 15; 15 April 2004, Volume 4, Number 16, and Gordon M. Hahn, “Is Russia’s Next Revolutionary Wave Coming?” Untimely Thoughts.com, 2 February 2005; http://groups.yahoo.com/group/tatar-l/message/6818 and Johnson’s Russia List, #9047, 3 February 2005). 

As I noted in September, “public frustrations with the present system are high and perhaps growing.” “Moreover, given the declining poll numbers of Medvedev, Putin, and United Russia, the likelihood grows that in those elections the leadership will be forced to maximize the use of administrative resources and other methods of cheating in order to win.  Any bold tilting of the electoral playing field risks provoking the growing segment of disatisfied citizens.  Frustrations could peak after a series of fraudulent elections, as occurred in the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, which are so feared by the Russian leadership.  One such election already occurred recently in the effort to push St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matvienko on a city district in a by-election in order to promote her to the post of Federation Council Chairwoman” (Gordon M. Hahn, “Is the Tandem Running Out of Time? Russia - Towards Another Revolutionary Moment,” Russia - Other Points of View, 12 September 2011).

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Demonstrations. On Sunday there was a small (~500) nationalist demo, Monday saw 5-6K turn out for the authorities but the big one was Saturday’s. I am going with Alexandre Latsa’s estimates – he was there, took pictures and made a methodical estimate. He tells me he estimates about 25-30K at the maximum with many coming and going for a total over the day of maybe 50K. There were demonstrations around the country, so about 75K would be a decent estimate across Russia. Who were they? The photos show the usual oppositionists – disgruntled ex-officials, nationalists, Communists and so on – but also a lot of young middle class people who, presumably, hadn’t protested before. Latsa estimates that perhaps two-thirds were these young middle class people. For lack of a better term I will call these NYP – new young people. What generalisations can be made about them? They came to maturity in the Putin Age, have only childhood memories of the worst of the 1990s and none from the Communist period. They are, so to speak, Putin’s “children”. (Putin agrees). But children grow up and become independent. I suspect that they do not much fear change (I think many older Russians do). They are not especially representative of the population but every Russian city will have some. They are computer-savvy and linked together by the New Media: I doubt they pay much attention to TV newscasts. What were they protesting? Vote-fixing to be sure but they don’t look particularly angry in the photos. I am coming to believe that they were protesting not so much against counterfeit elections as against counterfeit politics: a protest against the Establishment; an Establishment that includes Zyuganov, Zhirinovskiy and the rest: beneficiaries of the stagnant political structure for two decades. They were saying you can’t ignore us any longer! This makes me more convinced that Putin’s decision to return was a bad one especially in the way it was done: a back-room agreement with Medvedev, announcement and servile approval from United Russia. I do not believe that the NYP have any interest in the familiar oppositionists, most of whom they would regard as tainted and – most tellingly – obsolete. I doubt that they have “leaders” (facilitators like Navalniy perhaps. By the way, there’s more to be known about him than The New Yorker tells). I believe that something new has been born but I don’t think that the NYPs or anyone else has any idea of what. I think “Putin’s Children: Flying the Nest” puts it well. It is worth noting, however, that it’s not that clear-cut – many of the people at Monday’s demo look like NYPs too.

DRIFTING INTO THE HOLIDAYS

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

by Chris Weafer

Today: Asia’s markets are trading a little lower this morning, reflecting the weaker close in the US as investors in that market reacted to weaker than hoped for retail sales and the US Fed’s FOMC meeting added nothing new after its monthly meeting. The S&P 500 closed yesterday down 0.9% while the index was up 0.25% when Moscow closed. The key drivers in all global markets remain euro zone debt and the threat of a sovereign debt ratings downgrade across the region. For Russia investors the OPEC minister’s meeting may affect where oil trades later today. Brent is currently at $109.2 p/bbl. Copper is down 0.7%, after falling 0.4% yesterday. Gold is at $1,642.6 per ounce, off 1.2% this morning, and the dollar-euro rate is at $1.303.
 
PM Question Time tomorrow: Prime Minister Putin will host his annual live Q&A session tomorrow and that will provide him with the opportunity to give his thoughts on last week’s protests and to respond to the reasons that led to the event. Also tomorrow the WTO Council will consider Russia’s application for membership of the global trade body.

THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS AS ADMINISTRATIVE RESOURCE IN RUSSIA'S ELECTIONS

COMMENTARY

by Gordon M. Hahn

My previous article for ROPV (“The Thaw at the Polls: Tandem's Liberalization Policy Rocks the Vote”) indicated that the recent Duma election was freer and fairer than previous Putin-era elections, and the loss of some 77 seats (16 percent of the total) by the United Russia (YeR) party of President Dmitrii Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin testifies to this.  I also emphasized the likelihood that the voting process and vote counting appeared to be cleaner, while the pre-election campaign remains the locus of continuing unfairness, including the use of administrative resources such as keeping certain candidates or parties off the ballot and thus tilting the playing field in the favor of Kremlin candidates like those from the YeR.  One of several arguments I offered was the correspondence between exit and pre-election opinion polls, on the one hand, and the official final election results, on the other hand.  Afterward, it occurred to me that that there may have been a similar correspondence in previous elections, so I decided to dig back into the archives and check polling and voting patterns.  Here is what I found.

To access the full article, click here  Download GH__RusElections

THE THAW AT THE POLLS: TANDEM'S LIBERALIZATION POLICY ROCKS THE VOTE

COMMENTARY

by Gordon M. Hahn

Sunday’s election to the State Duma, Russia’s lower house, was stunning.  As I expected, it registered a sharp decline in support for the pro-Kremlin United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya or YeR) led by President Dmitrii Medvedev and Prime Minister and Vladimir Putin, showed a significantly freer and fairer voting and counting process, but a continuing uneven playing field during the pre-election campaign favoring the United Russia (YeR).  Voters delivered a strong message of rebuke to the YeR for ongoing corruption, limited economic opportunity, and bureaucratic arbitrariness.  Perhaps more important though, the results appear to show that the level of fraud was much more limited than in past elections and cut across party lines, benefiting all parties more or less equally and thus not affording the YeR any significant advantage.  Less fraud and equal opportunity fraud helped shape the sharp decline in YeR support.

As usual, the Washington Post and New York Times produced knee-jerk, ready-made responses to the vote that reflected neither of the vote’s two main outcomes.  A Post editorial characterized the vote as nothing but a “farce” and focused on several of the most arbitrary administrative measures (“The Farce of Russia’s Elections,” Washington Post, 5 December 2011).  The NYT simply reported the OSCE’s assessment that there was an uneven playing field and significant voting irregularies, but it left out the first sentence and almost all the positive OSCE remarks in the following excerpt from the OSCE’s initial report: “The observers also noted that the legal framework had been improved in some respects and televised debates for all parties provided one level platform for contestants.  On election day, voting was well organized overall, but the quality of the process deteriorated considerably during the count, which was characterized by frequent procedural violations and instances of apparent manipulations, including serious indications of ballot box stuffing.  

To access the full article, please click here  Download GH__Thaw at Polls

RUSSIAN FEDERATION SITREP

by Patrick Armstrong

Election results. The almost final results give a Duma with 238 seats for United Russia (down 77); 92 Communists (up 35); 64 Just Russia (up 26) and 56 Zhirinovskiy’s party (up 16). (Interactive map by regions). United Russia will dominate, but no longer be able to bully. Which is a step in the right direction.

Election fraud. There is a lot from the usual media outlets about widespread, even game-changing, fakery. I would suggest that those who believe this reflect on what might be termed the Prime Law of Election Fixing: Don’t fix it so that your party loses votes and seats. Especially when they have been saying that every previous Russian election was fraudulent. This should be obvious to anyone. Secondly the results accord well (as previous elections have) with opinion polling (indeed United Russia did a bit worse). This piece shows that the results are consistent with numerous polls (here’s a reasonably perceptive forecast from two months earlier and another, based on polls, from the day before). To persist in assertions of game-changing fraud in the face of these facts is just ridiculous. By the way, if you go by the English-speaking media you would think that foreign observers thought the elections were frightful: not so, here are a number of foreign observers saying that they were good enough. The OSCE report does not suggest big-scale fixing either; indeed it reads like other OSCE reports: administrative resources, lack of competition, some bad behaviour.